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This thesis investigates the challenges facing local government in South Africa by developing 
a means of exploring to what extent the problems of providing basic services currently 
experienced by municipalities are influenced by the political, administrative and financial 
configuration of the decentralized system of governance.   
 
It is argued here that the design of the intergovernmental governance system does not 
promote the constitutional objectives of decentralisation.  The current system of governance 
does not empower local government to become more distinctive and autonomous.  The 
problem in many cases is not what to decentralize or whether a basic service should be 
provided by national, provincial or local government, but rather how to align shared rule or 
concurrency of the particular service with the various levels of government.   
 
One of the key questions posed in this thesis is to what extent the system of decentralized 
governance in South Africa enables or hinders municipalities‟ abilities to provide basic 
services in an autonomous and sustainable manner.  It focuses particularly on their authority 
to make and implement autonomous political, administrative and financial decisions 
pertaining to the provision of basic services. 
 
While this study cannot conclusively report on the impact of decentralisation on basic service 
delivery in South Africa, it does identify some of the systemic and structural aspects that 
impact on the manner or way in which local municipalities provide basic services. It raises 
concerns that the basic service delivery obligations of local municipalities are strenuous and 
financially challenging, and will continue to be as long as local municipalities rely on or are 
controlled by other spheres of government in meeting their constitutional mandate, especially 
with regard to the intergovernmental transfers of fiscal resources.  
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The introduction of a constitutional democracy in 1996 inaugurated a decentralised system of 
governance in South Africa.  The system of local government is brought into the spotlight as 
the Constitution of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996) calls upon local government to take 
responsibility for addressing years of service delivery backlogs created by apartheid. The 
legislative obligations of local government are rigorous: it must be effective, efficient and 
responsive in carrying out its constitutionally mandated functions. It must organise its 
administration to manage, plan and finance its undertakings.  Local government has to 
provide democratic and accountable government for local communities; to ensure the 
provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner; to promote social and 
economic development; to promote a safe and healthy environment; and to encourage the 
involvement of communities and community organisations in matters of local government.
1
   
 
This constitutional mandate is no easy feat for a newly established autonomous sphere of 
government which has been assigned a heavy legislative burden.  Besides the above, local 
government is responsible for the provision of a wide range of services such as water supply; 
sewage collection and disposal; refuse removal; electricity and gas supply; municipal health 
services; municipal roads and storm water drainage; street lighting; and municipal parks and 
recreation.
2
   The Constitution requires that local government must be an autonomous and 
financially self-sufficient sphere of government, which is also responsible for creating its 
own economic development path.  This thesis will show that the constitutional obligations are 
posing a number of challenges to local government, especially with regard to delivering basic 
services such as water, sanitation and electricity. 
 
The national government is proud to announce that access to potable water has improved 
from 62% of the population in 1996 to 91.8% in 2009; basic sanitation from 52% to 77%; and 
                                        
1 Section 152(1) of the Constitution of South Africa. (Act 108 of 1996).   
2 Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution of South Africa. (Act 108 of 1996). 
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basic electricity from 58% to 73% – mostly in what were previously referred to as township 
areas.
3
  Since 2004, despite the impressive progress towards the eradication of service 
delivery backlogs, South Africa has experienced numerous protests and demonstrations 
across a number of municipalities.
4
 Charles Nqakula (then Minister of Safety and Security), 





Residents across South Africa are demanding better quality services from their local 
authorities.  For example, 3000 residents of Diepsloot (Gauteng province) took to the streets 
demanding basic services.  In Durban (KwaZulu-Natal province), 5000 people from informal 
settlements marched through the city centre demanding houses and services.  In Mitchells 
Plain (Western Cape province) barricades were erected and tyres were burned, excrement and 
rubbish were dumped onto the streets.  In a protest in Harrismith (Free State province) a boy 
was killed during a brawl with police.  A typhoid outbreak in Delmas (Mphumalanga, North 
West provinces) led to protesters demanding the resignation of the municipal manager.  Port 
Elizabeth (Eastern Cape province) suffered weeks of protest by thousands of people from 
informal settlements.  Angry residents complained about dirty water, frequent electricity 
outages, faulty street lights and overflowing sanitation infrastructure.
6
   
 
Media reports, departmental reports and independent research organisations have revealed 
that many municipalities are finding it difficult to meet their service delivery obligations.
7
 
The Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs identified a number of 
                                        
3
Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs.  (2009).  State of Local 
Government in South Africa.  Page 32.   
4See Buhlungu, S., Daniel, J., Southall, R. and Lutchmann, J. (Eds.). (2007). State of the 
Nation:  South Africa 2007.  Pp.54-65.   Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council 
Publishers.  And Langer, M.  Government Probes Causes of Service delivery Protests.  In 
Mail and Guardian.  24 July 2009.  And  Tau, P and Maphumulo, S.  More Service Protests 
on the Cards in The Star.  24 July 2008. 
5 Buhlungu, S., Daniel, J., Southall, R. and Lutchmann, J. (Eds.). (2007). State of the Nation:  
South Africa 2007.   Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council Publishers. Page 58. 
6
 Buhlungu, S., Daniel, J., Southall, R. and Lutchmann, J. (Eds.). (2007). State of the Nation:  
South Africa 2007.  Pp. 54-58. Pretoria: Human Sciences Research Council Publishers. 
7
SACities Network.  (2007).  State of Cities Finance Report. And Department of Cooperative 
Governance and Traditional Affairs.  (2009).  State of Local Government in South Africa.  
And National Treasury (2009)  Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Review 
2003/04-2009/10.  And Financial and Fiscal Commission.  (2009). Annual Submission for 
the Division of Revenue.  And  Ndaba, D. (2009).   Minister Sexwale Maps Out A 'Beyond 
Housing' Vision.  In Engineering News.  24 July 2009. 
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persistent local political, administrative and financial problems that impact on municipalities‟ 
ability to deliver sustainable basic services.
8
  Problems such as: inadequate interaction 
between local councillors and local communities; eradicating the remaining service delivery 




Many municipalities are experiencing serious financial stress brought on by problems such as 
the non-payment of services leading to municipal debt. The National Treasury stated that 
municipalities lack proper credit control and debt collection methods, resulting in municipal 
debt increasing rapidly. By the end of 2007, the national municipal debt was around R32 
billion, a figure which is estimated to be growing at R3.2 billion a year.
10
 The Auditor-
General noted that municipalities were inept at financial management, and stated that only 
197 (of a total of 283) municipalities submitted financial statements in 2009, of which only 
19% received clean audit reports.
11
   
 
Rationale for the Study  
 
Local government service delivery problems have become evident since 2000.  My own 
previous research findings highlighted eminent problems of sustainable service delivery.  For 
example, in 2005, I undertook extensive fieldwork in Pietermaritzburg (KwaZulu-Natal) 
which is located in the Msunduzi Municipality (classified as a Category B municipality).
12
  A 
survey of 500 households was carried out in five geographical areas, each representing 
different socio-economic demographics.
13
  The initial interest was to investigate the „culture 
of non-payment‟, a catchphrase which was popular during the liberation struggle when the 
                                        
8
 Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs.  (2009).  State of Local 
Government in South Africa.  Page 4. 
9
 Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs.  (2009).  State of Local 
Government in South Africa.  Page 4. 
10
 These are the most up-to-date official figures presented by the National Treasury in the 
Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Review 2003/04-2009/10. 
11
 Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs.  (2009).  State of Local 
Government in South Africa.  Page 166. 
12
 Stanton, A.  (2006).  Survey on Access to Basic Services in the Msunduzi Municipality.  
Unpublished Report. 
13 Sobantu (low-income African township area bordering the Central Business District);  
Imbali (low income African township area further away from the Central Business District);  
Oribi (low-income multi-racial area,  bordering industrial areas);  Northdale (middle-income 
Indian area bordering industrial areas);  Oak Park (upmarket White residential area). 
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African National Congress (ANC) made a nationwide call to protest against inferior service 
delivery by the apartheid government, making the country ungovernable by withholding 
payments for services and rates boycotts.
14
   
 
The intentional withholding of service fees became known as a culture of non-payment.  
After the first democratic elections in South Africa in 1994, the ruling ANC-led government 
launched a countrywide programme named „Operation Masakhane‟.  It urged residents to pay 
for services such as water, sanitation, electricity and refuse removal. The objective was to 




The main objective of my fieldwork was to ascertain to what extent such a culture of non-
payment continued to exist in the Msunduzi municipality.  The findings of the surveys 
contradicted the popular notion that citizens were continuing their resistance to pay service 
delivery fees.  Based on the findings, the claim that a culture of non-payment prevails was 
refuted.  The surveys showed that each area received most local government services, yet 
non-payment was prevalent.  For example, in the poorer areas of Sobantu, Edendale, Imbali 
and parts of Northdale, each resident interviewed had access to clean water within 50 meters 
of their residence, and most had in-house water.  Most households had access to sanitation, 
varying from pit-latrines to waterborne sewage.  Road infrastructure existed, and refuse was 
collected, even if irregularly.  Most households had access to electricity, and resided in RDP 
houses.
16
   Yet, at that time, the municipality had outstanding service arrears to the value of 
R78 million.
17
   
 
In an attempt to uncover the attitudes of those who are able to afford service charges, 100 
residents were surveyed in 2006 in Oak Park which is regarded as an upmarket area.
18
  In this 
area, the average house price in 2006 was at least ten times higher than those in Sobantu, 
                                        
14
 Nattrass, N. and Ardington, E. (1990).  The Political Economy of South Africa.  Cape 
Town:  Oxford University Press. 
15
 Nattrass, N. and Ardington, E. (1990).  The Political Economy of South Africa.  Cape 
Town:  Oxford University Press. 
16
 Stanton, A.  (2006).  Survey on Access to Basic Services in the Msunduzi Municipality.  
Unpublished Report. 
17
 Interview with Municipal Finance Officer. (Msunduzi Municipality).   Pietermaritzburg. 23 
June 2006. 
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Edendale and Imbali and five times higher than in Northdale.  Residents in Oak Park feared 
rising property rates and user fees, thinking that their rates would pay for service delivery 
across the municipalities.  In the surveys in 2006, Oak Park residents complained of rapidly 
deteriorating infrastructure.  Residents complained about potholes, irregular refuse collection, 
unkempt grass verges and broken street lights.  Some respondents suggested that paying 
households should withhold service payments until service delivery improved and all 
residents were forced to pay for service delivery.   
 
The survey findings showed that despite the high levels of poverty in Sobantu, Edendale, 
Imbali and to a lesser extent in Northdale, the majority of people accepted the responsibility 
to pay for service delivery.  It became clear that people did not pay because of a real inability 
to pay as opposed to an intentional withholding of payment.  Many households were headed 
by pensioners, often fostering children whose parents had died of Tuberculosis (TB) or 
HIV/AIDS. These pensioners still tried to pay for services. Others were only in temporary 
employment.  Transport costs and food prices constituted the greatest part of their monthly 
expenses.  The majority had no medical aid, pension fund, savings or any other long-term 
investment fund, while the tendency was to invest in funeral policies.
19
    
 
It became evident that although people‟s physical living conditions were relatively better off 
than under apartheid, few could afford their new standard of living.  Respondents from the 
low-income areas were aware of illegal electricity and water connections, but understood 
why residents would opt to do so, and none would report offenders to the authorities.  Theft 
in low income areas was high, especially those of taps, pots, door handles and water pipes 
which were supposedly sold for scrap metal.  Electricity cables and telephone wires were 
constantly stolen and sold for cash. 
 
My immediate question was that of sustainability.  How would the municipality maintain and 
fund future service delivery if payment was not forthcoming?  My conclusion was that local 
government would face significant service delivery problems if non-payment continued. 
Under such circumstances, basic service delivery was financially unaffordable for the 
municipality.  The consequence would be unsustainable service delivery.  The municipality 
would have to extract more resources from the wealthier residents, businesses and industries.  
                                        
19




Page | 18 
Or national government would have to subsidise service delivery substantially.  My guess 
was that the Msunduzi municipality was not the only municipality facing non-payment of this 
nature. 
 
Scope of the Study 
 
This study revisits some of the questions raised as a result of these surveys, but goes beyond 
the non-payment of basic services.  One can argue that local government is or might be an 
unviable sphere of government.  This study proposes, however, that the problems are those of 
basic service delivery not of local government per se and, as such, are broader governance 
problems.  
 
Local government has been assigned an extensive spectrum of responsibilities, too many to 
explore here.  The scope of this study is confined to the basic service delivery mandate.  The 
thesis will show that the basic service delivery mandate is onerous and complicated by a 
number of factors, many of which are beyond the control of local government.  It will be 
argued here that many service delivery problems emanate from the legislative, structural and 
procedural systems informing local government.   
 
This thesis will not explore the relevance of decentralisation for provinces or quasi-
autonomous units such as state-owned enterprises. It will only consider decentralisation with 
regard to local government.   
 
The thesis reflects on local government transformation between 1993-2009.  1993 was for all 
intents and purposes the official beginning of the local government transformation process.  It 
heralded, for example, the multi-party Local Government Negotiation Forum (LGNF) as well 
as the Local Government Transition Act (Act of 1993) between the then apartheid regime and 
the anti-apartheid liberation movements such as the African National Congress (ANC).  The 
outcome of these negotiations provided the framework for the post-apartheid local 
government reform processes culminating in local government becoming established as a 
constitutionally protected sphere of government in a system of decentralised governance.  
 
South Africa has 283 municipalities.  These are differentiated into three groups:  Category A 
(metropolitan municipalities); Category B (local municipalities); and Category C 
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municipalities).   Category A (or metropolitan municipalities) have exclusive executive and 
legislative authority and are governed by single councils. Category B municipalities, 
however, share executive and legislative authority with Category C municipalities within 
whose jurisdictions they lie.
20
  The focus of this thesis is on the challenges facing local 
government regarding the delivery of basic services.  But it also considers more particularly 
the basic service delivery issues experienced in local (Category B) municipalities as opposed 
to rural or metropolitan municipalities - even though all categories of municipalities may 
experience similar service delivery problems.   
 
The reason for focusing particularly on Category B municipalities is a strong belief that the 
service delivery problems facing these municipalities are underestimated.  The tendency is to 
focus research on Category C municipalities which are regarded as facing the most severe 
basic service delivery problems because they are predominantly located in underdeveloped 
and poor rural areas. However, this study will show that Category B municipalities face 
extensive and complicated basic service delivery problems, most of which emanate from their 
two-tiered configuration with Category C municipalities.   
 
There are a number of fundamental factors that impact on local government service delivery - 
too many to include in this study.  This thesis does not examine in much detail local 
government‟s political responsibilities such as fostering local democracy or community 
participation.  Neither does it set out to investigate local government‟s responsibility for local 
economic development.  These aspects are regarded as beyond the scope of this study and 
warrant critical investigation in their own right.  The thesis does, however, acknowledge and 
consider some of these issues if and when they are relevant to discussions on municipalities‟ 
autonomy regarding the provision of sustainable basic services.   
 
Serious consideration was given to whether to analyse local government‟s responsibility for 
local economic development (LED). The rationale for excluding this theme (notwithstanding 
that it constitutes a thesis in its own right) is that this study focuses more on 
intergovernmental relations between the three spheres of government and the impact thereof 
on local government autonomy, as opposed to local government‟s relationship with private 
                                        
20The Municipal Systems Act. (Act 32 of 2000). 
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partners or community groups. But despite the exclusion, it remains crucial to recognise the 
significance of LED and the impact it has on local government service delivery.    
 
While this study does not dwell on the merits of public participation, local public planning 
forums, or ward committee participation, it does acknowledge the contribution that such 
processes can make to shaping service delivery priorities.  The objective of the study is not to 
assess these institutions, or measure to what extent they are useful.  It does argue, however, 




Local government service delivery problems are viewed by the central government as 
administrative and financial problems.  One of the arguments made in this thesis is that while 
the viability of local government is indeed questionable, the challenges that face 
municipalities are not simply one of local administrative and financial incompetence.  On the 
contrary, this thesis will show that many of the problems are systemic and procedural.  It will 
show that many of the basic service delivery problems emanate from the decentralised system 
of governance that has evolved since the establishment of a new democratic dispensation in 
1994 with the first national democratic election.  In order to investigate this, a conceptual 
framework of decentralisation will be used for explanatory purposes.   
 
According to the literature, decentralisation implies the transfer of power over decision-
making to sub-national units of government.
21
  Such transfers take on different forms and can 
be put into effect in many ways. Authors often distinguish between three key dimensions: 
political, administrative and financial decentralisation; as well as three different forms:  
devolution, delegation and deconcentration.   
 
Based on the literature on decentralisation, the different dimensions of decentralisation are 
implemented as mechanisms for shifting power and authority away from the centre to sub-
national units of government.  Politically, this means that local government is made 
accountable first and foremost to its constituents as opposed to national government.  
Administratively, specific service delivery functions are assigned to lower levels of 
                                        
21
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government while, financially, local governments have adequate access to local revenue 
enabling them to act autonomously. 
 
This thesis investigates the nature of decentralisation in South Africa from these three 
vantage points and considers the different forms each dimension takes in order to consider the 
extent of local government autonomy.  Local autonomy is, according to the literature, at its 
most pronounced when local governments have been devolved the authority and capacity to 
make and implement political, administrative and financial decisions without intervention 
from central government.
22
  This thesis investigates to what extent municipalities in South 
Africa have such independent authority and capacity – focusing particularly on their 
autonomy to make and implement autonomous political, administrative and financial 
decisions pertaining to the provision of basic services.   
 
The purpose of the conceptual framework is not to assess whether South Africa is centralised 
or decentralised.  Neither does it aim to assess whether or not local government authority in 
South Africa is devolved, delegated or deconcentrated. The conceptual framework will be 
utilised to determine to what extent the system of decentralised governance in South Africa 
affects the autonomy of local government to provide basic services.  The objective of the 
conceptual framework is also not to assess whether decentralisation is „good‟ or „bad‟ for 
service delivery in South Africa.  It serves as a point of reference to investigate to what extent 
the different forms of decentralisation are apparent in political, administrative and financial 
intergovernmental relations and how this impacts on municipalities‟ ability to deliver basic 
services sustainably and autonomously. 
 
Aims of the Study 
 
One of the key questions posed in this thesis is to what extent the system of decentralised 
governance in South Africa enables or hinders municipalities‟ to provide basic services in an 
autonomous and sustainable manner.  
                                        
22
Cohen, J.M. and Peterson, S.B.  (1999).  Administrative Decentralization:  Strategies for 
Developing Countries.  Sterling:  Kumarian Press.  And Grindle, M.  (2007).  Going Local.  
Princeton:  Princeton University Press.  And Hutchcroft, P. (2001).  Centralization and 
Decentralization in Administration and Politics: Assessing Territorial Dimensions of 
Authority and Power.  In Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration. 
Volume 14 (1). Pp. 23-53. 
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The establishment of three spheres of government, as well as the three different categories of 
municipalities and its two-tiered configuration, has resulted in an intricate and complex 
system of service delivery.   Understanding this is crucial to this study. 
 
 
An overarching concern in this research is whether the failings of local government pose a 
threat to decentralisation.  This study considers whether the basic service delivery challenges 
facing local government are a threat to the system of decentralised governance in South 
Africa.  In other words, if municipalities are unable to meet their constitutional mandate for 
basic service delivery, does this mean that local government should no longer be an 
independent and autonomous sphere of government? 
 
Or are the failings of local government a result of the system of decentralisation in South 
Africa? In this respect the aim is to investigate if and how the decentralised system of 
governance affects the extent to which municipalities can independently meet their 
constitutional basic service delivery mandate. 
 
Closely linked to these questions is determining to what extent local government is a fully 
fledged part of South Africa‟s decentralised system of democratic governance.  Does the 
current configuration of the system of decentralisation and intergovernmental relations in 
South Africa assist municipalities‟ to provide basic services autonomously and in a 
sustainable manner?  Or does it hinder local government‟s autonomy to deliver basic 
services?   
 
This thesis will show that overcoming the apartheid legacy of service delivery backlogs 
depends on a degree of central oversight.  However, the question is whether this central 
oversight is at the cost of local autonomy.  Is central oversight at the expense of a 
municipality‟s right to “govern, on its own initiative, the affairs of the local community”?
23




                                        
23 Section 151(3) of the Constitution of South Africa.  (Act 108 of 1996). 
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This study is primarily a qualitative one which relied on a wide range of sources in order to 
identify and analyse the factors that affect local autonomy.  The conceptual framework is 





Extensive literature exists on decentralisation, primarily driven by a worldwide trend in 
governance towards decentralisation as witnessed over the last few decades.  A number of 
studies have been done tracing the initiation of decentralised practices in developing 
countries such as Latin America, Asia, and in Africa in general - where democracy has 
replaced previous autocratic or military rule.
25
 In Mozambique and Uganda, for example, 
decentralisation is regarded as being able to unite citizens after years of civil wars.
26
  More 
recently, studies are focusing on China as socialism is being replaced by democracy.  These 
studies claim that decentralisation is motivated by the need to localise service delivery to 
large populations which were previously out of the reach of central administration.
27
   
 
Most authors draw strong correlations between decentralisation and democracy.
28
  Diamond, 
especially, posits that if there is no decentralisation, then democracy is unlikely to endure.
29
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Specific country studies on the implementation of decentralisation are predominantly 
instigated by the World Bank and United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).
30
  
These institutions are adamant that decentralisation increases democracy and by implication 
enhances service delivery.  Funding allocations to developing countries are often conditional 
on their governments undertaking decentralisation.   
 
One interesting exception is Grindle‟s study on decentralisation in Mexico.  In her book 
Going Local, Grindle considers how, why, and when better local governance emerges, or 
does not.
31
  A question which she feels cannot be answered.  One can, however, identify 
factors that contribute to or hinder better local governance. She is careful to use the word 
better – insinuating that there is no model for good local governance.  She is interested in 
exploring why some local authorities succeed where others do not: 
The rhetoric and theory of decentralization promise better governance and deeper 
democracy as public officials are held more directly accountable for their actions and 
as citizens become more engaged in local affairs... however...it can also result in 




Studies on decentralisation in a post-apartheid South Africa are limited.  The majority of the 
literature deals with local government in general, and is not based on a theoretical framework 
of decentralisation. Some offer general descriptions of local government, its transformation 
and how it fits into the basic structures of governance, but offer minimal analytical content.
33
 
No specific study examines the implementation of decentralisation in a post-apartheid South 
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Africa with regard to its structural and procedural impact on local government.  Nor do any 
studies consider how the system of decentralisation impacts on local government‟s ability to 
provide basic services.  This makes this study unique.   
 
The information gathered relied extensively on journal articles, and working papers produced 
by independent research institutions, such as the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), 
the Centre for Development and Environment (CDE), and the South African Cities Network 
(SACities Network).  The majority of the data for this study was extracted from primary 
sources such as government legislation, policy documents, departmental reports, and 
submissions made by independent Commissions such as the Financial and Fiscal 
Commission (FFC).   The challenge became how to organise such piecemeal information in a 
holistic manner.  In addition to reviewing the respective reports, a number of interviews were 
held with municipal councillors and officials, many from the Msunduzi Municipality 
(Pietermaritzburg, KwaZulu-Natal province). Of interest (or concern) was the across-the-
board appeal for confidentiality, as respondents were worried about the political 
consequences of their statements.   
 
Many municipal council meetings and provincial portfolio committee meetings were attended 
throughout the study.  Workshops and local government conferences provided me with 
informal opportunities to interact with government officials from national, provincial and 
local government.  These meetings also enabled me to have impromptu interviews and it also 
gave me access to unpublished government reports.  During the course of my research, Dr 
Sutcliffe provided valuable input into discussions on local government – initially as the 
Chairperson of the Municipal Demarcation Board, and later in his capacity as municipal 
manager of the eThekweni metropolitan municipality (Durban, KwaZulu-Natal province).   
 
In undertaking this study, a number of research problems emerged.  It became evident that 
reliable, coherent and up-to-date data was lacking.  This posed significant limitations on the 
type of conclusions that could justifiably be made.  It made verifying and consolidating data 
for the purposes of this particular study problematic.  Throughout the study the utmost effort 
was made to source the latest datasets and government publications.  However, many official 
government reports did not go beyond 2007.  Even those reports that were published after 
2007 often used figures based on the data of the 2007 publications.  Some government reports 
used Census 2001 data, others relied on the 2007 Community Survey results.  The latest 
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report emanating from the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, 
namely The State of Local Government in South Africa which was published in late 2009, 
refers to Census 2001 data, the 2007 Community Survey, as well as to different government 
departments‟ own datasets.  The result is an assortment of „stats‟ based on a variety of 
sources.   
 
The budgetary data used in the thesis are based on the annual Division of Revenue Acts 
(DORAs).  It is acknowledged here that only the 2005/06 budget can be regarded as the latest 
actual budget and that the figures from 2005-2010 are only estimates, and may therefore vary 
from those in subsequent audited financial statements.  However, the actual figures are not of 
significance here.  Rather, the extent to which the respective budget allocation has increased, 
decreased or remained the same is indicative of the national government‟s vision of funding 
allocation. 
 
The research methodology applied in this thesis proved to be complex but at the same time 
also unique because the data available has not been analysed from a political, administrative 
and financial perspective, nor has it been used to investigate the impact it may have on local 
government‟s autonomy in their provision of basic services. 
 
Structure of the Thesis  
 
The thesis will commence by a conceptualisation of decentralisation, immediately following 
this introduction.  This second chapter will develop a conceptual framework for exploring 
local government within a decentralised system of governance.   It will reflect on the 
literature on decentralisation and will identify some of its fundamental characteristics in order 
to create an analytical framework for the study.  The chapter will focus particularly on three 
different dimensions of decentralisation, namely, political decentralisation, administrative 
decentralisation and financial decentralisation.  In addition to the three different dimensions 
of decentralisation, the literature also identifies three different forms of decentralisation: 
namely, devolution, delegation and deconcentration.  This second chapter will consider these 
three forms and the potential permutations thereof pertaining to the respective dimensions of 
decentralisation. For these purposes, the chapter will present a matrix in order to illustrate the 
interrelatedness between the different dimensions of decentralisation and the different forms 
of decentralisation.   
 
 
Page | 27 
 
The organisation of the remainder of the thesis is primarily based on the three dimensions of 
decentralisation as conceptualised in Chapter Two.  Chapter Three will examine the history 
of political decentralisation in South Africa.  It will analyse the transition from the minority-
led centralist apartheid regime to the introduction of a democratic system of governance.  It 
will illustrate the events that culminated in the creation of local government as an 
autonomous and democratically elected sphere of government. Chapter Three undertakes an 
analysis of the local government transformation process focusing particularly on the ongoing 
development of the legislative and policy framework.  This chapter will also investigate the 
introduction of local government reforms and the subsequent policy framework setting up 
local government as an autonomous sphere of government.  It will reflect on the process of 
demarcating new municipal boundaries and will analyse their significance for local 
government‟s current ability to deliver basic services.   
 
The fourth chapter will focus on administrative decentralisation in South Africa.  It is 
concerned with the manner in which national government transfers administrative 
responsibilities to local government.  It will focus particularly on the allocation of authority 
for basic services.  This chapter will show that the transfer of power and authority between 
the two-tiered system of local government impacts directly on the autonomy of local 
municipalities.  
 
Chapter Five provides a more specific investigation into the implementation challenges of 
administrative decentralisation.  It does so by focusing on cost recovery, which is a relatively 
new administrative local government function.  The argument is often made by the National 
Treasury that if municipalities were better at recovering costs associated with the delivery of 
basic services, then municipalities would be autonomous entities.  This chapter will critically 
assess this assumption and investigate why cost recovery appears to be an administrative 
problem for municipalities.  It will illustrate that cost recovery poses significant 
administrative challenges for local government, especially for Category B municipalities. 
 
Chapter Six will consider the system of financial decentralisation in South Africa.  It will 
examine the nature of intergovernmental fiscal relations and the process of transferring funds 
to local government.  It will analyse the structural and procedural system in place for the 
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division of national revenue across the three spheres of government and consider the 
implications for local fiscal autonomy. 
 
Chapter Seven is concerned with more specific fiscal challenges associated with financial 
decentralisation.  This chapter will examine more critically the popular notion that 
municipalities are currently in precarious financial situation.  It aims to identify some of the 
underlying factors that explain or underlie this financially unviable situation. It will illustrate 
that this financial weakness contributes to the weakening of local fiscal autonomy and, in 
turn, threatens local autonomy in general.   
 
The eighth and final chapter concludes the argument and draws together the various themes 
explored in each of the previous chapters based on the conceptual framework established at 
the beginning of the thesis.  It will provide a holistic understanding of decentralisation, local 
autonomy and basic service delivery in South Africa. The conclusion will reflect on all three 
of the dimensions and forms of decentralisation as they have unfolded in the South African 
context and will reach conclusions on how the configuration of decentralisation in South 
Africa has influenced local municipalities‟ autonomy to provide sustainable basic services.  It 
will present a critical analysis of how decentralisation has been put into effect in South Africa 
by considering, for example, the relationship between decentralisation in legal terms 
compared to how it is implemented.  The findings of the thesis highlight extensive 











The focus of this study is on the strategic policy choices that the South African government 
has made about the design as well as the sequencing of political, administrative and fiscal 
decentralisation.  The progression of political, administrative and fiscal intergovernmental 
institutional arrangements over the last fifteen years is a reflection of central government‟s 
interpretation of local government as a democratic sphere of government as established by 
the South African Constitution. Since then policies have been drafted and enacted and have 
tasked local governments with a set of new responsibilities.  In political terms, politicians 
were often appointed by the central government, but politicians are now elected locally and 
decision-making is theoretically democratic and inclusive.  Administratively, local 
government service delivery obligations extend beyond refuse removal and local traffic 
control to widespread services such as water supply and local economic development.  
Fiscally, local governments are responsible for managing their own budgets, generating their 
own revenue and generating full financial accounts.  These respective responsibilities are new 
to local government and as the thesis will explore, challenging.   
The literature on decentralisation is extensive. Decentralisation takes on different forms in 
different political regimes.  Typically, a unitary state is characterised by a single or multi-
tiered government in which effective control of government functions rests with the central 
government.  A federal state is a multilayered structure with autonomous decision-making 
distributed among levels of government.  In a confederal system of government, the central 
government serves as the agent of member units, usually without independent taxing and 
spending powers.
34
  The commonality is the transfer of central government authority to sub-
national units to provide public services.
35
 This transfer can be within formal political 
structures, within administrative or parastatal structures, or from the state sector to the private 
sector, or a combination of all.   
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This chapter focuses on the arguments that claim that decentralisation is integral to better 
governance and service delivery.  It does so by firstly exploring some of the reasons behind 
the popularisation of decentralisation.  More specific attention will be paid to the different 
dimensions of decentralisation, while the different forms will also be considered.  Some 
studies on decentralisation seek to design models in a search to assess to what extent a 
country is centralised or decentralised.  These will be explored even though the objective of 
this study is not to formally assess decentralisation in South Africa.  The rationale for its 
inclusion here is that these popular measures offer insight into why certain characteristics are 
deemed to increase or limit local autonomy.  The chapter ends by examining the theoretical 
distinction between centralised and decentralised governance. 
2.1  The Rise of Decentralisation 
 
The literature on decentralisation claims that over the past decade decentralisation has 
become a global governance phenomenon, not always for the same reasons or in the same 
manner, but all part of the broader political and economic reform processes experienced 
world-wide.  Factors leading to its prominence are diverse such as pressures exerted by 
international financial institutions; the advent of democracy and multi-party political systems; 
the need to the improve delivery of local services to large populations; the challenge of ethnic 
and geographic diversity; and the growing dissatisfaction with central governments‟ failure to 





Proponents of decentralisation emphasized the multifaceted contribution local government 
could make to improve democratic governance as well as public service delivery.  According 
to Cohen et al:  
Decentralization supported by increasing local participation is seen as one aspect of 
a strategy for ending the inefficient and ineffective heritage of statist-based command 
economies while downsizing bloated, costly and ineffective public sectors.  It is also 
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seen as key to the emergence of responsive local government leaders and more 




As such, advocates of decentralisation argue that decentralising government simultaneously 
improves the efficacy, quality and legitimacy of democracy.   
 
Grindle claims that the quality of governance, particularly local governance, became a 
popular consideration in discussions on improving public service delivery.
38
  Local 
democratic governance became more and more regarded as integral to good governance.  The 
most commonly cited reasons advocating decentralisation are that, compared to a centralised 
system of governance, decentralisation contributes to good governance in three key 
interrelated ways.  Firstly, it improves public sector responsiveness.  Secondly, it improves 
public sector accountability; and thirdly it makes service delivery more efficient and 
effective.  Each will be discussed briefly. 
 
Firstly, in contrast to highly centralised states which Diamond regards as inept at addressing 
local needs, decentralisation creates democratic local governance by moving decision-making 
for local public services closer to the people.
39
  In centralist states, decision-making takes 
place in isolation of peoples‟ immediate geographical and socio-economic environment.  As a 
result, public servants are more responsive to their immediate superiors than to the public at 
large.
40
  Contrary to a centralised government, local democratic government is more 
responsive because it offers a place for public participation.  As such, citizens can voice their 
service delivery needs and can call for better local government performance.
41
    
 
The theory on decentralisation promises better governance and service delivery since this 
form of governance offers an opportunity for citizens to engage with public officials, whereas 
in a centralised system of governance, public bureaucrats are too far removed from the people 
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they are meant to serve.
42
  The argument in favour of decentralised service delivery is that 
when local people participate in the decision-making process, services will then fulfil locally 
identified needs, avoiding ill-conceived service delivery projects.
43
   
 
Secondly, some claim that decentralisation improves public sector accountability.  For 
example, Cohen et al argue that public participation was more than a general feature of good 
governance, it also “was pushed as much for its potential to make the public sector more 
accountable as for its relationship to democratisation.”
44
  Centralised governments were 
increasingly being criticized for having limited levels of accountability.  Decentralisation was 
seen as a means “to redress decades of statist development strategies that had resulted in… 
high levels of corruption in the production of public services.”
45
  Those who strongly 
advocate decentralisation stress the significance of accountability.
46
  They argue that 
decentralisation improves government accountability since it brings government closer to 
local people.  Grindle, for example, argues that when people can elect their local government 
officials they can be held more directly accountable for their actions or inactions.
47
     
 
Thirdly, decentralisation leads to efficient and effective service delivery.  By the early 
1980‟s, concerns were increasingly being raised about the lack of administrative and fiscal 
capacity in the public sector.
48
  More and more calls were being made to introduce 
decentralisation in order to improve government effectiveness in the delivery of public 
services.
49
  The emphasis on more efficient and effective service delivery was partially 
informed by a global move towards new public management.   The paradigm of new public 
                                        
42
 Grindle, M.  (2007). Going Local.  Princeton:  Princeton University Press. 
43
 Oates, W. (1999).  An Essay on Fiscal Federalism. In Journal of Economic Literature.  
Volume 37(3). Pp. 1120-1149.   
44
 Cohen, J.M. and Peterson, S.B. (1999). Administrative Decentralization:  Strategies for 
Developing Countries.  Page 5. 
45
 Grindle, M.  (2007). Going Local.  Princeton:  Princeton University Press.  Page 7. 
46
Burki, S.  Guillermo, P and Dillinger, W.  (1999).  Beyond the Centre:  Decentralizing the 
State.  Washington: World Bank.  And Diamond, L. (1999). Developing Democracy: 
Towards Consolidation. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.   And Turner, M. and 
Hulme, D.  (1997).   Governance, Administration and Development.  London:  MacMillan. 
And World Bank.  (2000).  Decentralization: Rethinking Government.  World Development 
Report, 1999-2000. Washington:  World Bank. 
47
 Grindle, M.  (2007). Going Local.  Princeton:  Princeton University Press. 
48
 Cohen, J.M. and Peterson, S.B.  (1999).  Administrative Decentralization:  Strategies for 
Developing Countries.  Sterling:  Kumarian Press.   Oates, W. (1999). An Essay on Fiscal 
Federalism. In Journal of Economic Literature.  Volume 37(3). Pp. 1120-1149.     
49
 Grindle, M.  (2007). Going Local.  Princeton:  Princeton University Press. 
 
 
Page | 34 
management theorised that implementing service delivery approaches traditionally associated 
with markets would lead to greater cost-efficiency in the public sector.
50
  “Shifting greater 





The argument was that decentralising the delivery of public services removed public service 
monopolies, introduced competition, as well as improved the allocation of resources.
52
  
Cohen et al describe how concerns in the early 1990s about the lack of central government 
capacity and fiscal constraints provided further grounds for implementing decentralisation 
reforms to “facilitate such objectives as improved government effectiveness in the delivery of 
goods and service [and] the promotion of revenue collection.”
53
   
 
Decentralisation empowers regional and local governments and grants them some autonomy 
in service-delivery.  Such local authorities, the argument goes, are more efficient and 
effective than central government because if local governments are responsible for budgeting, 
public service delivery and the recovery of associated costs, they will be more prudent  than 
central government.
54
   
Although local governments always had some role in the management of local affairs, it was 
only towards the end of the twentieth century that they were given more responsibilities, 
more resources and more autonomy for public service delivery.  Responsibilities that were 
political, administrative and financial.  Political responsibilities in democratic regimes 
entailed having regular, competitive local government elections.  Theories on decentralisation 
also called for widespread public participation in local decision-making as well as increasing 
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local accountability.
55
  In administrative terms, municipalities became more and more 
responsible for planning, managing and overseeing service delivery within their jurisdictions.  




2.1  Dimensions of Decentralisation 
 
So far, the chapter has argued that decentralisation is generally about the transfer of authority 
from central government to lower levels of government (or quasi/private institutions for that 
matter) and that the rationale for decentralisation is often to democratise service delivery by 
bringing government closer to the people, as well as a belief that local governance is more 
effective and efficient than centralised governance. As such, decentralisation entails the 
transfer of central authority for specific functions and responsibilities down to sub-national 
units of government.  These different powers and functions are further separated into 
different dimensions of decentralisation.   
Authors group these respective functions and responsibilities into different dimensions.  Shah 
et al as well as Grindle identify three dimensions, namely:  (1) political, (2) administrative, 
and (3) fiscal decentralisation.
57
  From their perspective, decentralisation is generally 
summarised as the assignment of specific political, administrative and fiscal responsibilities 
to lower levels of government, and in some instances to the private sector. Cohen et al 
identify four dimensions: (1) political; (2) spatial; (3) market; and (4) administrative 
decentralisation.
58
  They do not single out fiscal decentralisation but indirectly address it in 
their analysis of market decentralisation.  Their studies focus primarily on administrative 
decentralisation and the extent to which administrative functions are deconcentrated, 
delegated and devolved among the levels of government.   
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2.2.1 Political Decentralisation 
Political decentralisation often commences with instituting democratic local government 
elections and distributing public policy-making power and the authority to make independent 
decisions both vertically (between levels of government and citizens) and horizontally 
(within a level of government).  Political decentralisation is sometimes referred to as 
democratic decentralisation in that it provides for local governments to be elected – to be 




The literature tends to assume an intrinsic relationship between political decentralisation and 
service delivery.  Some posit that political decentralisation is only worthwhile when it is 
supported by increasing local participation so that it can foster the emergence of responsive 
local government, in turn resulting in effective service delivery to local people.
60
 Political 
decentralisation, it is often argued, expands the scope of citizen participation in public 
decision-making which improves service delivery because it facilitates a better alignment of 
local preferences.  It entails the transfer of decision-making power to citizens to elect their 
local representatives.  In so doing, it increases the ability of citizens to select public officials 
who they think will be more responsive and accountable.
61
   The assumption made is that 
when citizens are able to participate in local decision-making, they will be able to insist on 
better public service delivery.  
According to Heller, many scholars regard political decentralisation as a necessary condition 
to establish decentralisation more widely.
62
   As such, it should precede administrative as well 
as fiscal decentralisation, thereby granting local representatives input in formalising the shape 
of subsequent administrative and fiscal decentralisation processes. He insinuates that without 
political decentralisation there can be no administrative or fiscal decentralisation. 
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2.2.2  Administrative Decentralisation 
 
Administrative decentralisation is concerned with the functional tasks of decentralisation.  It 
relates to the assignment of service delivery powers and functions across levels of 
government and determining where responsibility is situated. Cohen et al state that 
“administrative decentralisation is focused on the hierarchical and functional distribution of 
powers and functions between central and non-central units.”
63
 
Administrative decentralisation is concerned with the extent of central authority transferred to 
local governments and centres on key management functions of local government.  For 
example, it can assign to local governments the authority to hire and fire local staff without 
the prior approval of central government.  In some instances, administrative decentralisation 
devolves authority to local governments to determine the quantity, quality and distribution of 
public services.  In such cases, the challenge for central government is that while it wants to 
maintain national standards it has devolved administrative powers to local governments in 
order for them to design their own programmes for providing basic services.  
Devolving service delivery functions to local government can become contentious when 
shared across spheres of government, where each sphere has a degree of autonomy.  This is 
especially so in a unitary state where the central state wishes to retain a degree of control and 
sustain a system of hierarchy.
64
 
2.2.3 Fiscal Decentralisation 
Fiscal decentralisation concerns the allocation of financial powers and functions to lower 
levels of government.  The system of control and dispersal of financial revenue is a core 
component of fiscal decentralisation - whether such revenue is raised locally or is transferred 
from the central government.  Fiscal decentralisation is concerned with the distribution of 
fiscal responsibilities and the consequent interactions between the national and local 
governments.  It includes the design of intergovernmental fiscal transfers that shift general 
revenues from taxes collected by the central government to local governments and the extent 
to which municipalities may borrow from private financial institutions. It also relates to 
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financing local governments and the extent to which local service delivery will be 
subsidised.
65
   
Devolving financial authority to lower levels of government reduces central government‟s 
control over public expenditure. It involves the transfer of power to local authorities to make 
autonomous decisions about revenue collection strategies and expenditures decisions.  With 
such autonomy comes local responsibility such as that of cost recovery through user charges 
and property taxes.  
Fiscal decentralisation may confer power on locally-elected officials to collect and spend own 
revenue. In the most fulsome application of fiscal decentralisation, local government is 
awarded substantial taxing powers and the freedom to determine the extent of public service 
delivery.  The argument in favour of such extensive fiscal autonomy is that local government 
services would become more efficient if they were paid for by local taxes and fees.  However, 
in practice, such autonomy is rare, especially in developing or transition countries, because 
central governments tend to determine or control tax rates in the interests of macro-economic 
stability.
66
   
2.2.4 Market Decentralisation 
Cohen et al identify market decentralisation as another dimension of decentralisation.  
According to them, market decentralisation refers to reassigning service delivery authority 
from central government to other institutions.
67
 Calls for market decentralisation often 
emanate from international finance institutions such as the World Bank or the International 
Monetary Fund, calling for downsizing government, denationalising state assets and making 
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Market decentralisation:  
Focuses on creating conditions that allow goods and services to be produced and 
provided by market mechanisms sensitive to the revealed preferences of individuals.  
This form has become more prevalent, due to recent trends toward economic 
liberalization, privatization and the demise of command economies.
69
   
Market decentralisation represents a growing tendency among governments to look beyond 
the public sector for service delivery.  It does not mean that central government transfers its 
responsibility for service delivery elsewhere; nor does it mean that all authority is delegated.  
Central government remains the ultimate authority over essential national matters and has the 
power and, in fact, the responsibility to monitor and oversee decentralised functions.  Rather, 
it involves considering how to provide public services where capacity and resources are 
lacking.   
In South Africa, there are a number of examples where basic services are provided by private 
organisations through arrangements such as public-private partnerships (PPPs) or municipal 
service partnerships (MSPs). These may resemble aspects of market decentralisation per se - 
but such service delivery arrangements are more a consequence of the changing macro-
economic policy outlook of the ruling party, such as its move away from the ANC‟s initial 
nationalisation policies as reflected in the 1994 Reconstruction and Development Programme 
(RDP) which favoured centralised service delivery, to one which promotes local government 
self-sufficiency through cost recovery as embodied in the 1996 Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution Strategy (GEAR), as well as the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative 
(ASGI).
70
   
Despite the change in macro-economic policy, the national government directive remains that 
government must deliver as much as possible - and should only seek private sector 
involvement where and when necessary.  Privatisation especially is not a popular service 
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delivery option in South Africa.  National government has never regarded the delegation of 
service delivery responsibilities to the private sector as appropriate.
71
   
The transfer of ownership is not an option for core municipal services, particularly 
water, electricity and solid waste collection and disposal. Given the central role that 
these services play in meeting the material, social and economic needs of 
communities, it is undesirable that ownership of associated infrastructure and assets 
is removed from the public sphere.
72
 
While this study devotes considerable time to issues of cost recovery, the latter is not seen as 
an example of market decentralisation, but rather as a national directive to municipalities 
associated with their devolved administrative and financial functions.  For these reasons, this 
thesis focuses primarily on the three dimensions identified by Grindle, namely those of 
political, administrative and fiscal decentralisation, with particular emphasis on local 
government and its service delivery obligations.
73
  Each dimension assumes a mix of three 
forms:  deconcentration, delegation and devolution.  
2.3 Forms of Decentralisation 
 
Decentralisation is not applied uniformly but takes many forms and can be put into effect in 
many ways. Most commonly, authors distinguish between three types; namely, 
deconcentration, delegation, and devolution. Each of these forms of decentralisation denotes 
a unique set of central-local relationships.  
2.3.1 Deconcentration 
Deconcentration refers to central government dispersing responsibilities for certain services 
to regional branches.  It does not involve the transfer of authority to lower levels of 
government.  Deconcentration does not translate into autonomy or independence of these 
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agencies. It mostly comprises establishing „field‟ offices of the central government to assist 
with providing public services.
74
   In other words, deconcentration is when central 
administrative structures assign certain functions within specific policy sectors to field-level 
public servants.  This type of transfer of power is to an official appointed by and accountable 
to central government rather than to a local constituency.  In a deconcentrated system of 
governance, field officers are charged with overseeing the implementation of national 
policies.  In some cases, deconcentration may exist alongside devolved local government 
units as part of ensuring central government compliance.  As such, deconcentration can be a 
strategy to extend central control and closely supervise and monitor the implementation of 
national directives.
75
 Deconcentration may very well lead to greater technical efficiency, but 
it is not aimed at local democratisation or increasing public representation and 
accountability.
76
   
2.3.2 Delegation 
Delegation entails the transfer of decision-making and administrative authority for clearly 
defined tasks from central government to sub-national units of government or semi-
autonomous institutions.
77
  Compared to deconcentration, delegation allows for far more 
discretion in decision-making, but sub-national units of government remain first and foremost 
accountable to central government.  Any autonomy in administrative decision-making and 
policy implementation is limited to certain activities, and remains under central control.
78
   
Deregulation is regarded by Cohen et al as a type of delegation.
79
   It entails the removal of 
legal controls thereby opening up the opportunity for the private sector to provide goods and 
services formally held under state monopoly.  Their contention is that “under conditions of 
                                        
74
 Litvack, J., Ahmad, J. and Bird, R.  (1998).  Rethinking Decentralization at The World 
Bank.  Washington:  World Bank.   
75
 Cohen, J.M. and Peterson, S.B.  (1999).  Administrative Decentralization:  Strategies for 
Developing Countries.  Sterling:  Kumarian Press. 
76
 Turner, M and Hulme, D.  (1997).   Governance, Administration and Development.  
London:  MacMillan. 
77
 Litvack, J., Ahmad, J. and Bird, R.  (1998).  Rethinking Decentralization at The World 
Bank.  Washington:  World Bank.   
78
 Litvack, J., Ahmad, J. and Bird, R.  (1998).  Rethinking Decentralization at The World 
Bank.  Washington:  World Bank.   
79
 Cohen, J.M. and Peterson, S.B.  (1999).  Administrative Decentralization:  Strategies for 
Developing Countries.  Sterling:  Kumarian Press. 
 
 
Page | 42 
reasonably free choice, the provision of some public goods is more economically efficient 
when a large number of providers offer citizens more options and choices.”
80
 
The argument is that deregulation creates competition amongst service providers, which in 
turn promotes efficiency since citizens have the option to choose their preferred service 
provider.  Cohen et al argue that deregulation can end inefficient and ineffective states by 
downsizing bloated, costly and ineffective central public sectors.  Competition “promotes 
administrative accountability through competition, which in turn can promote democratic 





A third type of decentralisation referred to in the literature is devolution.  Turner et al explain 
that devolution is often regarded as the only true form of decentralisation because of its 
inherent democratic value. Devolution, they argue, is the  
Transfer of authority to sub-national governments electorally accountable to sub-
national populations’ and is the only authentic form of decentralization.
82
   
 
This form is closely associated with democratic local governance in that it confers decision-
making authority from central government on local government or quasi-autonomous units of 
government.  In a devolved system, local governments have clear and legally recognised 
geographical boundaries over which they exercise authority and within which they perform 
public functions.  Local governments also have some authority over local policy and 
allocating financial resources.  Devolved local governments are expected to raise their own 
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Table 2.1 summarises the key measures of assessment and illustrates the variations and 
interconnectivity between the dimensions and forms of decentralisation.   
 
























DIMENSION OF DECENTRALISATION 













Central appointment of 
regional and local field 
agents/officials 
Minimal service provision 
such as refuse collection, 
street lighting. 
Minimal user fees and rates 
determined by central 
government  
Recall of regional and local 
field agents/officials 
Administrative 
appointments by central 
government 
National budgeting process 
Local executive appointed 
by central government 
Salaries set and paid by 
central government 
No taxing powers 
 
Political parties organised 
along national lines 
Terms of employment set by 
central government  
No authority to incur debt 
 Administrative 
appointments based on 
patronage 









Accountability to central 
government 
Basic service provision, 
excluding social services 
Minimal taxing powers with 
rates determined by central 
government 
Local executives put 
forward by central 
government  
Service provision on agency 
basis 
Majority of fiscal transfers 
are conditional 









Regular, competitive local 
government elections  
 
Extensive exclusive service 
delivery functions. 
Authority to determine 
service delivery rates and 
user fees  
Accountability to local 
constituents 
Administrative 
appointments by local 
council 
Majority of fiscal transfers 
are unconditional  
Local executive elected by 
popular vote 
Authority to hire and fire 
and determining terms of 
employment and salaries 
Own revenue matches 
responsibilities and own 
expenditure 
 Assignment of functions 
based on subsidiarity 
Borrowing powers   
Local taxing powers 
Local political parties 
represent local interests and 
can challenge central 
authority. 
Bureaucracies insulated 
from systems of patronage 




Responsible for local 
economic development 
Authority to incur debt and 
independent local budgeting 
Authority for local policy-
making  
  Authority for procurement 
Effective input in national 
policymaking processes 
 Authority for cost recovery 
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Although distinguishing between deconcentration, delegation, and devolution helps in 
defining centre-local relationships, such relationships are not uniform or static.  Many local 
governments experience all three forms of decentralisation at the same time. This not only 
results in a complex division of powers and functions, but each includes a unique set of 
intergovernmental relationships.  As Grindle aptly states: 
 
It may matter less what kind of decentralization characterizes specific policy areas 
than how local governments and local officials adapt to new demands and 




2.4 Assessing Decentralisation 
 
 
Based on the literature, decentralisation tends to be conceptualised as the degree or extent of 
the transfer of power and authority to sub-national levels of government.  It is seen as an 
indicator of autonomy, independence, and discretion which is regarded as good for service 
delivery, good governance and democracy.  The general assumption is that decentralisation 
equals good governance, and centralisation does not - and that devolution is the only true 
form of decentralisation.   
 
A number of studies have been preoccupied with assessing or measuring decentralisation, and 
were founded on the assumption that decentralisation by devolution is the true form of 
decentralisation:  that the more autonomous local governments are, the more extensive 
decentralisation is.
85
 The criteria are useful, but the respective findings are not necessarily 
helpful.  The shortcoming of assessing decentralisation based on specific criteria is that it 
assumes that there is a right answer.  In other words, it assumes that there is a specific 
template that must be followed.  It neglects the political as well as the socio-economic 
context and how this may make some measures of assessment inappropriate or irrelevant.  It 
treats each criterion in isolation from one another when in reality they are not.  
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Despite the inherent shortcomings of such models of assessment, some of the criteria used to 
assess whether or not a country is politically, administratively or financially decentralised are 
briefly examined below.  The rationale is that they reveal certain traits in governance, and can 
assist in understanding the interrelation between features of political decentralisation and 
those of financial or administrative decentralisation.   
2.4.1  Measures of Political Decentralisation  
 
Hutchcroft provides a set of questions the primary objective of which is to determine to what 
extent political decentralisation has resulted in local government autonomy to elect, appoint 
and design local policy, as well as its exposure to systems of patronage.
86
  He regards these 
questions as critical in determining the level of decentralisation.  For example: 
 
1.  Are local executives appointed by the centre or elected by popular vote? 
2. Are there effective mechanisms for popular participation at the local level either 
through elections or via less conventional means? 
3. Are there municipal, provincial, national, and/or regional legislative bodies with 
substantial decision-making authority? 
4. Is there a concentration of socioeconomic and/or coercive power in local patrons and 
bosses? 
5. Is there a national legislature with significant decision-making authority? 
6. Are national legislators elected or appointed? 
7. To what extent does the electoral system provide for representation of local or 
regional interests in the national legislature? 
8. Are political parties organised along national or local/regional lines, and what is 
their level of internal cohesion? 
9. To what extent are administrative structures insulated from party patronage? 87 
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According to Hutchcroft, one can expect a highly centralised political system to exhibit a 
combination of the following features: (1) local and regional officials are appointed by the 
centre; (2) there are few avenues for political participation at the local level; (3) sub-national 
units lack their own legislative bodies; (4) there are no local bosses to challenge the authority 
of the centre; (5) decision-making authority is concentrated in the national executive (with a 
weak or subservient national legislature); (6) a significant proportion of national legislators 
are appointed by the centre; (7) there is a Proportional Representation electoral system (and 
selection of candidates within this system is determined by a national political party); (8) all 
political parties are national in scope, and capable of enforcing national-level decisions and 





Conversely, a highly decentralised political system will have a significant combination of the 
following features: (1) local and regional officials are elected by popular vote; (2) there are 
numerous and well-institutionalised means by which political participation can flourish at the 
local level; (3) local governmental units have well-established legislative bodies able to assert 
their interests vis-à-vis the centre; (4) throughout the provinces, local bosses with high 
concentrations of socioeconomic and coercive power challenge the authority of the central 
government; (5) there is a national legislature with extensive decision-making authority; (6) 
all national legislators are elected, not appointed; (7) there is a single-member district 
plurality electoral system; (8) all political parties are local in scope and have little control 
over either their membership or candidates and officeholders who run for election and gain 
office under their banner; and (9) bureaucracies are well insulated from systems of 
patronage.
89
   
 
The conclusions to be drawn from Hutchcroft‟s measures are that political decentralisation as 
defined above is the ideal governance system.  Variations on the ideal do not constitute 
devolved decentralisation. 
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2.4.2 Measures of Administrative Decentralisation 
 
Cohen et al identify a number of key factors that ascertain the extent to which administrative 
decentralisation is implemented.  The factors relate to the range of administrative local 
government functions and responsibilities and the extent to which local governments have 
autonomy in programme planning and project implementation, as well as to local 




A fundamental characteristic associated with administrative decentralisation is that of 
subsidiarity:  the allocation of powers and functions to the lowest possible level of 
government.
91
  Subsidiarity calls for the lowest and closest levels of government to have 
responsibility and control over all municipal services.  Only when the lower levels are 
incapable, must the matter become the responsibility of the next level of government.
92
  
Sharma contends that administrative decentralisation is achieved if and only when local 
governments have the freedom to fire/hire or set the terms of employment for local 
government employees.  They must also have the administrative regulatory authority to make 
by-laws as well as the freedom to contract out their own responsibilities.
93
  The implication is 
unless the above criteria are met, a government is not fully administratively decentralised.   
 
Executing stringent and formal assessments of decentralisation neglect the possibility that 
different levels of government may have different levels of technical and administrative 
capacity.  Staff at local government level may not have adequate management skills, or 
experience in accounting and budgeting.  The functions traditionally associated with local 
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government are limited to providing for refuse removal or street cleaning which do not 
require the same amount of expertise as that of the supply of clean water and sanitation. 
2.4.3 Measures of Fiscal Decentralisation  
 
The literature often identifies the extent of fiscal decentralisation as the key determinant as to 
whether a country is centralised or decentralised.
94
   Fiscal decentralisation is measured by 
determining local government‟s financial autonomy.  Indicators include assessing the extent 
of local financial responsibilities; central government involvement in local affairs; central 
government delivery of functions; local reliance on national funds; and local expenditures 
and revenues.  In other words, the more financial autonomy local governments have, the 
more such a country is deemed to be decentralised.
95
   
 
Zhang, et al, for example present certain criteria or measures for determining the extent of 
decentralisation.  They pose six questions for assessing fiscal decentralisation: 
1.  Do local governments have the authority to set the rates for local revenue? 
2. Are the majority of fiscal transfers formula-based and unconditional? 
3. Does local government revenue more or less match responsibilities? 
4. Does local government revenue finance the majority of local expenditures? 
5. Does local government revenue finance the majority of local government 
expenditures? 
6. Do local governments have autonomy for procurement?96 
 
Their assumption is that fiscal decentralisation is only achieved if these questions are 
answered in the affirmative.  As such, they argue that more fiscal autonomy translates into 
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better or fuller decentralisation.  The assumption is that the greater the financial 
responsibilities; the lesser the state involvement in local affairs; the lesser the reliance on 
state funds; and the higher local expenditures and revenues are - the more fiscally 
decentralised a system of governance is, and therefore the better public services will be 
provided.   
 
One of the key questions posed in this study is whether South Africa‟s particular system of 
decentralisation is, indeed, conducive to autonomous local governance and to effective and 
sustainable basic service delivery. 
 
2.5 Centralised or Decentralised Service Delivery 
 
The attempts at measuring the extent of decentralisation in any particular country advance a 
belief that decentralised service delivery by devolution is better.  However, despite the 
overwhelming theoretical support for decentralisation, as well as attempts at providing 
models and criteria for assessment, it remains to be proven whether a centralised or a 
decentralised system of governance provides services more effectively.   
 
Turner et al make the important distinction that there is no clear-cut separation between 
centralised and decentralised governance, “rather they represent hypothetical poles on a 
continuum that can be calibrated by many different indices.”
97
 Most forms of government 
adopt a mixture of centralised and decentralised authority.  This study will show that the 
same applies to local government in South Africa, and that the institutional framework 
fluctuates between centralist and decentralised designs.  Whether it is contributing to better 
municipal service delivery is debatable.  As Cohen et al argue, in some instances, 
centralisation may be more desirable and effective than decentralisation.  They state that 
“some tasks must be centralised because to administratively decentralise them would 
introduce inefficiencies in their delivery.”
 98 
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In heterogeneous societies, the central state can be a force of cohesion. In highly inegalitarian 
societies, central government can oversee the (re)distribution of public services, while 
decentralised governance can provide accommodation for minorities.
99
  In other words, if the 
need for creating redistribution and equity is high, then such objectives are better served 
under a centralised system of governance.  One argument in favour of central control is that 
the mobility of recipients and the potential tax base are high, and are not confined to one 
municipal jurisdiction, which makes it difficult for municipalities and is therefore better 
managed by central government.  Linked to this reason is the need for financial stability 
which some think is better achieved at national level.
100
   Central governments: 
 
are better placed to manage market stability and hence the stabilization and 
distribution objectives should be centralized. The stabilization objective should also 
remain centralized because most local level governmental units lack the stabilization 




Based on such arguments, both options of centralised and decentralised government have 
a/some relative advantage in their ability to deliver public services.   
 
The dilemma of balancing the contrasting forces of centralization and 
decentralization,... is more pronounced in the developing and transition countries, the 
nations that are on one hand trying to stabilize their economies while on the other … 
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Some argue that decentralisation may fail for a number of reasons, including weak state 
capacities at all levels, the shaky financial viability of local government, the size and 





…greater decentralization does not necessarily imply greater democracy let alone 
‘power to the people’ – it all depends on the circumstances under which 
decentralization occurs.
 104
    
 
The merits for assessing whether a state is centralised or decentralised is also limited by the 
fact that it is not always obvious whether a state is centralised or decentralised.   Grindle 
stresses that despite a state being defined legally as a decentralised system, the limitations 
placed on local governments determine its true autonomy.  She notes that in some cases 
national governments set the regulatory framework; determine the division of revenue; 
approve municipal budgets; determine local user fees; sanction municipal development plans; 
appoint and dismiss local government officials; and disallow municipal borrowings.
105
  Why 
such limitations exist is not always obvious.   
 
Cohen et al postulate that in some cases national politicians may be reluctant to cede power.  
They state that “highly centralised states find it difficult to do more than pursue carefully 
controlled and centrally dominated deconcentration.”
106
 As such, central bureaucracies resist 
the delegation of responsibilities, and when responsibilities are actually transferred there is 
rarely a corresponding transfer of financial resources.  Those resources that are available at 
the local level are often poorly deployed by inexperienced, ill-trained and underpaid field 
staff.
107
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Cohen et al reveal that a lack of resources necessary for service provision may set up the 
delegated government institution for potential failure before it has even begun.
108
  Litvack et 
al claim that:  
 
[T]he political decision to devolve powers from central government, for example, can 
only get translated into actual powers being shifted if sub-national governments have 




As such, decentralisation may necessitate the establishment of another layer of government, 
which means additional resources and increased public expenditure.  In some cases, a lack of 
skilled staff to fill these newly established posts may result in them being filled by 
inexperienced or incompetent staff.
110
   
 
Each dimension of decentralisation supposedly enhances service delivery through increased 
accountability and transparency of policy-makers and service providers.  Politically, residents 
get to vote municipal officials into office, and non-performing officials can be unseated in the 
next election.  Administratively, the allocation of service delivery responsibilities to local 
government offers local residents direct access to service providers, shifting accountability to 
the local authorities rather than to the central government.  And financially, local fiscal 
autonomy over own-source revenue raising and expenditure increases government 
responsiveness to local preferences and needs.   
 
In reality, it is not possible to fully separate the different dimensions of decentralisation. The 
concept, in its application, is far more complex than any typology can provide.  For example, 
some states may have devolved political power to lower levels of governments, while 
administrative and financial decentralisation is limited to deconcentration.   
 
Shah is cautious, even apprehensive, of why some governments choose to decentralise.  He 
doubts whether governments‟ agendas are directed towards democratisation. He believes that 
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“the decision to decentralise may have more to do with short-term political considerations of 
politicians rather than being based on the perceived benefits of decentralisation in the long 
run.”
111
  Shah takes it a step further by insinuating that it could be a deliberate strategy by 
central government to extend their control over local authorities.  His concern highlights the 
fact that implementing a system of decentralisation may not necessarily be to establish 
democratic local governance.  Rather, it may very well be applied to strengthen central 
control and authoritarianism as opposed to promoting local democracy.  Regardless, he does 







The majority of the literature on decentralisation claims that despite some of its limitations, 
establishing sub-national government institutions strengthens democracy by empowering 
local communities to participate in governance and development processes, which in turn 
improves the effectiveness of service delivery.  Decentralisation is widely accepted as 
integral to better public sector governance and performance.  Some studies have 
experimented with drawing up models for improving the ability of administrative systems to 
provide public services in an effective, efficient and accountable way.
113
  However, none 
have proved perfect, nor are they necessarily useful.  At best, they raise fundamental issues 
which, if ignored, can negate the presumed advantages of decentralisation.   
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The literature concludes that a workable decentralisation system is a matter of sequencing, 
alignment and coordination among the different levels of government.  Of interest is the 
approach or style of implementing decentralisation, of how intergovernmental relations are 
designed or structured.   
 
Decentralization means not only a complex set of new responsibilities but also a 
series of different relationships with other levels of government that have to be 
managed simultaneously…they are expected to perform - with new mandates and new 




Although decentralisation has brought significant new powers to local government in South 
Africa, it has also brought greater service delivery responsibility and challenges.  Political 
decentralisation has meant the introduction of free, fair and competitive local elections 
enabling the replacement of central government appointed officials with popularly elected 
representatives. Administratively, decentralisation has led to the distribution of basic service 
delivery functions among spheres of government.  Fiscal decentralisation has resulted in local 
municipalities being made responsible for managing their own budgets, generating their own 
revenue and recovering their own costs. 
 
This study, though, is not about determining to what extent South Africa is a decentralised 
state, nor will it propose what needs to be done to make it a decentralised state: it is whether 
its current decentralised system of governance is conducive to sustainable local government 
service delivery.  The purpose of this thesis is not to design a model for decentralisation.  
Rather, it aims to examine the transformation of local government in South Africa into a 
sphere of government which is constitutionally defined as the fundamental sphere responsible 
for the delivery of basic services.  As such, the question is not whether decentralisation is 
good or bad for service delivery in South Africa, but whether it works, whether its current 
configuration is conducive to efficient and effective local service delivery.   
 
The distinctions between deconcentrated, delegated and devolved authority are helpful in 
identifying the levels of local government autonomy.  However, it will be argued that the 
value of any assessment of decentralisation does not lie in determining whether a function is 
                                        
114
 Grindle, M. (2007). Going Local.  Princeton:  Princeton University Press.  Page 5. 
 
 
Page | 55 
deconcentrated or devolved, but rather what the extent of local government autonomy is.  Do 
local governments have the administrative power to adjust services and budgets to match 
local preferences?  Whether they have direct political authority and whether can they make 
and implement policy independently.   Whether they have adequate sources of funds and 
discretion.      
 
This chapter has shown that decentralisation is a mixture of political, administrative and 
fiscal functions, and that each can take different forms.  Subsequent chapters will consider 
how the resultant permutations influence the ability of municipalities in South Africa to 
provide basic services. It will investigate the implementation of decentralisation in South 
Africa by illustrating a far more complex and interesting mix of the different forms and 
dimensions of decentralisation, which are implemented for different reasons and with 
different results.   
 
The next chapter will explore the dimension of political decentralisation by examining the 
introduction of local government as a democratic sphere of government in South Africa.  It 
takes a critical look at the reconfiguration of the political landscape, as well as the creation of 











One of the objectives of this chapter is to show how complicated and drawn-out the task of 
transforming the apartheid government‟s highly centralised system of government has been, a 
system where local government authorities were appointed by central government and where 
public participation was non-existent.  It examines to what extent the new democratic 
dispensation accommodates political decentralisation.  Political decentralisation is concerned 
with the transfer of political power and authority to sub-national levels of government.  It 
most often provides for local government to be democratically elected, with the authority to 
pass by-laws in their sphere of jurisdiction.  It enables citisen participation, therefore making 
local government answerable to their local constituencies as opposed to central government. 
 
This chapter presents a predominantly historical narrative of the local government 
transformation process between the 1980s and 1990s which culminated in the creation of 
local government as a democratically elected and autonomous constitutional sphere of 
government.   In this respect, the chapter commences by describing apartheid local 
government and the initial reforms initiated by the then apartheid government.   
 
More specific attention is paid to the multiparty local government negotiation process that 
began in earnest in the early 1990s and how this set in motion a widespread range of reforms 
such as the reconfiguration of the apartheid state.   The local government demarcation 
process is identified as one of the most significant features in the dismantling of apartheid-
created racial and geographical boundaries.  The demarcation of municipal boundaries was 
complex, contentious and on-going, and made even more difficult in the absence of a final 
legislative framework for local government.   
 
The chapter then examines the post-apartheid legislative framework of local government 
which was primarily informed by the local government negotiations process.  It focuses on 
the Constitution with regard to the assignment of political power and authority to local 
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The Constitution is sovereign and from it flows a number of local government acts of 
legislation and policies setting up the legislative framework for local government.  This 
policy framework provides for local autonomous governance, cooperative governance, as 
well as avenues for public participation.  In this respect, this chapter critically investigates the 
extent of local political autonomy in practice by examining the power and authority of local 
government in the intergovernmental framework, questioning local government‟s status as a 
distinctive, interdependent and interrelated part of a system of cooperative government.
115
  
Legislation obliges local government to create independent ward committees in 
municipalities‟ areas of jurisdiction as avenues for public participation.  However, this 
chapter suggests that ward committees offer no opportunity for deepening local autonomy.   
 
The argument of this chapter is that in South Africa the nature of political decentralisation 
has set the agenda for the subsequent decentralisation of administrative and fiscal powers to 
local authorities.  This study regards the unfolding of political decentralisation in South 
Africa as a defining factor in how administrative and financial powers and functions have 
become decentralised, and what the consequences have been for delineating the extent of 
local government autonomy.    
3.1 Apartheid Local Government 
  
The political mandate of separate development during apartheid translated into the spatial 
fragmentation of South Africa as whole.  Legislation enforced strict racially-based settlement 
patterns, supported by administrative systems and institutional arrangements.  Rigorous 
apartheid policies prescribed residential settlement according to race.
116
   At a national level, 
apartheid legislation, such as the Bantu Authorities Act of 1951, resulted in the creation of 
four independent Homelands or Bantustans
117
 where Africans were expected to live under the 
leadership of chiefs.  Within the boundaries of the Republic of South Africa, six self-
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governing territories were established.
118
  (See Map 3.1).  This in effect translated into the 
apartheid government renouncing national government responsibility for providing 
infrastructure and service delivery to African people.  This was, in obscure terms, a type of 
decentralisation in that it created the perception that each race, within prescribed 
geographical spaces, was authorised to govern itself.  Homelands were declared independent 
and were not considered the responsibility of the South African government.
119
  Although the 
six self-governing territories remained in South Africa, they were not directly administered 
by the national government, and received partial autonomy, but were never granted 
independence.
120
   
 
Map 3.1  Homelands, Self-Governing Territories and Apartheid  Provincial Boundaries 
Source:  Gijsbertsen, B.  (2009). Department of Geography.  University of KwaZulu-Natal. 
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Besides the creation of separate homelands and self-governing territories, apartheid also 
created segregated settlement patterns in and around urban areas.  The Natives Resettlement 
Act (1954) entitled government to relocate Africans to separate townships.  Apartheid 
legislation intentionally shaped the spatial fragmentation of urban cities in that it enforced 
racial residential segregation by forcibly resettling Black people in own group areas.  
Different races were confined to specific group areas and townships and were removed from 
the Central Business District (CBD) which was reserved for whites.
121
   Deegan claims that 





Van Donk et al describe how during apartheid, local government structures were erected to 
meet the policy objectives of the state.   
 
The state projected an image of urban areas as white areas, where black labourers 
would stay temporarily - in racially segregated areas - for the duration of their 
employment.  It was therefore only in areas designated as ‘white’ that fully fledged 




Different types of local government authorities were set up in respective areas to execute a 
series of central government administrative functions; however, their accountability was to 
central government, not to local constituencies.  As such, political decentralisation was 
nothing more than deconcentration, where central government extended its power and control 
to provinces and local governments - the other two tiers of government which were regarded 
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Numerous apartheid laws intentionally discriminated against Black South Africans and were 
strictly enforced, dictating Black people‟s movements and access to basic services.
125 
  The 
Abolition of Passes and Coordination Documents Act (1952) prescribed that all Africans had 
to carry a reference book that had to be signed monthly by their employer as proof of 
employment, thereby limiting access to White areas through the pass system. The 
Reservation of Separate Amenities Act (1953) enforced social segregation in public amenities 
such as cinemas, restaurants, sports facilities and later schools and tertiary institutions.
126
   
 
The apartheid cities were demarcated into separate residential and commercial districts.  
African, Indian and Coloured South Africans had no ownership rights and had to reside in 
townships located on the outskirts of the CBD.  These areas were owned and administered by 
local agencies of the apartheid government.
127
 Outside the townships, all local areas were 
administered by white-elected city councils, with some having established committees which 
allowed for some input from Indians and Coloured.  Africans were only represented in 
advisory committees in townships.  According to McCarthy, such unequal decision-making 





The geographical distribution of settlement resulted in White suburbia, suitably developed 
and conveniently located close to employment and urban facilities.  Beyond these suburbs, 
further away from town, Indian and Coloured people were allowed to reside.  These areas 
tended to be located in or near industrial zones.  Expanding further outward, land was 
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allocated to African people.  These areas had minimal infrastructure, no or little employment 
opportunities and were provided with minimal basic services.
129
   In addition, these areas 
were highly overpopulated, often forcing people to live in squalor. Growing squalor 
reinforced underdevelopment, creating vast disparities between developed, well-serviced 
local government in White areas and underdeveloped, non-serviced local government in 
African areas.   The result was an easily identifiable urban city, predominantly White, well-




Institutional structures of representation reinforced underdevelopment. White Local 
Authorities (WLA) were appointed by central government and had the authority to identify 
specific locations where Africans could reside and determine how they would be represented 
on Black advisory boards.
131
  This meant that WLAs could situate themselves where 
economic resources were concentrated, and their decision-making authority entitled them to 
spend their resources on the provision of public services in their own areas.  Townships had 
minimal service delivery infrastructure and apartheid regulations limited retail and industrial 
developments in black areas. The strict settlement laws deterred industry from moving to 
outlying rural areas.  The absence of amenities and shopping facilities in Black areas meant 
that the little income earned by Africans was spent in White urban areas.  The sources of 
revenue in Black areas were limited to sorghum beer production, liquor sales and some 
income derived from rental and user fees.
132
 As such, it was inevitable that township areas 
would not have adequate infrastructure, nor would their residents have access to public 
services, leaving Black areas largely underdeveloped.
133
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3.1.1 Citizen Revolt and Apartheid Policy Reforms 
 
In the early 1980s, the apartheid government faced continuous and persistent citizen revolt 
against the central appointment of local political structures of governance, which were 
regarded as undemocratic and illegitimate.
134
  Pressure mounted on national government to 
democratise local government and provide equitable access to basic services.  Anti-apartheid 
movements called for the democratisation of the state and demanded that all South Africans 
be entitled to universal suffrage.  This period witnessed a series of attempts by the apartheid 
government to appease the growing demands for the democratisation of the state by making 
minimal legislative adjustments. One such response was the national government‟s enactment 
of the Black Local Authorities Act (Act No 102 of 1982).  This Act supposedly established 
democratic self-government for Black communities but in reality was an insignificant 
deconcentration of political authority to local institutions which were appointed and 
answerable to central government.   They were democratic only in terms of being a channel 
for residents to voice their needs; in reality, Black Local Authorities (BLAs) were merely 
structures set up and staffed by local residents approved of by national government.  They 
also received no additional government funding.
135
   Hence these local authorities were not 





A new constitution was enacted in 1984 which the apartheid government introduced as being 
racially representative.  It replaced the Whites-only parliament with three separate houses:  
the House of Assembly (for Whites), the House of Representatives (for Coloureds) and the 
House of Delegates (for Indians).  Africans were not officially represented.  A distinction was 
also made between what was regarded as own affairs of one race group and general affairs 
referring to all race groups.
137 
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The president remained the Head of State holding executive and legislative power.  
Legislative decisions (such as the election of the president) were calculated by the 4:2:1 ratio 
of White, Coloured and Indian representatives which meant that, effectively, the will of the 
House of Assembly prevailed.
138 
 Such manipulation of legislative powers as well as the 
glaring exclusion of the African majority meant that in reality, decentralisation continued to 
be little more but the deconcentration of central power. 
 
Civic unrests during the 1980s continued unabated, and forced the apartheid government to 
reconsider local government as it then existed.
139
  A campaign of non-payment commenced.  
Black residents refused to pay for the few basic services they received, and forced the 
councillors of BLAs to resign in an attempt to „make the country ungovernable‟.  This so-
called culture of nonpayment caused a total breakdown of local government in many Black 
townships.
140
   
 
The national government was pressurised into creating new unified, non-racial democratic 
local authorities where people could participate fully in local government decision-making 
processes, and where resources would be shared equitably across different local authorities.  
In response, Regional Services Councils (RSCs) were established in 1985 to financially assist 
the failing BLAs with service delivery.
 
 The transfer of limited authority to RSCs became 
characteristic of decentralisation by delegation.  The RSCs were granted authority to exact 
levies on industries located within their jurisdictions.  The expectation was that RSCs would 
generate enough revenue so as to cross-subsidise service delivery. However, RSCs were still 
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not democratically elected, but were represented by councillors nominated by central 
government.
141
    
 
3.2 The Local Government Transformation Process 
 
As the pressure on the apartheid system began to increase, so too did popular calls for more 
substantive local government transformation.
142
  From the mid-1980s until the early 1990s 
national negotiations for a democratic South Africa took place.  At the same time, 
negotiations took place between the apartheid government, the existing local government 
authorities and a number of local civic organisations.  Resistance to apartheid rule was 
strongest in urban areas and residents in townships mobilised under the popular slogan: „one-
city-one-tax-base‟.
143
  Protestors rallied against unequal revenue bases and demanded 
increased access to services, calling for the apartheid government to consolidate local 
government revenue and allocate it evenly across Black and White areas.
144
   
 
The apartheid government could no longer appease the majority calls for democratisation 
with nominal policy changes or new administrative structures.  The African National 
Congress (ANC) and other anti-apartheid political parties were unbanned in February 1990, 
followed shortly by the release of Nelson Mandela.  This set in motion the official multi-party 
negotiations, referred to as the Multi-Party Negotiating Process (MPNP) which proved to be 
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central to the transformation of a non-racial South Africa, paving the way for the first 




3.2.1 Reconfiguring the Apartheid State 
 
The first few years of negotiations saw many policy issues being debated.  During this period, 
various political factors shaped regional government, determining the future of local politics 
in South Africa, and leaving it with an institutionally complex system.  One of the 
fundamental policy questions was how to reorganise the apartheid state, and where local 
authorities would be situated.
146 
    
 
While the theories on decentralisation state that local democratic elections are indicative of 
devolved political decentralisation, Ramutsindela et al pointed out that the legacies of 
apartheid could not be undone by simply establishing local democratic electoral processes.  It 
also required the spatial and geographical restructuring of the country itself in order to 
remove the racially determined boundaries of the provinces, the self-governing territories as 
well as the homelands.
147
  However, re-integration into South Africa was not straightforward.  
The homelands and self-governing territories were large areas, which were predominantly 
underdeveloped with little infrastructure and service delivery.  The stark difference in 
infrastructure and service levels between homelands and self-governing territories compared 




Lodge describes how the amalgamation of the separate regional administrations of homelands 
and self-governing territories proved complex as each administration had a different 
managerial style with limited capacity and technical expertise.  Many lacked reliable data on 
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the number of employees, or even on the location of government facilities such as offices, 
buildings and equipment.
149
  He refers to these as the „legacies of homeland 
administration‟.
150
  As this study will illustrate, such legacies affect local municipalities as 
demarcation resulted in the amalgamation of these differently administered and under-
resourced areas into historically White urban municipal jurisdictions. 
 
Deegan argues that one of the most controversial issues during the negotiation period was 
what the nature of the relationship between central government and regions should be, 
whether these should be organised in a unitary or a federal state.
151
  The political diversity of 
South Africa‟s pluralistic society made discussions on centralisation versus decentralisation 
complex and a highly sensitive topic.
152 
   Understandably so, since this would define the 
degree of autonomy, power and authority bestowed on the different ethnic and racial groups 
under a new dispensation.  In other words, it would define the forms of political 
decentralisation. 
 
The ANC which represented the majority of South Africans, favoured a unitary state with 
power centralised.  The Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), a political party supported largely by 
Zulu people, wanted a devolved system of government within a unitary arrangement.  The 
IFP‟s support base was located primarily in the previous homeland of KwaZulu, where land 
was controlled by chiefs. The IFP preferred a unitary state configuration as opposed to any 
type of federal dispensation, because, as Deegan argues, they would financially benefit more 
by being included in the Republic of South Africa.
153 
  Decentralisation and the devolution of 
power to regional and local authorities would allow for a degree of self-determination, and 
hence control over their fiefdoms, while also being entitled to central support. 
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Minority parties representing White interests, such as the ruling National Party (NP) and the 
Conservative Party (CP), sought ways for each community within a region to run their affairs 
as independently as possible. The CP sought an independent Afrikaner state.  The NP 
favoured a federal dispensation, since this would protect the existing White geographical 
settlement patterns, while maintaining their economic base. For all intents purposes, the 




The MPNF endorsed the amalgamation of all four homelands as well as the six self-
governing territories into the Republic of South Africa, demarcated into nine provinces of a 
unitary state.  (See Map 3.2) 
 
Map 3.2:  The Nine Provinces of South Africa  
Source:  Gijsbertsen, B.  (2009). Department of Geography.  University of KwaZulu-Natal. 
 
Lodge argues that the establishment of nine regional polities owed much to “the imperatives 
of a negotiated transition to democracy in which the ANC was persuaded of the wisdom of 
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making concessions to smaller parties.”
155
  The physical reconfiguration of the geographical 
and political landscape of South Africa provided the foundation for creating a democratic 
South Africa, where political power would be shared in a unitary state.  During subsequent 
discussions, the significance of local authorities became more and more evident as well as the 
extent to which powers would be devolved to local authorities.  Minorities groups wanted 
local governments with extensive autonomous decision-making powers.  The devolution of 
substantial local power and authority was deemed critical to safeguarding the autonomy and 
self-determination of the various communities.
156   
 
3.2.2 Local Government Negotiations 
 
The early 1990s were characterised by a series of local government negotiations together 
with a number of legislative reforms.  By the end of 1991, the ANC-aligned civic 
organisations had organised themselves into the South African National Civic Association 
(SANCO).  In 1991, the Interim Measures for a Local Government Act (Act 128 of 1991) 
was passed by the White minority parliament, indicating a move towards a more democratic 
system of local government.
157 
  This legislation was further extended by the Provincial and 
Local Authority Affairs Amendment Act (Act 134 of 1992) signalling the way for 
negotiations between the ruling party and liberation movements on the political 




During 1992, the then Minister of Local Government entered into discussions with SANCO 
regarding the restructuring of local government.  By early 1993, SANCO persuaded the 
Minister of Local Government to establish a national Local Government Negotiating Forum 
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(LGNF), which proved to be a pertinent contributor to local government reforms.
159
  The 
LGNF was made up of two delegations: a statutory delegation
160
 and a non-statutory 
delegation.
161
  It did not replace any existing statutory body and did not have legal status.  Its 
tasks were merely to explore, research and recommend options for local government 
restructuring to the Multi-Party Negotiating Process (MPNP) at the World Trade Centre in 
Kempton Park (Gauteng).
162
    
 
The establishment of the LGNF was a major achievement for local government 
transformation in South Africa.  The purpose of the LGNF was to “contribute to the 
democratisation of local government and to bring about a democratic, non-racial, non-sexist 
and financially viable local government system.”
163
  The LGNF drafted the Agreement on 





Initially, the negotiations around local government reform illustrated the different 
stakeholders‟ determination to uphold their respective policy positions.  For example, the 
non-statutory delegation insisted on exclusive proportional representative local government 
elections, whereas the statutory delegation insisted on exclusive ward representation.  The 
minority-led ruling party, the National Party (NP), wanted to protect its constituency in a 
future dispensation of majority rule, and argued strongly for the protection of minority rights 
at a local government level.  The NP therefore called for municipal councillors to be elected 
on a constituency-based system and proposed a ward representation system, delineated into 
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specific geographical boundaries.
165
   Because of the geographical location of White 
suburbia, it would largely guarantee the election of a White political representative for that 
area.  This would ensure that minorities would have some representation at local government 
level.  On the other hand, non-statutory bodies called for local government representation 
based on a simple system of proportional representation which translates into majority-rule.  
The final agreement reached was that local councils would comprise 60 percent of 
councillors elected on a ward-system, and 40 percent of councillors elected by proportional 
representation.
166
    
 
The LGNF‟s recommendation became officially entrenched in the Local Government 
Transition Act of 1993 (Act 209 of 1993) (LGTA).  The LGTA essentially offered a 
framework for a locally-negotiated transition process.
167
  It established the policy framework 
for introducing a system of decentralised government prior to the first democratic elections.  
It also continued to inform local government transformation until 1996 when the Constitution 
of South Africa was enacted and the White Paper on Local Government drafted.
168
  The 
LGTA was the first piece of legislation that seriously considered the introduction of a 
democratic local government for South Africa and signified an agreement reached after more 
than a decade‟s worth of negotiations between the ruling party of the day, and those who had 
previously been formally excluded from the political decision-making process.
169
   
 
The framework for transition adopted in the LGTA was incorporated in the Interim 
Constitution of 1993.
170
  As such, democratic political decentralisation became official with 
                                        
165
 Van Donk, M. and Pieterse, E. (2006).  Reflections on the Design of a Post-Apartheid 
System of (Urban) Local Government.  In  Pillay, U.  (Ed.).  (2006).  Democracy and 
Delivery:  Urban Policy in South Africa. Pretoria:  Human Sciences Research Council 
Publishers.  And The White Paper on Local Government (1998). 
166
The Local Government Transition Act. (Act 209 of 1993).  And Van Vuuren, D.J., 
Wiehahn, N.E., Rhoodie, N.J. and Wiechers, M. (Eds.). (1999).  South Africa in the Nineties.  
Human Sciences Research Council Publishers:  Pretoria.   
167
 Van Vuuren, D.J., Wiehahn, N.E., Rhoodie, N.J. and Wiechers, M. (Eds.). (1999).  South 
Africa in the Nineties.  Pretoria:  Human Sciences Research Council Publishers.   
168
 The Local Government Transition Act. (Act 209 of 1993).  And The Constitution of South 
Africa.  (Act 108 of 1996).   
169
 The Local Government Transition Act. (Act 209 of 1993).   
170
 Van Donk, M. and Pieterse, E.  (2006). Reflections on the Design of a Post-Apartheid 
System of (Urban) Local Government.  In  Pillay, U.  (Ed.).  (2006).  Democracy and 
Delivery:  Urban Policy in South Africa. Pretoria:  Human Sciences Research Council 
Publishers.   
 
 
Page | 71 
the ANC committing itself to grant local government constitutional authority as a separate 
level of government after the first national democratic elections.  Local government was seen 
as fundamental to fostering democracy, as well as conducive to economic and social 
development.  For the first time in South Africa, decentralisation would entail devolution, by 
transferring political autonomy to local authorities.
171
   
The LGTA initiated a three-phased local government transformation process: the pre-interim; 




- The pre-interim phase commenced in April 1994 immediately after the first national 
and provincial democratic elections in South Africa. 
 
- The interim phase began with the completion of the first local democratic elections in 
December 1995 and ended with the enactment of the Constitution in 1996. 
 
- The final phase officially commenced once the Constitution was enacted.  
 
Each phase brought about significant changes and reforms for local government.  Combined, 
they illustrate how lengthy and disjointed the local government transformation process has 
been in South Africa.  Particularly during the pre-interim phase, fundamental aspects of 
political decentralisation were debated concerning local electoral systems and processes as 
well as public participation.  The demarcation and amalgamation of municipal boundaries 
were perhaps the most fundamental and complex local government reforms undertaken, and 
as this study will illustrate, this indirectly shaped the administrative and fiscal local 
government systems and procedures that were to be considered in the legislation that had yet 
to be drafted. 
 
3.2.3 Local Government Demarcation 
 
Since 1993, local government demarcation has been an on-going process, which has taken 
place in each of the three phases of local government transformation.  The LGTA established 
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nine provincial demarcations boards that would be responsible for reviewing existing 
municipal boundaries and establishing new municipalities in time for the first local 
government elections which were planned for December 1995.  These provincial boards were 
advisory bodies and assisted with the elimination of racial boundaries by creating 
jurisdictions that were racially more representative of South Africa.
173
  The objective was to 
create „wall-to-wall‟ municipalities encompassing the whole of South Africa.  This entailed 
the abolishment of apartheid created boundaries and redetermination of municipal boundaries 
encompassing areas that were previously regarded as homelands and self-governing 
territories in time for the 1995/96 elections.
174
  The end result was the delineation of 1280 
new non-racial boundaries, accompanied by the appointment of interim local councils, 
enabling South Africa‟s first democratic local government elections.
175
  In essence, the 
objective of the first round of demarcation was to create politically representative and racially 
inclusive municipalities so that local democratic elections could be held.
176
  As such, the 
demarcation process facilitated the political decentralisation process.  
 
The 1998 Demarcation Act established an independent Demarcation Board.  The 
Demarcation Board was responsible for rationalising and amalgamating previously separate 
municipalities into racially more representative authorities in time for the 1999/2000 election.  
(See Map 3.3 illustrating the reconfiguration of TLCs into Category B municipalities and 
Map 3.4 illustrating the 843 municipalities established in 1995 by the Demarcation Board). 
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Map 3.3:  Reconfiguration of Transitional Local Council into Category B Municipalities 
              Source:  Gijsbertsen, B.  (2009). Department of Geography.  University of KwaZulu-Natal.        
Map 3.4:  Delineation of 843 Local Municipalities (1995). 
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The Demarcation Board was heavily criticised for creating, firstly, too many municipalities, 
and secondly, financially unviable municipalities during the 1999/2000 demarcation 
process.
177
  However, this outcome was inevitable given the vast administrative and financial 
disparities that existed between the more developed White areas compared to those of under-
resourced and undeveloped homelands, the self-governing territories, as well as the 
townships 
 
The LGTA set-up a hierarchical two-tiered local government system.  Firstly, at a 
metropolitan level between the Transitional Metropolitan Councils (TMCs),  as the secondary 
tier, and Metropolitan Local Councils (MLCs), as the primary tier of local government.  
Secondly, by defining Regional Councils (RCs) as the secondary tier of local government 
outside of metropolitan areas, thus incorporating the Transitional Local Councils (TLCs) and 
the Transitional Rural Councils (TRCs).
178
  Immediately after the first local government 
elections held in December 1995, the Demarcation Board set forth to redefine municipal 
boundaries yet again - reducing the number of local authorities from 1280 to 843 comprising: 
 
 6 Transitional Metropolitan Councils (TMCs) in the largest metropolitan regions in 
the country.  Each was further subdivided into Metropolitan Local Councils (MLCs);   
 
 42 Regional Councils (RCs) overseeing large expanses of mostly less populated rural 
and agricultural areas;   
 
 506 Transitional Local Councils (TLCs) in urban areas, incorporating larger tracts of 
rural areas into the former boundaries of cities; 
 
 And 265 Transitional Rural Councils (TRCs), except in KwaZulu-Natal where 
traditional leaders objected to the establishment of democratically elected local 
councils. 
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Table 3.1: Municipal Demarcation During The Interim Phase  
 
Provinces 
TMCs MLCs RCs TLCs TRCs 
Eastern Cape   6 94 76+7 
Free State   4 80 15 
Gauteng 4 12 2 14 9+10 
KwaZulu-Natal  1 6 7 61 - 
Mpumalanga   3 55 18 
Northern Cape   6 64 42 
Northern Province   2 13 36 
North West   5 30 18 
Western Cape 1 6 7 95 27 
South Africa  6 24 42 506 265 
Source:  Adapted from Municipal Demarcation Board. (2000).  Municipal Demarcation Board Process and Research Circular.   
 
Local authorities experienced numerous implementation problems emanating from the two- 
tiered local government system.  The Financial and Fiscal Commission argued that the two-
tiered system in metropolitan areas was financially wasteful and impracticable.
179
  Further 
criticism was targeted at the fact that both upper-tier TMCs and lower-tier MLCs were given 
autonomous powers and functions.  This meant that each tier could pass its own budgets, and 
were employer bodies in their own right. Each set about developing its own full complement 
of senior officials.  This resulted in significant over-investment of staff capacity across 
metropolitan areas, relative to what was required.
180
  In addition, the operating budgets of the 
TMCs and individual MLCs had to balance collectively, not individually. In some cities this 
meant that MLCs could safely assume that their shortfall would be covered by the TMCs, 
meaning that MLCs had little incentive to contain expenditure. This resulted in poor financial 
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Outside the metropolitan areas, each province was demarcated into RCs.  RCs were further 
demarcated into TLCs in and around urban areas, and TRCs in more rural areas. However, in 
KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape agreement could not be reached on where to establish 
TRCs since most of the land outside the urban areas was tribal land and under traditional 
leadership.  Traditional leaders (or Chiefs) believed that the Demarcation Board cut across 
tribal areas, meaning that tribal land would be divided between different municipal councils 
and therefore would be affected differently by development programmes.
182
  The deadlock 
between government and traditional leaders on this issue meant that the RCs in KwaZulu-
Natal and the Eastern Cape provinces were not demarcated into TRCs but were declared 




Tension arose around the issue of traditional leadership versus democratic representation at 
the RC level.  At first, traditional leaders could take up no more than 20% of seats in a RC.
184
  
The number of seats of a RC was determined inversely.  For example, if two traditional 
leaders reigned in the jurisdiction of a specific Regional Council, then that Council would 
have ten seats.  In KwaZulu-Natal, however, 63 traditional leaders resided in Regional 
Council 5,
185
 meaning that this Council was made up of 315 seats.  (See Table 2.2).  This 
calculation meant that the smallest Regional Council consisted of 125 councillors while the 
largest Regional Council in KwaZulu-Natal comprised 335 councillors.  These were large 





Table 3.2:  Representation in KwaZulu-Natal’s Regional Councils 
 RC 1 RC 2 RC 3 RC 4 RC 5 RC 6 RC 7 
Seats 335 175 125 135 315 235 260 
Total 1580 local councillors 
 
Source:  Adapted from Municipal Demarcation Board. (2000).  Municipal Demarcation Board Process and Research Circular. 
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The result in KwaZulu-Natal led to large all-encompassing RCs which incorporated 
nominated representatives from the TLCs and, in the absence of formal TRCs, nominated 
representatives from the Remaining Areas that fell outside the TLCs.  RCs had little authority 
since they were composed of a mix of interest groups such as farmers, women, ratepayers and 
traditional leaders. Traditional authorities had no voting or decision-making powers since 
they were not democratically elected.
187
   
 
In essence, the demarcation of RCs resulted in the creation of large sub-national government 
units with insignificant political decision-making powers. As a result, provinces were 
delegated the task of setting the decision-making agenda, and the powers and functions of 
RCs were awarded by provincial proclamation.  This system entrenched a hierarchical system 
of local government.  The weaknesses of RCs meant that TLCs were dependent on the 
financial resource allocations determined by provinces.  This system resulted in TLCs finding 
themselves subordinate to RCs as well as to provinces.  The creation of large ineffective RCs 
under the auspices of provincial governments created political tension, administrative chaos 




Many criticised the 1999/2000 demarcation process for having prioritised political 
accommodation above administrative and financial feasibility.
189
  The White Paper on Local 
Government stated that the newly created boundaries failed to properly integrate urban and 
rural settlements.  In search of creating politically neutral jurisdictions, demarcation created a 
large numbers of local authorities.  These new structures, although highly controversial and 
often incapable of delivering local government services, were nevertheless a first step 
towards making local government democratic in that local municipalities finally represented 
all races and interest groups.  As such, demarcation succeeded in making local authorities 
politically and racially representative – thus making great strides towards political 
decentralisation.  In this respect, criticism of the Demarcation Board was unjustified since its 
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fundamental objective was to eradicate the racially determined apartheid boundaries and 
create wall-to-wall municipalities so that democratic local government elections could be 
held.
190
   
 
Newly amalgamated municipalities were administratively in a state of flux and financially 
non-viable.  However, this was not a problem of demarcation but rather was because of the 
large discrepancies between traditional White areas and all other areas, which were caused by 
the structural and geographical fragmentation of apartheid separate development policies.   It 
was an inevitable consequence of having to amalgamate the underdeveloped homelands and 




Besides the geographical challenge of amalgamating previously excluded areas, demarcation 
also took place in the absence of a final legislative framework. In addition, the respective 
administrative and financial powers and functions of local government were also not yet 
defined.  It was only in 1996 with the enactment of the Constitution of South Africa, and the 
Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998), that specific types of municipalities were 
identified.  As such, the municipal boundaries delineated by the Demarcation Board during 
the interim phases became obsolete.   
 
So far this chapter has presented a chronological narrative of events preceding and informing 
the current legislative framework for local government in South Africa.  The negotiation 
processes of the 1990s, and the resultant Local Government Transition Act set in motion a 
series of processes, such as demarcation, and formalised a local electoral system composed of 
proportional representation and constituency-based representation.  This has resulted in a 
politically decentralised system of local government based on the political compromises 
reached during the negotiation process.   
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The focus of the remainder of the chapter is on the emerging legislative framework of local 
government in a post-apartheid South Africa, beginning with the enactment of South Africa‟s 
first democratic Constitution.  It is argued that the Constitution precipitated the need for a 
series of local government statutes in order to give effect to local government‟s 
constitutionally guaranteed autonomy.  The subsequent section of this chapter identifies the 
nature of political decentralisation, both normatively and in reality.  It questions to what 
extent the legislative framework decentralises political power and authority to local 
government, and how this has unfolded in practice.  
 
3.3 The Constitution of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996) 
 
With the enactment of South Africa‟s first democratic Constitution in 1996, local government 
became officially established as a constitutionally protected sphere of government.  It 
entrenches local government as an autonomous sphere of government, whereby Municipal 
Councils are elected locally and are granted executive and legislative authority.
192
 Each has 
the autonomy to “govern, on its own initiative, the local government affairs of its community, 
subject to national and provincial legislation, as provided for in the Constitution.”
193
  Based 
on this, political decentralisation by devolution appears to be firmly entrenched.   
3.3.1 Local Government as a Sphere of Government  
 
The devolution of political authority to sub-national levels of government is further evident in 
the establishment of three spheres of government:  national, provincial and local government. 
Spheres (as opposed to tiers) are supposed to co-exist in a system of cooperative government, 
which are “distinctive, interdependent and interrelated.”
194
  Spheres must perform their 
functions within their own designated powers and functions, and not encroach on other 
spheres.
195
   Instead, spheres “must assist and support one another”
196
 and inform, consult and 
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As such, local government is officially recognised as one of three spheres of government.  It 
is no longer a tier of government, subordinate to provincial or national government, but a 
sphere with its own powers and functions, which is legally demarcated into geographical 
areas of jurisdiction.  Local authorities are responsible for their own revenue, and accountable 
to their local constituencies through popular local elections. Local government is no longer a 
function of provincial or national government.
198
  In theory, therefore, local government is 
officially recognised as a fully fledged part of South Africa‟s decentralised system of 
democratic governance. 
 
At face value, local government powers as derived from the Constitution are no longer 
delegated from provincial government.  Provinces have no power over municipal by-laws, 




 - which are further defined in 
legislation such as the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act, Municipal Structures 
Act and the Municipal Systems Act.  (See Table 3.3 on page 83).  Monitoring is limited to 
identifying the extent to which municipalities are meeting their legislative obligations.  
Where such shortfalls are identified, provinces must take measures that will support the 
municipality in question.  Intervention can be as minimal as demanding access to municipal 
documents, (even if the function is exclusively a municipal one) or more extensive with the 
municipal functions being taken over by the province. 
 
The objective of such a system of cooperative governance is to promote and facilitate 
collaborative intergovernmental decision-making. Cooperative governance is about 
coordinating and aligning priorities, budgets, policies and activities across interrelated 
functions and sectors.  It aims to ensure a smooth flow of information within government, 
and between government and communities, with a view to enhancing the implementation of 





Political decentralisation is further embedded in the division of legislative and executive 
authority in all three spheres of government. (See Appendix 1 on the Structures of 
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Governance in South Africa).   Legislative authority under the auspices of the national sphere 
of government is vested in Parliament which is composed of the National Assembly (NA) 
and the National Council of Provinces (NCOP).
202
  The former is elected by a national vote 
based on proportional representation, while the latter comprises ten delegates from each of 
the nine provinces. Local Government has ex officio representation at the NCOP.  In the 
provincial sphere, legislative authority resides in provincial legislatures;
203
 and at the local 
sphere in municipal councils.
204
 The national legislature may only intervene in provincial or 
municipal legislative authority when this is in the interest of: national security; economic 
policy; maintaining national standards; setting national service standards; and setting the 




Executive authority in the national sphere of government resides with the President (who is 
elected by Parliament) as well as a Cabinet (which is appointed by the President).  Ministers 
have executive authority over individually assigned national government departments.  
Executive authority in the provincial sphere of government resides with the Premier (who is 
elected by the provincial legislature), as well as with provincial Members of the Executive 
Council (MECs) who have executive authority over individually assigned provincial 
government departments.  In the local sphere of government, executive authority is vested in 
the Mayor (who is elected by Council) and an Executive Committee (elected by Council) or a 
Mayoral Committee (appointed by the Mayor).  The Executive oversees the work of the 
Municipal Manager who resides over local government department heads.
206
  Issues related 




3.3.2 The Delineation of Municipal Categories 
 
In addition to prescribing the three spheres of government, as well as specifying each 
spheres‟ respective legislative and executive authority, the Constitution further provides for 
three categories of municipalities:  Category A, B and C.   It reiterates the notion of wall-to-
wall municipalities: “the local sphere of government consists of municipalities which must be 
                                        
202
 Section 44 of the Constitution of South Africa.  (Act 108 of 1996). 
203
 Section 104 of the Constitution of South Africa.  (Act 108 of 1996). 
204
 Section 156 of the Constitution of South Africa.  (Act 108 of 1996). 
205
 Schedule 6 of the Constitution of South Africa.  (Act 108 of 1996). 
206
 Municipal Structures Act. (Act 117 of 1998). 
207
 The Constitution of South Africa.  (Act 108 of 1996). 
 
 
Page | 82 
established for the whole of the territory of the Republic”.
208
    A fundamental objective is to 
ensure the inclusion of all areas in the new local dispensation.   
 
Category A municipalities or metropolitan municipalities have “exclusive municipal 
executive and legislative authority in their area.”
209
  They are characterised as areas where 
there is high population density; an intense movement of people, goods, and services; 
extensive development; multiple business districts and industrial areas.  They are also areas 
with a “centre of economic activity with a complex and diverse economy and have strong 
interdependent social and economic linkages between its constituent units.
”210
  As such, 
metropolitan councils are a category of municipality that largely operate independently of the 
other two categories. 
 
In effect, the Constitution entrenches a two-tiered system of local government between 
Category B and Category C municipalities.  Category B municipalities, or local 
municipalities, “share municipal executive and legislative authority in [their] area with a 
Category C municipality within whose area it falls”
211
 and Category C (or district) 
municipalities have “municipal executive and legislative authority in an area that includes 
more than one municipality.”
212
    
 
The rationale was to remove the urban-rural distinction between urban areas and regional 
councils.
213
   With regard to the assignment of service delivery functions, the delineation of 
three different types of categories of municipalities and their location within the overall 
hierarchy of government remains an area of contestation, as the next chapter will highlight.  
The two-tiered relationship between Category C and Category B, it will be argued, has 
become more characteristic of delegation and deconcentration as opposed to devolution to the 
lowest level of government.  
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3.3.3 The Local Government Legislative Framework 
 
The Constitution of South Africa is sovereign and provides the legislative framework for 
subsequent legislation.  It requires government to give effect to local government autonomy.  
From the enactment of the Constitution until late 2000 a number of fundamental local 
government Acts were authorised.  Some of the key policy documents and Acts with 
particular relevance to the political powers and functions of local government are summarised 
in Table 3.3.  
 
Table 3.3: Local Government Legislation Pertaining to Political Decentralisation  
The Organised Local Government Act (Act 52 of 1997) 
Provides for national and provincial organisations representing the different categories of 
municipalities and the designation of representatives to participate in the National Council of 
Provinces.  It provides for the establishment of the South African Local Government 
Association and nine provincial local government associations (PLGAs).   
The Municipal Demarcation Act (Act 27 of 1998) 
Provide the criteria and procedures for the determination of municipal boundaries by an 
independent authority.  It establishes and regulates the independent Municipal Demarcation 
Board.  It authorises the Municipal Demarcation Board to establish and/or amend local 
municipal boundaries conducive to representative and participatory democracy. 
The Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998) (See Appendix 2) 
Provides for the establishment of municipalities in accordance with the requirements relating 
to categories and types of municipality.  It establishes criteria for determining the category of 
municipality to be established in an area; and defines the types of municipality that may be 
established within each category.  It provides for an appropriate division of functions and 
powers between categories of municipality; and regulates the internal systems, structures and 
office-bearers of municipalities.  It provides for the determination of  electoral systems. 
The Municipal Electoral Act (Act 27 of 2000) 
Provides for citizens‟ right to choose their local council through regular, competitive local 
elections as well as the election procedures for municipal councils, including the 
requirements for parties and ward candidates to contest the elections as well as general 
procedures, to regulate municipal elections. 
The Municipal Systems Act (Act 32 of 2000)  
Provides for the establishment of guidelines for community participation in local government 
decision-making processes.  
The Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (Act 36 of 2005) 
To establish a framework for the national government, provincial governments and local 
governments to promote and facilitate intergovernmental relations; provides for mechanisms 
and procedures to facilitate the settlement of intergovernmental disputes; and provides for 
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While local government legislation was being considered, the municipal boundaries 
established during the interim phase had to be re-established in accordance with the 
Constitution and the Municipal Demarcation Act (Act 27 of 1998).  The focus of demarcation 
then extended to creating not only politically inclusive municipalities, but also to making 
them more financially and administratively viable. The priorities were geographical 
continuity and coherence, resource sharing, manageable size and functionality.
214
  The 
objective was to create “truly-bounded municipalities where boundaries correspond with 
socio-economic activity spaces.”
215  
Municipalities had to be created that integrated both 
urban and rural settlements.  The argument was that all towns had functional links to rural 
areas, whether culturally or economically. The criticism was that the “[R]ural administrations 
that were set up during the interim phases were largely political shells without any formal 
administration.”
216
   
 
By the end of 2000 (in time for the second local government elections) the 834 local 
authorities were further rationalised into 283.
217
  (See Table 3.4).  The new municipal system 
consists of:
218
   
· 6 Category A Municipalities
219
  
(or metropolitan areas with 6.6 million voters, 1052 councillors).  
· 231 Category B Municipalities  
(or local municipalities with 11.7 million voters, 6376 councillors)  
· 46 Category C Municipalities  
(or district municipalities with 1518 councillors serving them).
220     
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Table 3.4:  Demarcation of Municipal Boundaries as from 5 December 2000  
 









Cross Boundary local 
municipalities  
South Africa  6 42 223 8 
Eastern Cape  - 6 38 - 
Free State - 5 20 - 
Gauteng 4 2 7 
1 with Mpumalanga 
1 with North-West 
KwaZulu-Natal  1 9 50 - 
Mpumalanga - 3 17 
4 with Northern Province 
1 with Gauteng 
Northern Cape - 4 21 2 with North-West 
Northern Province - 4 24 4 with Mpumalanga 
North West - 4 22 
2 with Northern Cape 
1 with Gauteng 
Western Cape 1 5 24 - 
Source:  Adapted from Municipal Demarcation Board. (2000). Municipal Demarcation Board Process and Research. 
 
 
The rationalisation from 843 to 283 municipalities meant that the newly demarcated areas 
were geographically more expansive, and demographically more populated than emerged 
from the first demarcation process.  It resulted in yet another process of administrative and 
fiscal reorganisation, as municipal staff and separate administrations, with different financial 
capacity and resources, were amalgamated into new municipalities.
221
   
 
In metropolitan areas, the two-tiered system of metropolitan municipalities was removed with 
the abolishment of Metropolitan Local Councils.  Regional Councils and Transitional Local 
Councils were disbanded and replaced with Category C and B municipalities respectively.  
However, the structural tension which characterised the relationship between Regional 
Councils and Transitional Local Councils continued as Category C and B municipalities 
remain structured as a two-tiered system of local government insofar as Category B 
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municipalities share executive and legislative authority with Category C municipalities.
222
     
In other words, while Category A and C municipalities were devolved autonomous powers 
and authority, Category B municipalities remain in a two-tiered configuration with Category 
C municipalities, with the latter having the authority to delegate certain powers and functions 
to Category B municipalities.
223
   
3.4 Intergovernmental Relations and Local Government Autonomy 
 
The Constitution legally enshrines local government as a functional and critical part of a 
system of cooperative government. It further delineates local government in different 
categories of municipalities.  However, in practice, intergovernmental relations between the 
national, provincial and local government spheres, as well as among local government 
categories, illustrate a hierarchical system of governance. 
 
While there is a division of legislative and executive authority within and across the three 
spheres of government, what is obvious is the absence of direct local government 
representation at national government level.  While the Organised Local Government Act 
(Act 52 of 1997) theoretically provides for local government to partake in national policy-
making, the Constitution stipulates that only ten part-time representatives designated by 
organised local government “may participate … but may not vote”
 224
 in the national 
legislative process through NCOP. Representation is limited to the South African Local 
Government Association (SALGA) and the nine Provincial Local Government Associations 
(PLGAs), thus comprising the ten participants „allowed‟ to participate at NCOP.  The result is 
that local government is largely absent at national government level.  Representation is 
limited to only one representative of each provincial local government association, headed by 
a delegate of SALGA, that is ten officials, representing 283 municipalities.  
 
The Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (Act 13 of 2005) (IRFA) elaborates on the 
constitutional notion of cooperative governance. Prior to the IRFA, many ad hoc 
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intergovernmental forums existed.
225
  One of the objectives of the IRFA is to formalise a 
series of intergovernmental forums; however these forums provide for limited local 
government participation.  For example, there is no formal local government representation 
on the key national intergovernmental bodies such as: 
 
 The President‟s Coordinating Council (PCC), 
 FOSAD (Forum of South African Director-Generals) which comprises National and 
Provincial Director-Generals,  
 the respective Ministerial Forums (such as MinMECs),  
 the Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC),  
 nor in the Cabinet Cluster system (comprising ministries and departments in related 
functional areas as well as provincial director-generals).  
 
According to the policy framework, fostering good intergovernmental relations is part of 
provinces‟ obligation to provide local government support.  In reality the system of 
cooperative governance is hierarchical.  Although the Constitution enshrines local 
government as a functional and critical part of a decentralised system of cooperative 
governance, it seems that in reality local government remains a lesser or subservient sphere 
of government for a number of reasons.   
 
At a provincial level, The Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (IRFA) only provides 
for Category A and Category C municipalities to be represented on Provincial Coordinating 
Forums (PCFs). Regardless of the fact that such intergovernmental structures meet 
sporadically or are not particular effective, the point remains that, in legal terms, Category B 
municipalities are excluded. Their opportunity for intergovernmental input is mainly in 
District Intergovernmental Forums (DIGFs).  DIGFs delegate one representative to the 
Provincial Local Government Associations (PLGA) which in turn delegates only one 
representative to the national government level. 
 
In other words, for Category B municipalities, the only entry point at national policy-making 
level is through their DIGF representative.  However, not all districts are represented and 
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only one district delegate per provincial local government association represents all three 
categories of municipalities in the South African Local Government Association (SALGA) - 
an intergovernmental body that has no voting power. 
3.5 Ward Committees as Institutions for Public Participation  
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the literature on political decentralisation often focuses 
on its contribution to the democratisation of state-society relations. Under apartheid, local 
government was an extension of a minority-led central government providing no 
opportunities for popular participation or input into decision-making processes.   In post-
apartheid South Africa, the Constitution devolves political authority to local government 
insofar as municipalities must „provide democratic and accountable government for local 
communities.’
226
  Whereas apartheid policies prohibited widespread public participation, 
constitutionally, municipalities now have a legal obligation to „encourage the involvement of 
communities and community organisations in the matters of local government.’
227
   
 
The political compromise reached during local government negotiations meant that 
municipalities had to be divided into municipal wards in order to enable local government 
elections based on proportional representation as well as on a ward system.   The expectation 
was that wards would enable local public participation and input into the local governance 
processes. 
 
The literature claims that decentralisation brings government closer to the people, and offers 
people an opportunity to partake in and inform policy-making.  In so doing, the argument 
goes, municipal authorities understand local needs and can serve their constituencies better, 
leading to appropriate service delivery.
228
  These types of theoretical arguments are widely 
represented in South African local government legislation.  The Municipal Systems Act, for 
example, defines municipalities as the sphere of government closest to the people, with 
powers and duties that directly affect the development of local areas and the daily lives of 
local residents.  It charges municipalities with the duty to develop a culture of democratic 
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The Municipal Systems Act instructs local authorities to be responsive to the needs of the 
local community;
230
 to establish clear channels of communication with the local 
community;
231
 to inform the local community about the services which they are entitled to 
receive;
232
 and to inform the local community how the municipality is managed, what it 
spends its money on, and who is in charge.
233
  It regards the formal systems of governance, 
such as periodic elections, as but one element of local governance, calling on the active 
participation of citizens in municipal processes.  It argues that community participation 
deepens democracy by giving local citizens a direct say in a range of decisions and processes 
which affect them, and regards this as integral to the provision of municipal services.
234
   
 
Municipalities must create the necessary conditions for greater democratic public 
involvement in municipal decision-making processes.  Besides participation, municipalities 
must be transparent and make decisions publicly available for comment.  Municipalities must 
create and support formal structures so that residents can participate in local policy-making 





The Municipal Structures Act is more specific and stipulates the powers and functions of 
municipal office bearers, and the obligation to establish municipal committees to which the 
public must have access.   One such prescription is the establishment of municipal-wide ward 
committees to act as non-partisan forums for community participation.  In Category A and 
Category B municipalities 50 % of councillors are elected in their respective wards.  The 
remainder of the council comprises councillors elected on a party-list system of proportional 
representation.
236
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A ward councillor is responsible for setting up a ward committee (comprising no more than 
ten people) representing a diversity of interests.
237
   The objective of ward committee 
meetings is to provide a forum for interaction between ward councillor and residents, where 
information is shared and where matters affecting the ward are discussed.
238
  Ward 
committees, in turn, may make presentations to the local council.
239
   
 
Although it is not the objective of this study to assess whether the political decentralisation of 
local government has created democratic local government, it is relevant insofar as 
questioning to what extent the political structures and systems such as the ward system at 
local government level enable public participation.  Some studies suggest that forums for 
public participation, such as ward committees, are not effective channels for community 
participation in local decision-making.
240
  The ward system was proposed during the national 
negotiation period as a way to provide for constituency representation as opposed to a system 
of proportional representation which favours national political parties. Constituency 
representation can offset patronage inherent in a system of proportional representation when 
the national ruling party dominates.  However, in the South African context, it appears that 
ward committees, too, have been usurped by the national party agenda.
241
   
 
Deacon et al explored ward committees and their contribution to municipal governance in 
relation to party politics.
242
 They questioned whether “ward committees offer an opportunity 
for the local community to engage, and hold accountable, officials and councillors 
independently of party agendas, or [whether they are] an innovation dominated by, and even 
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advancing the interests of, the local party branch?”
243  
Their investigation into the operation 
of ward committees in the Msunduzi municipality (Pietermaritzburg, KwaZulu-Natal) found 
that functional, ward committees tended to be dominated by party agendas.  They found that, 
in a number of cases, ward committees have become forums for political parties, deepening 
patterns of patronage as opposed to deepening local democracy; that ward committees “are 
too politicised to offer an independent source of non-electoral accountability to parties.”
244
   
 
In such circumstances, ward councillors are, by implication, more accountable to the party as 
opposed to their local constituencies.  The authors find it questionable that ward committees 
can be truly non-partisan given the dominance of one party (the ANC) in South Africa‟s 
system of representative democracy.   (See Appendix 3 on the 2004 and 2009 National 
Election results). 
 
Alongside patronage, the national Department of Provincial and Local Government (DPLG) 
argues that despite the existence of a comprehensive institutional framework for public 
participation in local government, such systems and structures remain ineffective largely 
because of weak local councillor involvement.
245
 Accountability is limited, while corruption 
and nepotism are prevalent - with many municipalities under investigation.
246
  Common 
examples cited are accusations of favouritism in procurement processes, abuses of travel 
allowances, fictitious tenders, non-payment of services by councillors and the use of 




My own surveys in 2006 as well as the follow-up surveys in 2009 found that the majority of 
respondents regarded ward committee meetings as meaningless.  Few attended, and those 
who did thought it was a waste of time. Ward committee meetings were irregular, and some 
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ward councillors did not even attend their own meetings.
248
   In some instances, issues or 
problems were screened by the ward committee members first before they would be 
considered by the ward councillor; hence respondents regarded ward councillors as 
unapproachable and unwilling to be held accountable.  Despite their criticism, every 
respondent thought that ward committee meetings should be held since this would give them 
a chance to raise service delivery issues, and give them an opportunity to meet their ward 
councillor face-to-face.  
 
The politicisation of ward committees in South Africa is but one indicator of an overall 
system of political patronage.  This is amplified, as some argue, by the fact that the ANC has 
no serious party opposition in any sphere of government, and it has the power and legitimate 
authority to control and reform the state.
249
  If so, then political power is not devolved to local 
government, but rather the central government‟s political reach has been extended.  Despite 
the legislative provision for devolved local government, formal structures for local 
participation, such as ward committees, appear to be deconcentrated extensions of the ANC‟s 
national party agenda, offering no distinctive opportunity for residents to contribute to the 
local service delivery agenda.   
Conclusion  
 
This chapter has illustrated that in the past two decades local government in South Africa has 
undergone some remarkable changes.  In theory, political decentralisation is no longer 
racially prescriptive, and politically fragmented institutions have been replaced by a 
formalised and democratic system of representative local government.    
 
It is apparent from the above that the local government transformation process has been a 
continuous and lengthy, if not somewhat disjointed, reform process.  Local government 
reforms were a complex and drawn-out process encompassing wide-spread transformation - 
legislative, politically, geographically, and institutionally.    
The replacement of a blatantly racist political system with one that enables universal public 
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participation at local government level is by itself momentous.  Officially, local government 
is the platform for local democracy and public participation.  However, as this chapter has 
shown, while legally positioned to foster local democracy, in reality, current practices 
illustrate that multiple factors have limited, and continue to limit, the true extent of political 
local government autonomy. 
 
This chapter has argued that the local government demarcation process was essentially driven 
by the ANC-led government‟s political quest to create racially more representative local 
authorities.  While demarcation took place, overarching legislation was drafted aimed at 
formalising the devolution of powers and functions to local authorities.    
 
This chapter has shown that the formal intergovernmental relations framework marginalises 
local government, thereby contradicting the constitutional definition of local government as 
being a distinctive, interdependent and interrelated sphere of government.  One of the tenets 
of this study is that the lack of political local government autonomy impacts on the extent of 
administrative as well as financial local government autonomy. 
 
It has also been argued that Category B municipalities are to all intents and purposes fully 
excluded from the national decision-making process.  Firstly, because of their lack of official 
representation in national intergovernmental forums at executive level, since Category B 
municipalities are not represented beyond the district level.  The marginalisation of Category 
B municipalities makes them vulnerable to unwarranted provincial or national government 
intervention.  Decisions on whether provinces or national government should intervene are 
taken at national executive level – a level, as has been argued earlier, where Category B 
municipalities are glaringly absent.  Secondly, because of the ineffectiveness and 
independence of ward committees.  Even in those municipalities where ward committees do 
operate successfully, such input is lost, and as Deacon et al argue, party agendas dominate.
250
    
Such a configuration, this study will argue, poses a challenge for Category B municipalities 
as they are at the forefront of current service delivery problems yet they are marginalised at 
the national policy-making front.  
The next chapter will focus on the decentralisation of administrative authority to local 
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government.  The nature of political decentralisation influences the devolution of 
administrative powers and authority across the three spheres of government.   The chapter 
will focus more specifically on the administrative obstacles confronting Category B 
municipalities, and how sharing service delivery responsibilities with Category C 
municipalities constitute a unique set of intergovernmental complications, thus reiterating 












The previous chapter examined political decentralisation in South Africa by analysing the 
political configuration of governance.  It showed that despite local government being 
constitutionally entrenched as a separate and autonomous sphere of power, it remains 
dominated politically by the national executive authority as well as marginalised in national 
government policy-making processes.   
 
The focus of this chapter is on the distribution of powers and functions between national and 
sub-national governments which Cohen et al consider to be aspects of administrative 
decentralisation.
251
  In theory, this understanding of administrative decentralisation is evident 
in the legislative framework in South Africa. The enactment of the Constitution and 
subsequent local government policies, such as the White Paper on Local Government (1998), 
the Municipal Structures Act (1998) and the Municipal Systems Act (2000), formalised 
political decentralisation by determining the regulatory framework for local government, and 
also provide the foundation for the devolution of powers and functions to local government.   
 
This chapter will commence by identifying the constitutional functions and responsibilities 
devolved to local government.  These are broad, extensive and not specifically defined.  The 
focus of this thesis is on local municipalities‟ responsibility for service delivery, and more 
particularly on what is commonly referred to as basic services.  This chapter will show that 
the local government service delivery mandate is extensive.  Local governments are not only 
responsible for providing basic services, but must simultaneously eradicate existing service 
delivery backlogs.   
 
While all municipalities in South Africa face similar basic service delivery problems, this 
chapter will also investigate some of the basic service delivery challenges facing Category B 
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municipalities by exploring the administrative impact of: firstly, demarcation; secondly, the 
two-tiered local government system; and thirdly, the ongoing uncertainty regarding the 
assignment of basic service delivery functions between Category B and Category C 
municipalities. 
 
This chapter is particularly concerned with the division of powers and functions for basic 
service delivery between Category B and Category C municipalities.  It will show that the 
legislative process undertaken since 1993 has had ongoing administrative implications for 
Category B municipalities in their efforts to provide basic services.  This chapter will argue 
that most problems originate or are situated in the two-tiered system of local government.  
There has long been a tense relationship between these two categories of municipalities.  
This, it will be argued, is made worse by a lack of legislative clarity on the specific powers 
and functions devolved to each tier of municipality.   
 
The previous chapter demonstrated that the constitutional and legislative configuration of 
political decentralisation has set the agenda for the allocation of service delivery powers and 
functions.  This chapter re-examines the legislative framework with particular reference to 
the basic service delivery mandate of local municipalities. One of the contentions of this 
chapter is that local government‟s fundamental responsibility for basic service delivery is 
often compromised by the imperatives of the other spheres of government.  For example, 
while local governments have been devolved the legal authority to plan and execute their own 
social economic development programmes, as well as structure and manage their own 
administration,
252
 in reality autonomous authority for local development planning with regard 
to basic service delivery is dominated by the national mandate as opposed to one driven by 
local municipalities themselves. 
 
This chapter briefly considers the allocation of powers and functions to the three spheres of 
government and highlights the inherent challenges of concurrency. Such concurrency 
reinforces the argument that there are fundamental limitations to administrative 
decentralisation and by association, to local government autonomy.  This chapter will show 
that the basic service delivery challenges raise concerns over the extent of local 
municipalities‟ autonomy.  One of the key arguments here is that the hierarchical nature of 
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political decentralisation is also evident in that the decentralisation of administrative powers 
and functions to local municipalities are delegated as opposed to devolved. 
 
4.1    Local Government and its Constitutional Mandate 
 
Local government has been assigned substantial administrative autonomy regarding local 
democratic governance, service delivery and local economic development. The powers and 
responsibilities of local government are stipulated in the Constitution as follows:  
 to provide democratic and accountable government for local communities; 253  
 to ensure the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner; 254  
 to promote social and economic development; 255  
 to promote a safe and healthy environment;256 and  
 to encourage the involvement of communities and community organisations in the 




In addition to the above, a municipality must:   
 structure and manage its administration, and budgeting and planning processes to give 
priority to the basic needs of the community, and promote the social and economic 
development of the community;
258
 and  
 participate in national and provincial development programmes.259  
 
This study is concerned with local government‟s second constitutional obligation:  to ensure 
the provision of services to communities in a sustainable manner. The previous chapter 
highlighted the weaknesses of local democratic governance, and subsequent chapters will 
illustrate how financial challenges constrain local economic development.  The argument 
here is that the basic service delivery mandate is cumbersome, and made more challenging by 
ongoing national and provincial control over and delegation of basic service delivery 
responsibilities to local government. 
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The national mandate of the ANC has always been to provide universal access to a broad 
range of public services.  The Constitution enshrines the right of all citizens to quality socio-
economic services.  The most encompassing definition of public services refers to universal 
access to housing, water, sanitation, waste management, refuse removal, electricity, 
education, social welfare, nutrition, and health.
260
  The responsibility for realising these 
socio-economic rights is shared across the three spheres of government.  These are set out 
more fully in Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution. Schedule 4A sets out the functional areas 
of concurrent national and provincial legislative competence while Schedule 5A lists the 
functional areas of exclusive provincial legislative competence.  (See Appendixes 5 and 6).  
Based on these Schedules, municipal services relate to water supply; sewage collection and 
disposal; refuse removal; electricity and gas supply; municipal health services; municipal 
roads and storm water drainage; street lighting; and municipal parks and recreation.   
 
The Constitution recognises that municipalities may not have the resources necessary to fulfil 
each of these rights immediately. In this respect “[A] municipality must strive, within its 
financial and administrative capacity, to achieve the objects set out.”
261
 The primary 
obligation is to take reasonable legislative and other measures, based on the resources 
available, in order to achieve the progressive realisation of each of these rights.
262
   
  
4.2   Defining Basic Services 
 
In a context where resources and capacity are limited, the question remains as to which 
services to prioritise - in other words, which services are regarded as basic services.  The 
sheer size of unequal development during apartheid and the denial of the majority of South 
Africans to public services make any delineation of what constitutes a lifeline service 
difficult.  The Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC) regards all the local government 
functions spelt out in Schedule 4B as a core bundle of basic municipal services.   The White 
Paper on Local Government (1998) offers no clarity either, and refers to basic services as 
those services that enhance the quality of life of citizens, and increase their social and 
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economic opportunities by promoting health and safety, facilitating access (to work, to 
education, to recreation) and stimulating productive activities.
263
     
 
In 1994, the ANC introduced its Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) as 
South Africa‟s socio-economic policy framework. The RDP was a culmination of 
negotiations between the ANC and its Alliances partners (comprising the Congress of South 
African Trade Unions and the South African Communist Party).  The main vision of the RDP 
was to alleviate poverty and address the massive backlogs in social service delivery.  Meeting 
Basic Needs was identified as one of the key objectives of the RDP.  This is interpreted as 
 job creation, land reform, housing, services, water and sanitation, energy, 
telecommunications, transport, the environment, nutrition, health care, social security 
and social welfare.
264
   
 
A lack of resources made it necessary to determine a minimum threshold.  The RDP 
identified water and sanitation as the fundamental basic service delivery obligations of local 
government in respect of poor households.  But even then, existing resources would not 
suffice and basic services were capped at certain minimum levels.   
 
4.2.1 Basic Water 
 
The Water Services Act (Act 108 of 1997) describes basic water supply as the prescribed 
minimum standard of water supply services necessary for the reliable supply of a sufficient 
quantity and quality of water to households, including informal households, to support life 
and personal hygiene.
265





At RDP level:  The infrastructure necessary to supply 25 litres of potable water per person 
per day within 200 metres of a household and with a minimum flow of 10 litres per minute 
(in the case of communal water points) or 6000 litres of potable water supplied per formal 
connection per month (in the case of yard or house connections). 
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Below RDP:  A household has access to infrastructure such as a standpipe more than 200 
metres from a household.  Or no infrastructure when households rely on water from a dam, 
spring, river or trucking projects.  The absence of infrastructure at or below RDP level 
constitutes a water service delivery backlog. 
 
4.2.2 Basic Sanitation 
 
The quality and quantity of what constitutes basic sanitation is not as clearly defined.  It 
refers to a minimum acceptable basic level of sanitation defined as a system for disposing of 
human excreta, household waste water and refuse, which is acceptable and affordable to the 
users; is safe, hygienic and easily accessible; and which does not have an unacceptable 
impact on the environment.
267
  (See Appendix 7 for a List of Basic Sanitation Alternatives).  
The most common basic form of sanitation „at RDP level‟ is identified as Ventilated Pit 
Latrines (VIPs). 
 
4.2.3 Basic Electricity 
 
In 2003, electricity was officially added as a basic service and delegated to local 
government.
268  




Below RDP Level:  Households that relied on wood and candles as sources of cooking and 
lighting.    
 
As such, water, sanitation and electricity were identified as the three fundamental basic 
services which all South Africans should have immediate access to.  This meant that local 
government was the primary sphere of government responsible for the provision of the 
national service delivery mandate since the provision of these basic services are functions 
exclusively assigned to local government.   
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4.3   Eradicating the Service Delivery Backlog 
 
The eradication of basic service delivery backlogs has and continues to be a fundamental 
function and responsibility of local government.
270
  The Constitution of South Africa 
entrenches local government as the sphere of government responsible for basic service 
delivery.  Yet, it has been repeatedly reported that local authorities lack expertise, capacity 
and resources. This is made worse by their apartheid inherited service delivery backlogs.
271
   
 
The vast lack of adequate and quality service delivery during apartheid has left the newly 
amalgamated, inexperienced and ill-equipped local authorities with a daunting and 
challenging mandate.  The national mandate since 1994 has been to alleviate apartheid-
created backlogs.  Table 4.1 summarises the basic service delivery backlogs in South Africa 
as inherited by the ANC-led national government in 1994. 




 25% of South Africans do not have access to potable/piped water. 
 40% access to water to their homes. 
 17.5% of all African households have access to piped water in their homes. 
 33% have to fetch water from other sources, such as rivers, streams, damns, springs or 
boreholes. 
 7.7% of African households in rural areas have piped water in their homes. 
 40% of African households in metropolitan areas have piped water in their homes. 




 45% of all households in South Africa do not have access to grid electricity. 
 75% of African households in rural areas are not connected to the national grid. 
 Households rely largely on fuel wood stocks. 
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Continued:  Table 4.1:  Basic Service Delivery Backlogs in South Africa 1994 
Sanitation backlogs 
 
 50% of all households in South Africa have flush toilets: 
- Nearly all white and Indian households have flush toilets. 
- 88% of coloured households have toilets. 
- 34% of African households have flush toilets. 
- 41% of African households have pit latrines. 
- 6.5% of African households have bucket toilets. 
- 16% of African households have no form of toilet. 
 
 
Source:  Adapted from Deegan, H. (2001).  The Politics of the New South Africa:  Apartheid and After.  Cape Town:  Prentice Hall:  Pp. 
116-117. 
 
Under the new democratic dispensation, local government is at the forefront of undoing 
apartheid-created backlogs. Since 1996, local government has had considerable success in 
expanding access to basic services to households.  Figure 4.1 illustrates that access to water 
„at RDP level‟ has increased from 62.4% in 1996 to 91.8% in 2008.   
 
Figure 4.1:   Households with Access to Basic Water 
 
 
Source:  Adapted from The Presidency.   (2009).  Development Indicators.  Page 31. 
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Figure 4.2 illustrates that access to sanitation „at RDP level‟ has increased from 51.6% in 
1996 to 77.1% in 2008.  And Figure 4.3 shows that access to electricity has increased from 
54.1% in 1996 to 73 % in 2008. 
 
Figure 4.2:   Households with Access to Basic Sanitation 
 
Source:  Adapted from The Presidency.   (2009).  Development Indicators.  Page 32. 
 
Figure 4.3:   Households with Access to Basic Electricity 
 
Source:  Adapted from The Presidency.   (2009).  Development Indicators.  Page 32. 
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The figures above all indicate a steady increase in the eradication of basic service delivery 
backlogs.  However, later chapters will show that the remaining backlogs are problematic for 
municipalities.  
 
4.4   Category B Municipalities and Basic Service Delivery Challenges 
 
The data available on service delivery backlogs do not distinguish between the three different 
categories of municipalities.  However, the SACities Network claims that Category B 
municipalities are particularly faced with the dual challenge of extending service delivery 
into rural outlying areas as well as upgrading informal settlements by providing basic 
services „at RDP level‟.
272
  The administrative decentralisation of the basic service delivery 
mandate to local government has affected Category B municipalities more significantly then 
any other category of municipality or sphere of government. There are three key challenges.  
Firstly, the establishment of wall-to-wall municipalities in terms of the demarcation process 
resulted in the creation of large Category B municipalities, including vast tracts of 
undeveloped and highly populated land.  While Category A municipal boundaries also 
increased, their land was more developed with some basic infrastructure in place.
273
  
Secondly, the two-tiered configuration of local government positioned Category B (or local) 
municipalities in a hierarchically subservient relationship with the upper Category C (or 
district) municipalities.  And thirdly, perhaps what is most complex and challenging for local 
municipalities is the ongoing assignment and reassignment of basic service delivery functions 
between Category B and C municipalities.    Each will be discussed below. 
 
4.4.1 Amalgamation, Size and Jurisdiction  
 
As the previous chapter highlighted, the restructuring of local government has since the early 
1990s been a continuous feature in South Africa‟s changing political landscape.  One of the 
objectives of the demarcation process was to create wall-to-wall municipalities by integrating 
and removing the urban-rural divide, and by including areas which were previously part of 
homelands, self-governing territories or townships.  The (re)demarcation of Transitional 
Local Councils (TLCs) into Category B municipalities meant that many local municipal 
boundaries expanded vastly in geographical area.  Map 4.1 illustrates the boundaries of the 
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TLCs prior to the 2000 demarcation process.  These boundaries were rationalised into much 
larger Category B municipalities.   
 




Boundaries finalised in December 1995. 
Category B municipalities  
Boundaries finalised in December 2000. 
 Source:  Gijsbertsen, B.  (2009). Department of Geography.  University of KwaZulu-Natal. 
 
The demarcation process in South Africa resulted in three separate administrative 
reorganisation processes; the first prior to the first local government elections (in 1995 which 
created 1280 municipalities); followed by the second period between the first and second 
local government elections (1995-2000 which created 843 municipalities); and finally the 
third demarcation process ending in 2000, creating 283 municipalities. 
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Each local municipal amalgamation process resulted in widespread administrative changes 
such as the reallocation of resources, including the transfer of staff, assets and liabilities, as 
well as the alignment of administrative management processes among and within the 
different categories of municipalities.
274
  The process of amalgamating these administrations 
generated many problems.  For example, each local authority had its own municipal practices 
and by-laws.  Different management styles and organisational structures were merged into 
one.  Rationalisation and policy alignment became daunting tasks for the newly constituted 
municipalities. Wages, salaries and conditions of service had to be standardised.
275
  Tensions 
arose between politically inexperienced councillors and municipal officials who had served 
under the previous political dispensation, and had the practical know-how.
276
  In some cases, 
municipalities experienced a loss of productivity due to low staff morale resulting from the 




Newly established local municipalities were not only faced by internal administrative 
reorganisation, but also by the extension of municipal boundaries which instantly increased 
the size of local authorities, including many largely illiterate and poor inhabitants.  Many 
newly created local municipalities continue to face the numerous administrative and financial 
problems emanating from the demarcation and amalgamation process, and continue to 




The Constitution only provides for broad local government responsibilities. As a result, 
municipalities were predominantly left to manage and restructure their newly configured 
administrations on their own accord.  This was made more complex in the absence of specific 
local government powers and functions since these were yet to be fully defined for the three 
categories of metropolitan, district, and local councils. 
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4.4.2 The Two-Tiered Configuration Between Category B and Category C 
Municipalities 
 
The creation of Category B (local municipalities) and Category C (district municipalities) as 
a two-tiered system of local government has been problematic since its inception. Just as with 
Category A (metropolitan municipalities), local municipalities are also governed by a single 
council.  However, they do not possess autonomous powers and each local municipality falls 
under the jurisdiction of a district municipality.279  This makes local municipalities a tier of 
district municipalities, which is not autonomous from district municipalities.  This is because 
of the hierarchical nature of the system.  The critique is that local municipalities have more 
capacity and are more competent compared to their „ruling‟ district municipality.  Many 
studies have reported on the disjointed and often contentious relationships between local 
municipalities and their district councils.
280
 District municipalities are legislatively 
responsible for monitoring, regulating and supervising the activities of the local councils in 
their areas of jurisdiction.  Compared to the district councils, local councils are economically 
and financially stronger.  They have more capacity, expertise and resources, but in a two-
tiered configuration they find themselves subservient to the authority of the district 
council.
281
     
 
Another underlying tension between local and district municipalities is partially informed by 
the history of underperforming regional and district councils. At the time when Black Local 
Authorities were struggling to provide basic services, the apartheid government established 
Regional Service Councils (RSCs) and Joint Services Boards (JSBs) in an attempt to extract 
revenue from businesses for these cash-strapped administrations.
282
 In KwaZulu-Natal, for 
example, Regional Councils replaced the old RSCs and JSB structures. However, the interim 
Constitution (1993) and the Local Government Transition Act (1993) did not provide clear 
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powers for the interim Regional Councils, leaving provinces to allocate powers and functions.  
Hence, Regional Council structures continued the roles served by the old RSCs and JSBs.  
Provinces primarily oversaw the provision of bulk services in the newly established regional 
council areas.
283
   
 
With the passing of the Constitution (1996), the White Paper on Local Government (1998) 
and the Municipal Structures Act (1998), the RSC and JSB structures were officially replaced 
by district municipalities.  These were tasked with the responsibility of being development 
agents, with a strong redistributive function, which was particularly to support the 
development of the new local government structures in the rural areas and small towns, but 
have never quite succeeded in meeting such expectations.
284
  The thinking was that local 
municipalities would generate sufficient service delivery surpluses which could cross-
subsidise the district municipalities‟ service delivery costs in rural areas.
285
   
 
The decision to officially establish a two-tiered local government system means that - 
structurally - local municipalities have no legislative or executive autonomy.  While district 
municipalities preside over local municipalities, they lack the resources and expertise to 
contribute to service delivery, often relying on the local municipalities in their jurisdiction to 
assist the district with delivering basic services into other areas of the district.
286
      
 
Such a configuration has ramifications for basic service delivery insofar as the general lack of 
capacity at district municipality level means that in reality local municipalities are the 
primary service providers, although legally this authority resides with the districts.  This will 
be explored in more detail in the chapter on cost recovery where the financial implications of 
the two-tiered system are analysed. 
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The allocation of the Schedule 4B and 5B local government powers and functions between 
Category B and Category C municipalities remains unresolved and is shared hierarchically 
within this two-tiered local government system. Category A (or metropolitan) municipalities 
are governed by a single council with autonomous executive and legislative authority.  
Whereas metropolitan municipalities are assigned authority over all the local government 
functions, the Constitution allows for asymmetrical as well as differentiated allocations of 
powers and functions between Category B and C municipalities.   
 
A division of powers and functions between a Category B municipality and a 
Category C municipality may differ from the division of powers and functions between 




While this flexibility has advantages in that it allows for assignments based on the diverse 
capacities of municipalities, it can also result in the ongoing adjustments of powers and 
functions between these two municipal categories.  To date, the adjustments have had 
significantly negative implications for Category B municipalities.  This has become 
particularly evident with the amendment to the Municipal Structures Act (1998). 
 
The Municipal Structures Act (1998) was the first official policy document aimed at 
clarifying the functional tasks of local government listed in Schedule 4B and Schedule 5B of 
the Constitution.  In some respects, it succeeded.  It clarified the internal administrative 
structures and processes of municipalities, together with the composition and responsibilities 
of political office bearers. It defined municipalities as local administrative institutions 
consisting of political and administrative structures, which are responsible for the people who 
live in a local area.   It devolved authority to municipalities to elect office-bearers such as the 
election of a speaker, an executive mayor, a deputy executive mayor, a mayor or a deputy 
mayor. They, in turn, must appoint a municipal manager who heads the administration, and is 
the accounting officer for the municipality.  Municipalities have the authority to hire and fire 
                                        
287
 Section 155(3)(c) of the Constitution of South Africa.  (Act 108 of 1996). 
 
 
Page | 110 
local staff, thereby making local officials accountable to elected local councillors, without the 
need for approval by other levels of government.
288
   
 
The Municipal Structures Act allocated the basic service delivery functions to Category B 
municipalities, while Category C municipalities were responsible for broader development 
planning.  The original Section 83(3) of the Municipal Structures Act (1998) defined the core 
function of district municipalities to ensure basic service delivery through: 
 
the integrated sustainable and equitable social and economic development of its area 
as a whole by inter alia, ensuring integrated development planning … promoting bulk 
infrastructural development … building the capacity of local municipalities to 
perform their functions and powers … and [promoting] the equitable distribution of 
resources between the local municipalities.
289
   
 
As such, district municipalities were regarded as responsible for coordinating, overseeing and 
supporting the delivery of basic services of the local municipalities within their jurisdiction.   
 
However, in 2000 the Municipal Structures Amendment Act (hereafter referred to as the 
Amendment Act) was promulgated, adjusting the allocation of powers and functions between 
local municipalities and district municipalities.  The Amendment Act transfers control over 
fundamental local government powers and functions from local municipalities to district 
municipalities.
290
  Of significant concern for local municipalities is that all three basic 
services - water, sanitation and electricity – have been transferred from local to district 
municipalities.
291
   
 
The Amendment Act was met with widespread criticism right from the start.  Some argued 
that the Amendment Act is illegal insofar as it contradicts local government legislation.
292 
  In 
the absence of a local government Act, the White Paper on Local Government and the 
Constitution remain the primary legislative framework for local government policy.  Those 
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opposed to the Amendment Act (such as the National Treasury and the Financial and Fiscal 
Commission) claim that it is contradictory to Sections 155 and 229 of the Constitution, as 
well as the White Paper on Local Government, because both these policy documents limit 
district municipalities as the tier of local government to being responsible for strategic 
oversight as opposed to direct service delivery.
293
    It states that the primary purpose of 
district municipalities is to render district-wide coordinating functions, and offer 
administrative assistance to those local municipalities which lack the necessary capacity:  
their brief is not to deliver services.   
 
Whereas the Municipal Structures Act of 1998 states that a district municipality is 
responsible for the bulk delivery of municipal services for the area as a whole, the Municipal 
Structures Amendment Act (2000) vests the actual provision as well as distribution of water, 
electricity, sanitation and waste, and municipal health services in the district municipalities 
directly – thus making district municipalities service providers.  The change is in the district 
municipalities‟ authority to supply bulk water and electricity in the area of the district 
municipality as a whole, as opposed to the 1998 Municipal Structures Act which delegated 
this function to district municipalities where local municipalities did not have the capacity to 
do so.  In essence this signals a reversal of powers and functions by reassigning the provision 
of all three basic services from Category B to Category C municipalities.   
 
Table 4.2 lists all the functions that are currently assigned to the respective municipalities and 
highlights those services which the Amendment Act transferred from Category B to Category 
C municipalities.  It is clear that the Amendment Act has vested authority for the delivery of 
all three basic services in Category C municipalities. 
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Table 4.2:  Reallocation of Functions Between District Municipalities and Local  





Section 84 (2) 
Local 
Municipality 
Air pollution 4B  X 
Billboards 5B  X 
Building regulations 4B  X 
Cemeteries, funeral parlours and crematoria 5B x X 
Child care facilities 4B  X 
Cleansing 5B  X 
Control of public nuisances 5B  X 
Control of undertakings that sell liquor 5B  X 
Electricity and gas reticulation 4B x used to be 
Facilities for the accommodation, care and 
burial of animals 
5B  X 
Fencing and fences 5B  X 
Firefighting 4B x used to be 
Licensing and control of undertakings that 
sell food to the public 
5B  X 
Licensing of dogs 5B  X 
Local amenities 5B  X 
Local sports facilities 5B  X 
Local tourism 4B x X 
Markets 5B x X 
Municipal  public transport 4B x X 
Municipal abattoirs 5B x X 
Municipal airports 4B x used to be 
Municipal health 4B x used to be 
Municipal parks and recreation 5B  X 
Municipal planning 4B x X 
Municipal roads 5B x X 
Noise pollution 5B  X 
Pontoons and ferries 4B x X 
Pounds 5B  X 
Public spaces 5B  X 
Public works 4B x X 
Refuse removal, refuse dumps & solid waste 4B x used to be 
Sanitation 4B x used to be 
Stormwater management 4B x X 
Street lighting  5B  X 
Street trading 5B  X 
Trading regulations 4B  X 
Traffic and parking 5B x X 
Water and sanitation services 4B x used to be 
Source:  Adapted Municipal Demarcation Board. (2005).  Review of the Adjustment of District Municipality Functions to 
Local Municipalities.   
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According to the Amendment Act, district municipalities are the primary service providers 
for bulk water and electricity, and may delegate these functions to local municipalities on an 
agency basis until such capacity is gained by the district municipality in question, whereas 
the 1998 Act delegated the provision of bulk water and electricity to local municipalities 
where capacity existed, and to a district municipality if its local municipalities did not have 
the capacity. 
 
The Amendment Act has left local municipalities with significantly less power and 
autonomy.  On the fiscal front, for example, Section 84 of the Amendment Act transfers the 
authority to impose and collect taxes, levies, as well as duties in relation to these functions, to 
district municipalities.  District municipalities have the authority to receive, allocate, and 
distribute local revenue.  The National Treasury warned that the Amendment Act would 
result in  





This proved to be right.  The national Portfolio Committee for Provincial and Local 
Government reported that in some instances a local municipality would carry out a district 
service function without any formal authorisation or proper financial reporting processes.  
The Portfolio committee found that district municipalities would reflect in their budgets that 
they had provided the service, while in reality a local municipality has done so - with the 
financial costs being reflected in both budgets.
295
   
 
4.5 Administrative Decentralisation and National Executive Authority 
 
The passing of the Amendment Act raises a number of questions with regard to the central 
government‟s impact on local government autonomy.  The Amendment Act was driven by 
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the Minister of Provincial and Local Government in the national government.
296
  Many 
viewed the reassignment of powers and functions from local municipalities to district 
municipalities as a unilateral exercise of central power.  Some of South Africa‟s most 
fundamental and significant policymaking structures such as the National Treasury; the 
Financial Fiscal Commission (FFC); the South African Local Government Association 
(SALGA);  the Ministerial Advisory Committee on Local Government and Transformation; 
the national Portfolio Committee on Provincial and Local Government and the national 
government Select Committee for Local Government and Administration of the National 
Council of Provinces, all claimed that the Amendment Act lacked consultation.  The criticism 
was also that it went against the intent of the Constitution with regard to when national 




According to the Constitution, the legislative authority of national government to intervene in 
local government matters is limited to cases where the sub-national units of government are 
incapable of providing the devolved function.  Only then does the national government have 
the executive authority to assign to a municipality the administration of a matter listed as 
provincial functional areas (Schedules 4A and 5B) if – 
(a) that matter would most effectively be administered locally; and 
(b) the municipality has the capacity to administer it.
298
 
As such, the principle of subsidiarity is embedded in the Constitution insofar as it 
recommends that powers and functions should be assigned to the sphere of government 
closest to the point of delivery.  This means that local municipalities should be the primary 
basic service providers unless they do not have the capacity to do so. The Amendment Act is 
also illustrative of a tightening of central control insofar as it decreases the provinces‟ 
authority to oversee the assignment of local government functions between Category B and 
Category C municipalities.  According to the Amendment Act, the provincial MEC for local 
government may now only adjust the divisions of powers and functions between a district and 
a local municipality if the latter lacks the capacity to exercise its functional powers only with 
regard to solid waste disposal sites, municipal roads, the regulation of passenger transport, 
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municipal airports, fire fighting service, fresh produce markets, cemeteries, local tourism and 
municipal works.
299
  In other words, provinces no longer have the authority to assign the 
functional powers of water, sanitation and electricity.  This authority has been transferred to 
the national government.
300
  Some claimed that the motivations are political;  that is, to limit 
the powers of Premiers or provincial MECs in provinces which were at the time not under 
ANC control.
301
 The inference can therefore be made that central control is being extended.   
In November 2000 the Minister of Provincial and Local Government partially reversed the 
amendments by authorising all local municipalities to continue to provide bulk services for an 
unspecified period of time until districts had the capacity to do so.
302
  The realisation was that 
it would not be practically possible to transfer these basic service delivery functions and 
powers in time for the December 2000 elections.
303





The Portfolio Committee for Provincial and Local Government reported that many 
municipalities felt that:   
[T]he process of finalizing the division [has taken] too long and has not been 
consultative enough…both district and local municipalities raised the need to provide 
greater certainty and clarity on what precisely the new division of powers and 
functions are, what their technical meanings are, and what the financial implications 
of these new allocations are…and how these overlap with and are distinct from...
 305
 
The current approach is an annual (re)assessment of the allocation of powers and functions 
between district and local municipalities.  This is managed by the Demarcation Board.
306
   
Municipalities must annually complete a self-administered capacity-assessment template 
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which - at a quick glance - is rather rudimentary.  (See Table 4.3).  Each municipality is 
expected to complete this assessment with regard to the functions assigned by the 
Amendment Act.  Capacity is determined by four criteria and their permutations:  
 Whether the municipality already performs the function - Yes or No 
 Whether the municipality has a budget for performing the function - Yes or No 
 Whether the municipality had the necessary staff to perform the function - Yes or No 
 Whether the municipality has the infrastructure to perform the function - Yes or No 
 
Sixteen options are possible as depicted in Table 4.3.  Each option reflects a different 
permutation of the four criteria, informing the Demarcation Board on whether the district 
municipality in question should perform the function.
 307
    
 











1 Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2 Yes Yes Yes No Yes 
3 Yes Yes No No No 
4 Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
5 Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
6 Yes No No Yes No 
7 No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
8 No No Yes Yes No 
9 No No No Yes No 
10 No Yes Yes No Yes 
11 No Yes No Yes No 
12 No No No No No 
13 Yes No No No No 
14 Yes No Yes No No 
15 No Yes No No No 
16 No No Yes No No 
In addition to the capacity-assessment process, the Demarcation Board identifies four 
possible service delivery arrangements.  The current arrangement is Figure 4.4; which is 
promulgated as the default arrangement, according to the Municipal Structures Amendment 
Act.  Where the district municipality only has limited capacity, then Figure 4.5 represents the 
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arrangement where some local municipalities provide services on behalf of the district 
municipality on an agency basis.  Figure 4.6 represents the scenario where the district 
municipalities have no capacity at all to deliver basic services; where possible, local 
municipalities provide these on behalf of the district municipality, or even in other local 
municipalities.  Figure 4.7 depicts a circumstance when a provincial government takes over 
service delivery functions when either the district municipality or the local municipalities 
within the district‟s jurisdiction lack capacity.  The situations depicted in Figures 4.5, 4.6 and 
4.7 are regarded as temporary arrangements until the district has gained adequate capacity.  




Figure 4.4:  District Retains Functions for All Local Municipalities  
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Figure 4.5:  District Retains Functions for Some Local Municipalities  
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Figure 4.7:  District and Local Municipality Functions Assigned to Provinces 
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While this form of arrangement has made some contribution towards clarifying the 
distinction between Category B and Category C responsibilities, its classification remains ad 
hoc.  As such, the uncertainty remains since district municipalities may at some point decide 
to retract such service delivery arrangements, leaving local municipalities in a constant state 
of flux.  It also illustrates that basic service delivery functions are no longer devolved but are 
delegated to local municipalities. 
 
The Demarcation Board claims that the idea is no longer that district councils should provide 
the services themselves, but that they must coordinate them:  that district municipalities are 
service authorities whilst local municipalities are service providers.
309
    National government 
can instruct local municipalities to extend services to other municipal areas on behalf of the 
district, but cost recovery remains the responsibility of local municipalities.  The co-existence 
of the Amendment Act and the ministerial authorisation for local municipal service delivery 
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has without doubt created confusion and thereby increased uncertainty rather than offered 
clarity on what exactly the respective municipal powers and functions are. 
 
The two-tiered system of local government has an implicit hierarchy, placing local 
municipalities (except for a few stronger local municipalities)
310
 at a subordinate level, as 
merely the „delivery arm‟ of district municipalities.  As such, local municipalities have 
insignificant autonomy in the provision of basic services.  Administrative decentralisation in 
this respect is by delegation as functions, power and authority for basic service delivery get 
assigned and reassigned by the national executive on an annual basis.  
 
4.6   Hierarchy and Concurrency in the Division of Service Delivery Functions 
 
The centralist tendencies experienced in the promulgation of the Amendment Act are also 
identifiable in the overall system of intergovernmental relations with regard to the 
implementation of service delivery functions.  The responsibility for service delivery in 
general is shared across the three spheres of government.  Some national or provincial 
designated functions - whether exclusive or concurrent - impact on the administrative 
autonomy of municipalities.  
 
In essence, the national sphere of government is the primary sphere for regulatory oversight 
and determines the norms and standards for service delivery (including that of basic services). 
Local autonomy is therefore by default limited by norms and standards prescribed by national 
government.  This is justifiable and necessary in a country where service delivery was 
unequal and discriminatory in its application. 
 
Some functions are explicitly identified in the Constitution as concurrent or shared between 
spheres of government.  (See Appendix 5 and 6).  However, even where the competencies are 
exclusively national or provincial, legislative decisions can impose duties on local 
government.  Local government is often expected to assist other spheres of government with 
the implementation of exclusive national or provincial functions.
311
  The constitutional 
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obligations associated with cooperative government indirectly require municipalities to 
support the national and provincial spheres in the implementation of their specific 
constitutional mandate.  The provision of housing, for example, is a concurrent national and 
provincial government competency, yet it has become a duty shared by all three spheres of 





The general tendency is for national government to provide finances, setting out the norms 
and standards, while the provincial government oversees implementation.  In many cases, 
municipalities become implementing agents for provincial governments insofar as they are 
expected to supplement the national and provincial housing initiatives with, firstly, the 
provision of service delivery infrastructure, and, secondly, supply water, sanitation and 
electricity.
313
 However, the service delivery decision is one which is made by national and/or 
provincial government. 
 
By identifying water, sanitation and electricity as the fundamental responsibilities of local 
government, the misconception is created that municipalities can prioritise the delivery of 
basic services.  In reality, however, the extent to which national and provincial functions 
overlap with those of local government means that the activities of other spheres often dictate 
or determine the local service delivery agenda.    This is widespread and not limited to a few 
functions.  For example, municipalities are tasked with upgrading existing informal 
settlements, eradicating backlogs and providing these areas with access to basic services.  On 
the other hand, national and provincial government are more involved in the provision of new 
developments, such as low-cost housing.  However, both functions require local government 
to extend their scope of basic service delivery.  In this respect, it is also questionable to what 
extent a local municipality can give effect to its constitutional responsibility to “structure and 
manage its administration, and budgeting and planning processes to give priority to the basic 
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A cursory glance at the functional areas of local government as listed in Schedules 4B and 5B 
of the Constitution illustrates the extent to which most resemble the provincial functional 
areas listed in Schedules 4A and 5A.  In other words, a comparison of the two schedules 
clearly shows that a considerable overlap exists between the powers and functions of local 
and provincial governments.  This is made more difficult since the content of the respective 
functional areas is not defined. Table 4.4 illustrates the duplication in provincial and 
municipal functional areas. 
 
Table 4.4:  Comparison of Similar Provincial and Municipal Functional Areas 
 
 
Provincial Functional Areas 
 
Local Functional Areas 
Airports (4A) Municipal airports (4B) 
Disaster management (4A) Firefighting services (4B) 
Health services (4A) Municipal health services (4B) 
Liquor Licences (5A) 
Control of undertakings that sell liquor to the 
public (5B) 
Pollution control (4A) Air pollution (4B) 
Provincial recreation & amenities (5A) Beaches & amusement facilities (5B) 
Provincial roads (5A) Municipal Roads (5B) 
Provincial traffic (5A) Traffic & parking (5B) 
Provincial sport (5A) Local sports facilities (5B) 
Public transport (5A) Municipal public transport (4B) 
Regional planning & development (5A) Municipal planning (4B) 
Tourism (4A) Local tourism (4B) 
Trade (4A) Trading regulations (4B) 
 
Extracted from Schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution of South Africa. (Act 108 of 1996). 
 
The very nature of public services entails a degree of intergovernmental overlap, and 
concurrency is inevitable between the functions of national, provincial and local government. 
As such, functional overlaps are widespread and even unavoidable.  However, the critique is 
that while in terms of the Constitution all spheres of government have administrative 
autonomy in the delivery of a service in a common functional area, be it housing or health 
care, in practice this often leads to local government becoming implementing agents for other 
levels of government.  As such, the local development agenda is often determined by national 




Page | 123 
Even where the competencies are distinct, judicial decisions can impose national and or 
provincial responsibilities onto municipalities duties. In perhaps one of South Africa‟s best 
known Constitutional Court cases with regard to citizens‟ right to basic services, commonly 
referred to as the Grootboom case,
315
 squatters who had been evicted demanded that the 
Oostenberg Municipality (Western Cape Province) provide them with adequate basic 
temporary shelter or housing for them and their children which, according to Bill of Rights, 
they are legally entitled to.
316
  The municipality referred the claim to the provincial 
government.  However, the Constitutional Court held that this duty fell on all three spheres of 
government – national, provincial and local – despite the fact that housing, as a competency, 




The Constitutional Court reasoned that based on the principle of cooperative government, the 
policies and actions of all three spheres must cohere and be coordinated in order to give effect 
to the socio-economic right to housing. National government was deemed responsible for the 
provision of finances, provincial government for the implementation of a housing 
programme, and municipalities for the actual provision of the service delivery infrastructure 
and the provision of water, sanitation and electricity.
318
   
 
Such scenarios of indefinite delegations from national and provincial functions can translate 
into local municipal planning problems as their development agenda is informed by the 
service delivery agendas of national and provincial government.
319
  Municipalities have long 
been criticised for their ineffective and inadequate Integrated Development Plans (IDPs).  
Municipalities have been accused of drafting broad objectives as opposed to specific local 
development plans.
320
  While this criticism is mostly justified, the growing range of cross-
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sectoral national and provincial government programmes increase the responsibilities of 




The lack of clarity of service delivery powers and functions also has implications for cross-
sectoral programmes. Currently, national or provincial departments are unsure whether to 
delegate line-functions to the district or to local municipalities.  For example, some local 
municipalities have been delegated the responsibility to manage the national Department of 
Water Affairs and Forestry‟s (DWAF) water schemes; however, (based on the Municipal 




Concurrency can also cause a duplication of service delivery, which is likely to occur when 
more than one sphere of government is responsible for a functional area, as were (and in 
some cases continue to be) DWAF‟s water schemes.  For years, DWAF established local 
water schemes, while some local municipalities created and managed their own water project 
physically proximate to DWAF‟s.
323
  The duplication of water schemes caused confusion 
with regard to DWAF‟s and the municipalities‟ respective mandates and responsibilities.  The 
result is ill-managed projects, with no maintenance plans - in some instances resulting in the 
total collapse of water schemes.
324
  Uncertainty over responsibility can lead to inefficient and 
slow service delivery, or in worse cases, lead to a situation where none of the spheres takes 
responsibility for the service. As De Visser argues: 
 
...where two levels of government are responsible for the same functional area, the 
state government withdraws from the field, leaving local government as the sole 
provider of a service. While municipalities may wish to exercise their autonomy in the 
area, the withdrawal of the senior levels is often accompanied by the withdrawal of 
state funds, leaving local government with an unfunded mandate. The result may be 
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Shared powers and functions imply shared accountability.  De Visser refers to this as 
potentially a system of organized irresponsibility.
326
 In cases where functions are concurrent, 
and no services, or substandard services have been delivered, blame can be shifted by one 
sphere of government to another, and no-one can be held responsible by the public.  He 
claims that this practice defers accountability and often results in a lack of transparency. As 
he says “the electorate simply does not know who is to be held accountable for what 
function.”
327
   
 
Uncertainty, continuous adjustments and temporary arrangements with regard to service 
delivery responsibilities can only but complicate effective and sustainable service delivery.   
Each time adjustments are made, municipalities face administrative and financial 
consequences such as changing revenue streams (which will be considered in the next 
chapter).  Adjustments necessitate the transfer of assets, liabilities and administrative data, as 
well as the alignment of existing by-laws, regulations and resolutions.  Thirteen years have 
passed since the Constitution of South Africa has established local government as an 
autonomous sphere of government.  However, local municipalities continue to undergo 
reorganisation and restructuring, and their administrative power and authority remain unclear.  
At this point in time, it remains ambiguous whether local government‟s constitutional 
mandate for basic service delivery is an autonomous and devolved function, or whether it is a 




It has been argued in this chapter that despite the constitutional allocations of powers and 
functions to the respective spheres of government (as stipulated in Schedules 4 and 5), the 
detailed process in practice remains hierarchical and open to national government 
intervention.  Analysing the extent of administrative decentralisation while keeping in mind 
some of the limitations of political decentralisation explored in the previous chapter, makes 
one question - yet again - the true extent of local government autonomy.    
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The complications which arose from the Amendment Act have brought to the fore underlying 
tensions in the intergovernmental configuration between district and local municipalities, and 
offers an opportunity to reassess the need for such a distinction as well as the need for district 
municipalities altogether, which is  a proposition which will be revisited later on in this study. 
 
This chapter has shown that providing basic services across different spheres of government 
inevitably poses problems of concurrency. However, concurrent service delivery obligations 
often translate into local government becoming the subservient delivery arm of the other 
spheres of government.  Although local government is constitutionally protected as a distinct 
sphere of government, its administrative powers and functions remain open to interpretation, 
as well as subject to national or provincial adjustment.   
 
The administrative decentralisation of basic service delivery functions to Category B 
municipalities is far from complete.  The Municipal Structures Act of 1998 and the 
subsequent Amendment Act (2000) were meant to finalise and clarify the allocation of 
powers and functions between Category B and C municipalities, but have in fact intensified 
service delivery problems, which is resulting in the continuation of uncertainty, duplication, 
undue administrative cost in service delivery, as well as a general lack of coordination 
between the three spheres of government.   
 
The debate on the division of powers and functions has not yet been resolved, and may never 
be.  While the constitutional framework devolves administrative functions to local 
government, this chapter has shown that, in reality, the administrative decentralisation of 
service delivery functions to local government is more characteristic of delegation rather than 
devolution. 
    
The next chapter will explore the complexities associated with cost recovery.  This is a 
function which has been devolved to local government, and one which is significantly 
affected by the extent of administrative decentralisation discussed here. 
 
 







Decentralisation in South Africa has resulted in the establishment of local government as an 
autonomous sphere of government.  Previous chapters have described the structural and 
procedural configuration of local government, and some of its underlying tensions. For 
example, the two-tiered system of local government that exists between Category B and 
Category C municipalities as well as the assignment of fundamental basic service delivery 
functions and responsibilities to politically autonomous local governments. The previous 
chapter on administrative decentralisation highlighted the enormity of the service delivery 
obligations devolved to local government. This particular chapter is concerned with an 
additional local government responsibility, namely, cost recovery. 
 
This chapter investigates the extent of local government autonomy by focusing particularly 
on the devolution of cost recovery as an autonomous local government function.  The 
legislative framework impels local government to take on the full responsibility for 
recovering costs associated with the provision of basic services.  The argument will be made 
here that the apartheid legacy of unequal development and poverty poses a wide range of 
challenges for the recovery of costs by municipalities.   
 
The general principle of cost recovery and some of the fundamental arguments supportive of 
cost recovery will be examined.  This chapter commences by explaining the general concept 
of cost recovery and the rationale behind it.  It briefly examines the legislative framework of 
cost recovery in South Africa and the obligations it confers on local government.   It contends 
that while in theory the principle of cost recovery is sound and justifiable, it poses particular 
challenges for local municipalities in South Africa, particularly regarding the provision of 
basic services.   
 
The chapter identifies a number of challenges pertaining to cost recovery which face local 
government in general, as well as challenges more specific to Category B municipalities. The 
general cost recovery challenges include those emanating from local capacity, such as: (i) the 
 
 
Page | 128 
inability to accurately calculate public service delivery costs;  (ii) the strategies of cost 
recovery; and (iii) perhaps the most difficult and complicated cost recovery challenge – the 
national mandate of Free Basic Services.  
 
The challenges more specific to Category B municipalities, it will be argued, relate directly to 
the hierarchical two-tiered system of local government.  The challenges are complex because 
the assignment and reassignment of basic service delivery authority to and from district and 
local municipalities remains ongoing. This chapter will show that cost recovery poses 
complex implementation problems for local municipalities, and that these problems impact 
on local municipal autonomy. 
 
5.1  Defining Cost Recovery 
 
In general, cost recovery is referred to as the collection or capturing of the costs of providing 
a service through fees, levies or other mechanisms.
328  
Proponents of cost recovery, 
particularly the World Bank and other international institutions, present moral, environmental 
and fiscal reasons as to why governments must pursue cost recovery.  Morally, the motivation 
for cost recovery centres on the liberal notions of rights and responsibilities: if people have a 
right to socio-economic rights such as water, then they also have the responsibility to pay for 
it.
329
  In environmental terms, cost recovery is regarded as a strategy that will limit 
wastefulness.  The argument, for example, is that people will be less likely to waste water if 
they are made to pay for it. When viewed in fiscal terms, cost recovery means that 
governments need no longer finance the provision of basic services, thus making money 




The fiscal notion is that only by paying the full cost of a public service can one appreciate its 
true “value”.  That:  
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only a fee reflecting the costs will encourage users to correctly value the service they 
receive [and charging a fee] will help reverse the ‘entitlement mentality’ that has 
been the historical result of subsidizing public services.
331
    
 
The argument is thus that the inclusion of moral, environmental and fiscal considerations in 
the recovery of public services costs will lead to sustainable, efficient and effective service 
delivery. However, such sentiments have inherent complications when applied to the 
provision of basic services in South Africa.  The cost recovery of basic services such as water 
and sanitation has long been controversial.  On the one hand, developing nations backed by 
the World Health Organization and UNICEF
332
 argue that the health and social benefits 
associated with access to basic water and sanitation services outweigh the immediate and 
largely irrecoverable financial costs of public service delivery.
333
 It is argued that as long as 
people have no access to basic services, there can be no income generation, poverty 
alleviation or local economic development. The assumption is that access to basic services 
will improve peoples‟ living conditions, making them economically active which, in turn, 
will lead to economic development, thereby resulting in users being able to afford user fees, 
and therefore in government being able to recover costs.  
 
On the other hand, economists at the World Bank argue that a willingness to pay and the 
affordability of user fees are prerequisites for investing in basic service delivery 
infrastructure.  Providing basic services to those unable or unwilling to pay will result in 
infrastructure being underutilised and falling into disrepair at huge costs to the public 
sector.
334
   
 
Some argue that user fees should be charged even when poverty is high because access to 
free services leads to abuse or neglect, as well as wastage and unsustainability.
335
  In addition, 
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they argue that when people have to pay for a service, they make sure they get it.
336
  
Consumers who pay for basic services are more critical of the quality of what they get.   
Those in favour of user charges claim that it improves client power and accountability since 
customers can demand better services.
337
  Such arguments ignore the potential that socio-
economic inequality can increase because service delivery may very well be targeted only to 
those who can afford to pay.  In short, there is no clear-cut answer, and both arguments have 
merit.   
 
5.2 Cost Recovery in South Africa:  The Policy Framework 
 
Under the new decentralised system of governance, municipalities, which have been assigned 
a range of autonomous powers and functions, as well as the responsibility for basic service 
delivery, are at the forefront of implementing cost recovery strategies.  Under apartheid rule, 
local governments had limited cost recovery obligations.  The highly centralised system of 
governance meant that central government retained control over local financial autonomy.  
Local governments had little service delivery authority, delivered few services and therefore 
had limited cost recovery potential.
338
  Where user fees, tariffs and general property rates 
existed during apartheid, these charges were related to utility or consumption costs as 
opposed to including the broader operational or maintenance costs.
339
    
 
Under the new democratic dispensation, discussions on cost recovery emerged.  However, 
only towards the end of apartheid in the mid-1990s has cost recovery become an explicit and 
widespread government policy objective.  According to some authors such as Bond and 
McDonald and Pape, the apartheid state heavily subsidised basic services in white suburbs, in 
industry, as well as in black townships, the self-governing territories and independent 
homelands, although not to the same extent as that of white areas.  In fact, state subsidisation 
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to black local authorities continued despite the service boycotts of the 1980s.
340
  Although 




The initial macro-economic policy, as represented in the 1994 Reconstruction and 
Development Programme (RDP) policy, focused on the nationalisation of state assets and 
central control over service delivery.
342
  Cost recovery was limited to charging user fees, 
tariffs and general property rates for services, which were criticised by some for not being a 
true reflection of the real costs, but merely reflected marginal costs.
343
 The RDP policy was 
replaced in 1996 with the Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) strategy.  GEAR 
introduced a move away from heavily state subsidised basic service delivery towards a 
reduced central government role where responsibilities for cost recovery were to be 
decentralised to local government.
344
   
 
Local government revenue powers are regulated by the Constitution, the Municipal Structures 
Act, the Municipal Systems Act, and the Municipal Property Rates Act.  Table 5.1 provides a 
brief summary of the respective legislative provisions. 
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Table 5.1: Policy Assignment of Local Government Revenue Powers. 
 
The Constitution of South Africa (Act 108 of 1996) 
Taxes User Charges 
 
Section229 
- Property taxes 
- Taxes on consumption of local 
government provided services allocated 
exclusively municipalities. 
- Local government explicitly prohibited 
from levying income tax, VAT, general 
sales tax or custom duty. 




- No specific assignment of user charges - 
revenue powers incidental to power to 
provide services; powers are either 
Schedule B powers or assigned.   
- Schedule B powers are subject to 
oversight by national and provincial 
government. 
- Its assigned power must also be regulated 
by assigning sphere.   
- Category B and C municipalities must be 
distinguished in the exercise of original 
powers and assigned powers 
General Local Government Legislation 
Taxes User Charges 
 
Municipal Structures Act (Section 84(p)) 
- The imposition and collection of taxes as 
related to the distribution of powers 
between district and local municipalities. 
 
Municipal Systems Act (Section 11(3)) 
- Powers include imposing & recovering 
rates, taxes, levies, service fees and 
surcharges on fees. 
 
Municipal Systems Act (Section 74(2)(f))  
- Provision for surcharge on a tariff can be 
made in the Tariff policy. 
 
The Municipal Property Rates Act  
- General local tax or levy for general 
municipal services.   
- Administered by local governments based 
on an assessment of the value of land and 
improvements thereon.   
- Tariffs and rates determined by national 
government. 
 
Municipal Structures Act (Section 83 & 
84) 
- Provides framework for allocating 
Schedule B functions across district and 
local municipalities.   
- District municipalities assigned power for 
key local government trading services by 
default in Section 84.   
- Powers can be either reassigned by 
national (Schedule 4B functions) or 
provincial (Schedule 5B) proclamation. 
 
Municipal Systems Act 
- Provides framework for when and how to 
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While the Constitution establishes the rights of citizens to have access to basic public services 
such as water and sanitation,
345
 it constrains these rights with regard to the state‟s availability 
of resources. It explicitly notes that:  
[T]he state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available 
resources, to achieve the progressive realization of each of these rights.
346
   
 
Calling officially for the end of the so-called culture of non-payment evident during the 
apartheid local government boycotts, then president Nelson Mandela in 1997 highlighted the 
need for local government cost recovery: 
We can no longer simply bemoan the past. The fact that we were deprived does not 
entitle us to free services. And it would be self-defeating to refuse to pay for services 
because we demand improvements first; or to pay self-imposed flat-rates where 
services are being efficiently delivered. The more our councils are strapped for cash 





Examining post-apartheid local government policies and legislation illustrates widespread 
government subscription to cost recovery, including the recovery of costs associated with 
each of the three basic services:  water, sanitation and electricity.  
 
With regard to water, for example, the White Paper on Water and Sanitation (1994) stated 
that government may subsidise the cost of construction of basic minimum services but not the 
operating, maintenance or replacement costs.  The subsequent National Sanitation Policy 
White Paper (1996) stated that payment by the user is essential in order for the sanitation 
systems to be sustainable. 
 
The White Paper on Water Policy (1997) proposed that in order to  
promote the efficient use of water, the policy will be to charge users for the full 
financial costs of providing access to water, including infrastructure development and 
catchment management activities. 
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The White Paper on Local Government (1998) stipulates that people are only to receive 
services that they can afford.  They must pay the full cost in direct proportion to the amount 
they consume, and subsidisation must be avoided.  Section 56 of the National Water Act (Act 
36 of 1998) lists extensively the aspects that should be included in determining water user 
charges.  These include costs associated with water resource management;
348
 as well as for 
funding water resource development which includes construction,
349
 operational and 
maintenance costs;
350
 and water distribution costs.
351
  The proviso is that rates may 
differentiate in respect of demographic areas.
352
  The same applies to determining the rates 
for sanitation and waste-water treatment.
353
  While the 1998 National Water Act calls for 
calculating the full costs associated with the provision of water. 
  
With regard to the provision of electricity, the White Paper on Energy Policy (1998) stated 
that government policy is to encourage energy prices to be as cost-reflective as possible.  This 
was reiterated in the National Energy Act (Act 34 of 2008) where it states that the national 
Minister must adopt measures that provide for universal access to appropriate forms of 
energy or energy services, limited by the affordability and cost-effectiveness of such 
provision.
354
   
 
The Municipal Systems Act (2000) also stipulates that residents have the duty to pay for all 
of their municipal services. The Act instructs municipalities to levy and recover fees that 
reflect the costs associated with rendering the service, including capital, operating, 




In other words, it is clear that the legislative policy framework pertaining to the provision of 
basic services reiterates the national government‟s directive of cost recovery.  The result is 
that as the primary basic service provider, local government has the primary function and 
responsibility of cost recovery.  However, this function has resulted in a number of 
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implementation challenges such as: determining the full costs; collecting user fees; and 
meeting their national obligation to provide Free Basic Services.  Each will now be discussed. 
 
5.3  General Challenges of Cost Recovery  
 
5.3.1 The Challenge of Full Cost Recovery  
 
The policy framework for local government service delivery obliges municipalities to pursue 
full cost recovery in the provision of basic services.  This entails charging consumers more 
than the amount of consumption. Full cost recovery is regarded as the collection of all costs 
associated with the provision of a public service such as the cost of materials, administration, 
maintenance, depreciation, as well as anticipated expenditures.
356
  Tariffs, for example, 
should include more than the cost of bulk purchases in the case of electricity and water.  It 
should include: distribution costs; distribution losses; maintenance of infrastructure; and other 
fixed assets depreciation expenses; as well as administration costs.
357
  At its most inclusive or 
comprehensive, tariffs should also take account of bad debts and/or non-payment.
358
  The 
argument is that:  
unless all of the costs related to providing and maintaining a service (technical, 
human resource, institutional) are identified, organized, and covered in a coherent 




One challenge is how to calculate the full costs associated with the delivery of a public 
service.  In theory, calculating the costs of a service is based on averaging the cost of 
providing that particular service. This includes estimates of capital, labour and variable inputs 
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costs per unit of service provided.   The next step is to calculate output standards for each 
service.
360
  The Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC) explains this as follows:   
 
[U]sing the estimates of average cost it is then possible to deduce the total cost of 
providing a service at some specified standard. If one then sums across all services, it 
is possible to obtain an estimate of the total costs to be met ... based on the derived 




Common expenses incurred by municipalities in the delivery of basic services are the cost of 
bulk purchases of water and electricity; distribution costs; distribution losses; infrastructure 
maintenance costs; depreciation of assets or infrastructure; interest charges (if capital is 
borrowed); and general administration costs.
362
  The intention is that the calculation must 
include the marginal costs of production plus a portion of long-term operating and 
maintenance costs.  This means, for example, that the price of electricity must include the 
costs of connecting the household to the electricity grid; a portion of the amortised operating 
and maintenance costs of the bulk infrastructure required to generate and distribute 





However, the ability of municipalities to recover the full cost associated with service delivery 
depends on the type of service.  Some services benefit the community as a whole, while 
others benefit households or individual consumers. Stormwater drainage, fire services and 
streetlighting, for example, are services to the community as a whole and are inclusive and 
inexhaustible.  No individual service charge can be collected for these services, which tend to 
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On the other hand, public services such as electricity and water are consumed by individual 
households and can be measured and charged on an exclusive basis.
365
   
 
Distinguishing between the types of services is not always that obvious.  Some services, such 
as refuse removal and sewerage services, are charged to individual households, but have 
wider public benefit.
366
  Some services are self-financing insofar as residents are charged a 
flat-rate for certain municipal services, such as sanitation and refuse removal, which are 
payable regardless of utilisation and a surplus may be yielded.   
 
The provision of bulk services like electricity and water are often a municipality‟s most 
profitable income generator.  This may offset other services provided by a municipality that 
may not always be affordable for residents or cannot always be recovered; for example, 
ambulance or fire services.  These services then need to be subsidised by other sources of 
funding, either through subsidised external funds such as national government grants, or 




Some municipal services, however, do not generate any income but are a municipality‟s 
responsibility to provide.  For example, maintaining the verges or sidewalks, graveyards, or 
maintaining cultural and recreational buildings. These are often difficult for municipalities to 
provide without surplus funds.
368
   
 
Determining the full costs of service delivery is near impossible.  Some service charges are 
easier to calculate than others.  Water and electricity, for example, can be accurately 
measured in volumetric terms.  However, expected operating and maintenance costs can only 
be estimated. With regard to electricity, municipalities tend to charge households a 
connection fee, for the amount of electricity consumed, as well as a flat-rate which is an 
estimate of operating and maintenance costs.  Although some household consumption „units‟ 
can be measured, the actual cost of service production and maintenance is difficult to 
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Calculating costs where the pricing of service provision is not easily measurable difficult.  
Services such as refuse collection are generalised as it is near impossible to calculate how 
much refuse households are creating.  Cost recovery models follow a flat-rate based on an 
overall average.  However this is to the disadvantage of those households which generate less 
refuse because they pay the same amount as households which do.  A monthly availability 
charge may be levied to all ratepayers even if the consumer does not make use of such 
services.  For example, the bill for electricity can include consumption charges, as well as a 
standard connectivity charge (sometimes referred to as a demand charge).  A fixed 
availability charge enables cross-subsidisation.
370
   
 
Basing prices on the real economic cost of supply and service would clearly be problematic 
for poor households.  If this is strictly applied according to the costs of the infrastructure 
required alone, it is obvious that the connection fees in rural or underdeveloped localities will 
be higher than in suburbia, thereby discriminating against poor households.  In order to 
compensate or subsidise service delivery to rural areas, full cost recovery would then need to 
include the amount of the operating surplus needed to compensate for the loss of revenue 
(resulting from providing free basic services and the property rates rebate awarded to 
indigents), as well as for financing general services and future capital expansion of the 
service concerned.
371
   
 
Those who adamantly oppose cost recovery of basic services accuse government of being 
pre-occupied with profit.
372
   The Department of Social Welfare has raised objections against 
municipalities‟ current practice of setting tariffs for basic services at a level in order to 
generate a surplus.   
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Governments are supposed to deliver particular public services at cost with no 
deliberate profit element built into the consumer tariff structure.  The tariff is 
supposed to cover only the per unit of the services supplied...Where local 
governments are allowed to compile their tariffs in such a way as to deliberately 
induce a surplus, this becomes an indirect tax on particular services with a 
redistribution of wealth effect which is unacceptable as the benefit-received principle 
is violated. There is no moral justification for consumers of particular services to be 
taxed in order to subsidize the users of collective services. It is unfair because not all 




Such an opinion is to some extent morally justifiable; however, discontinuing this practice 
would threaten the financial stability of many municipalities in South Africa.  It is commonly 
known that most municipalities generate a large portion of their revenue from surpluses 
accrued from the sale of water and electricity.  However, authors such as Bond, McDonald 
and Pape who oppose full cost recovery and/or surcharges do not propose how else local 
government can raise revenue.
374
 The assumption is that revenue can be offset by increased 
intergovernmental grants and increased taxes, which are problematic in themselves.  (This 
will be investigated in the subsequent chapters on Fiscal Decentralisation and Fiscal Service 
Delivery Challenges). The irony is that building in a surplus or profit element in a consumer 
tariff structure is the very method that enables cross-subsidisation, and is to the advantage of 
those consuming less.   
 
To summarise, full cost recovery depends on the ability of municipalities to determine the 
costs associated with the different types of services as well as the recovery rate.  From a 
purely mathematical perspective, calculating the costs associated with public services is 
complex by itself.  It is not easy to delineate operating costs, in other words, to isolate costs 
and revenues associated with a given service, because some resources (human as well as 
capital) are shared between different service sectors and costs and are therefore difficult to 
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apportion.
375
   Despite the national government‟s insistence on municipalities pursuing full 
cost recovery, under certain circumstances, full cost recovery is just impossible. 
 
5.3.2 The Challenge of Recovering Costs. 
 
The widespread devolution of basic service delivery functions coupled with the responsibility 
for cost recovery places the onus on municipalities to seek mechanisms for the collection of 
user fees if they are to eradicate basic service delivery backlogs, extend basic service 
delivery, as well as sustain service provision.   However, the implementation of cost recovery 
strategies is problematic.  For example, recovering costs from consumers is challenging.  
Administratively, the capacity for billing and collecting revenue must be in place.  McDonald 
et al argue that many municipalities lack a workable administrative system.  This is a 
fundamental weakness because the enforcement of cost recovery “requires a measuring 
system that allows a service provider to allocate costs to individual end-users, a billing 
system that informs consumers of their payment obligations, and collection mechanisms 




According to the Auditor-General, municipalities‟ billings and revenue collection systems are 
inadequate in a number of areas.  Some municipalities lack the capacity to regularly bill and 
collect payments, and are unable to consistently and accurately measure the consumption of a 
particular service by an individual household or where consumption cannot be measured.  At 




In addition, many municipalities do not or are not able to accurately determine how much 
water or electricity is unbilled or unaccounted for because of illegal connections, leakages, 
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and faulty meters.
378
  Bekker et al argue that there are persistent „non-technical losses‟ such 
as electricity theft through illegal connections or meter tampering which municipalities have 
not been able to include in their costing exercises.
379
   
 
Municipalities that are competent and have an appropriate billing system in place are better 
able to compile tariffs and user fees policies stipulating different rates or rebates.
380
  
However, even competent municipalities are faced with non-payment, regardless of how 
rigorous their cost recovery system is.   Municipalities faced with non-payment implement a 
range of cost recovery strategies, most of which are stringent and predominantly punitive, 
which in some cases can have detrimental consequences for both the municipality and the 
consumer. The overriding concern is the inflexible manner in which cost recovery is being 
implemented in relation to poor or low-income households which default.   
 
Bond, McDonald and Pape rightfully argue that rigorous cost recovery mechanisms ignore 
elements of affordability.
381
  As discussed earlier in this study, the non-payment of basic 
services at local government level was a powerful tool to force political change in South 
Africa.  During the 1980s, local authorities throughout South Africa faced mass action and 
widespread protests erupted against rent and service charges.  More than two decades later 
and under a democratic dispensation, non-payment is still prevalent.
382
    
 
However, some studies have highlighted that the culture of non-payment or unwillingness to 
pay for basic services that existed during the apartheid struggle no longer accurately explains 
the non-payment for municipal services.  It is more likely an inability to pay because of 
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poverty and the relatively high costs of municipal services to the poor.
383
  The 2006 
Intergovernmental Fiscal Review found that the poor face an affordability crisis which most 
likely is the reason why so many households default on municipal service payments.  The 
poor in peri-urban areas do not generally have steady incomes, and are often unable to pay a 




One of the most prevalent municipal cost recovery strategy is disconnection or service cut-
offs.  From an administrative point, it is easy to implement:  it is a matter of turning off a 
switch or valve that can be switched back on once payment has been made.
385
 However, there 
are reports where people who have not been able to pay their arrears for long periods of time 
are permanently disconnected and denied access to basic services.  Municipalities resort to 
removing the infrastructure to prevent illegal (re)connections. Such removals result in a waste 




Disconnections and service delivery cut-offs ignore the possibility that non-payment of basic 
services can be cyclical. Households may have non-regular income and therefore may be able 
to pay some months and not others.  In some instances people often did not pay rates in the 
beginning of the school year because of school fees and uniforms.  Gardeners did not pay 
during winter because they had no gardening work.
387
   The consequence of disconnection is 
that households have to pay a reconnection fee.  In serious cases, consumers may be 
blacklisted which means that they will not be able to enter into a new municipal service 




                                        
383
 Stanton, A.  (2006).  Survey on Access to Basic Services in the Msunduzi Municipality.  
Unpublished Report.  
384
 McDonald, D. and Pape, J. (2000). The Crisis of Service Delivery in South Africa.  
Pretoria:  Human Sciences Research Council Publishers. 
385
 Personal Conversation with Municipal Engineer. (Msunduzi Municipality). 5 July 2007. 
386
 Chetty, I.  The Free Basic Electricity Policy: A Case Study of Policy Implementation in 
the Msunduzi Municipality.  Unpublished M.Soc.Sc. Dissertation.  University of KwaZulu-
Natal. 
387
 Stanton, A. (2006)  Survey on Access to Basic in the Msunduzi Municipality.  
Unpublished Report.  
388
 Chetty, I. (2007).  The Free Basic Electricity Policy: A Case Study of Policy 
Implementation in the Msunduzi Municipality.  Unpublished M.Soc.Sc. Dissertation.  
University of KwaZulu-Natal. 
 
 
Page | 143 
Municipalities regularly disconnect or cut-off services at short notice, or without notice at all.  
Households are threatened with legal action and in some cases forceful evictions take 
place.
389
   Hemson criticised some municipalities for installing drip devices that literally 
dispense water one drop at a time.
390
   
 
A preoccupation with cost recovery can lead to municipalities prioritising quantity above 
quality.  In other words, a focus on short-term service delivery and affordability may lead to 
municipalities providing inferior or sub-standard service infrastructure in attempts to cut 
costs.  For example, decisions might be taken to upgrade informal squatter camps or 
settlements as opposed to providing alternative housing and service delivery infrastructure.
391
  
But, as one municipal official stated, faced with financial limitations and limited revenue 
potential, municipalities will find it difficult to invest in better public service infrastructure.
392
 
The Municipal Systems Act (2000) gives local authorities the power to seize property for 
non-payment of services.
393
  Other cost recovery measures include legal actions which entail 
the attachment of private/household assets.  These types of cost recovery strategies are 
politically unpopular, and expensive to implement.
394
   
 
A popular local government cost recovery mechanism is the installation of prepaid meters for 
volumetric services such as water and electricity, which is widely practiced by municipalities, 
whether in-house or at communal water stands.   Prepaid meters operate on a card-system 
where units of water (litres) or electricity (kilowatt) are purchased by the consumer.  Prepaid 
meters allow the operational and infrastructural costs to be built into service costs.  To access 
water or electricity, users have to pay a connection fee upfront; they can then purchase 
coupons to access the prepaid meters.  The arguments in favour of prepaid meters are that 
municipalities collect money in advance, thereby avoiding non-payment. It is 
administratively inexpensive in that there is no need to read meters or monitor consumption, 
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or bill and collect fees.  It removes the need for postal delivery addresses for billing in areas 
where none exist.  This is meant to help consumers budget and protects them from going into 
arrears.
395
   
 
Prepaid meters have been met by widespread community opposition, where some residents 
even physically remove or destroy meters.  Many regard prepaid meters as discriminatory 
insofar as they automatically disconnect people who cannot afford to purchase more units.
396
  
There have been a number of attempts by communities to persuade the courts to make the 
installation of prepaid meters unconstitutional.  In May 2008 in the Johannesburg Magistrate 
Court, Judge Tsoka ruled in favour of the residents of Phiri (Soweto) declaring prepaid 
meters as "illegal and unconstitutional".
397
 Residents immediately started digging up prepaid 
meters or by-passing them allowing them ongoing access to water.
398
   
 
In October 2009, the Constitutional Court reversed this decision and dismissed an application 
made by residents who demanded the removal of prepaid meters by the city of Johannesburg.  
The Constitutional Court ruled that prepaid meters were fair and just.  It deemed prepaid 
meters as more appropriate than conventional credit-meters because if customers default on 
conventional credit-meters, then interest is charged on amounts in arrears and the consumer 




Some claim that the installation of prepaid meters resulted in or at least contributed to the 
outbreak of cholera in KwaZulu-Natal in 2000.
400
 In that case, people initially had access to a 
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free communal water tap, but these were replaced in 1999 by prepaid meters.  Residents had 
first to pay R50 for a card before they could purchase credits for water.  However, the study 
found that many could not afford this fee and resorted to using unsafe water in nearby 
streams - resulting in cholera.
401
   
 
The cholera epidemic which began in 2000 in KwaZulu-Natal highlights some of the 
challenges municipalities face in their attempts at meeting their cost recovery obligations.  
For instance, the installation of prepaid meters and the charge of R50 per card were based on 
the assumption that if the majority of the approximately 1900 households purchased a prepaid 
card then the municipality would recover the costs of the provision, as well as provide for the 
maintenance of the water infrastructure. However, the lack of household subscriptions 
resulted in the underutilisation of prepaid meters which in turn translated into municipalities 
not being able to afford the maintenance costs.  Besides the wastage of infrastructure 
investment, the outbreak of cholera resulted in increased health care costs for the province.  
Hospitals and clinics ran out of capacity and supplies.
402
  McDonald estimated that the health 
cost associated with the cholera outbreak far outweighed the total amount that would have 
been spent on providing free water.
403
   He argues that the provision of free water would have 
cost the municipality and the province much less than the subsequent health care costs or the 
installation of expensive infrastructure which has since become redundant.
404
   
 
In short, the debate on what constitutes appropriate cost recovery mechanisms remains 
unresolved.  Municipalities experience widespread problems in recovering costs associated 
with basic service delivery. Many have inappropriate or inadequate administrative capacity to 
accurately bill or physically collect fees.  In addition, non-payment of user fees remains high 
and is often dealt with punitively, regardless of consumers‟ ability to pay.  In turn, the 
                                        
401
 Cottle, E. and Deedat, H. (2002).  The Cholera Outbreak: A 2000-2002 Case Study of the 
Source of the Outbreak in the Madlebe Tribal Authority Areas, uThungulu Region, KwaZulu-
Natal.  Durban:  Health Systems Trust. 
402
 Cottle, E. and Deedat, H. (2002).  The Cholera Outbreak: A 2000-2002 Case Study of the 
Source of the Outbreak in the Madlebe Tribal Authority Areas, uThungulu Region, KwaZulu-
Natal.  Durban:  Health Systems Trust. 
403
 McDonald, D. (2002). No Money, No Service.  In Alternatives.  Volume 28(2).  Pp.16-22.   
404
 McDonald claims that Cholera costs the province $0.5 billion per year in direct medical 
costs and $3.6 billion per year in lost economic production, which he claims is more than the 
toal amount that would be needed to provide water infrastructure to everyone in South Africa. 
McDonald, D. (2002).  No Money, No Service.  In Alternatives.  Volume 28 (2).  Pp.16-22. 
 
 
Page | 146 
outcome of inadequate cost recovery may further lead to municipalities opting for short-term 
solutions by providing inferior infrastructure to save on operating costs.   
5.3.3 The Challenge of Free Basic Services 
Perhaps the most challenging cost recovery issue for municipalities is the national mandate of 
free basic services that was introduced in 2003. This mandate essentially translates into 
municipalities being legally obliged to provide indigent households with access to 6kl of free 
water, basic sanitation and 50kWh of free electricity.  (See Appendix 8 on Free Basic Service 
Levels).  In 2003, the Department of Minerals and Energy published the Electricity Basic 
Services Support Tariff Policy Framework, commonly referred to as Free Basic Electricity 
Policy.  This policy instructs municipalities to provide all indigent households with: (1) 
50kWh of free grid electricity per month with concomitant blocked or stepped tariffs for 
electricity consumption beyond 50kWh;
405
 or (2) free non-grid electricity
406
 to all non-grid 




The national government‟s delegation of the free basic services mandate to local government 
meant the assignment of a new set of service delivery functions and responsibilities to 
municipalities.  Firstly, municipalities had to identify all indigent households that qualify for 
free basic services;  and based on indigency, they had to design differentiated tariffs for 
municipal services in order cross-subsidise service delivery.
408
  In other words, 
municipalities‟ had to implement cost recovery strategies that would enable them to afford 
the provision of free basic services to those deemed indigent. 
 
The Indigent Support Policy (2005) suggests that municipalities apply progressive block 
tariffs.  This means that municipalities must subsidise the minimum service level which is 
determined by national government.  Currently, national policy determines the minimum 
service levels that municipalities must provide for indigents and only if indigents consume 
above the prescribed amount are municipalities entitled to charge and extract fees for 
consumption above that level.  
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According to the Department of Provincial and Local Government the term indigent means 
“lacking the necessities of life”, which it lists as:  sufficient water; basic sanitation; refuse 
removal in denser settlements; environmental health; basic energy; health care; housing; food 
and clothing.
409
  Anyone who does not have access to these goods and services is considered 
indigent.  According to StatSA, 52.2% of South Africans are regarded as poor and are 
without access to basic services and would therefore be deemed as indigent and entitled to 
free basic services.
410
   However, the threshold of indigence varies depending on which 
datasets one consults.  For example, the Department of Provincial and Local Government 
regards as indigent and hence entitled to free basic services those households which earn less 
than R1,100 per month,
411
 while the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry sets the 
qualification for free basic services at households which earn less than R800 per month.
412
  
The Department of Minerals and Energy does not use household income as a criterion but 
rather consumption levels.  In this case, households that consume less than 150kWh per 
month is regarded as poor and should be entitled to 50kWh per month.
413
   
 
With such widespread variation, it is obvious that the label „indigent‟ is open to 
interpretation.  This places the onus on municipal administrators to design an indigence 
policy appropriate to their socio-economic context.  In addition to such variations, 
municipalities experience administrative problems.   For example, determining the criteria for 
indigence; identifying who qualifies; verifying the validity of applications; designing an 
application process sensitive to the poor and illiterate; as well as designing a system of 
monitoring and evaluation. Compiling accurate and up-to-date indigence registers is 
administratively challenging for municipalities. The SACities Network reported that many 
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municipalities continue to struggle with compiling registers of indigents.
414
  Municipalities 
complain that compiling and maintaining indigence registers are costly and impractical.
415
  
The South African Local Government Association (SALGA) reported that few municipalities 




Municipalities are faced with numerous challenges in identifying households which qualify.  
For example, defining what constitutes a household.  Or what if more than one household 
resides in one dwelling?  What about child-headed households?  Or is low consumption an 
indicator of indigence?  Does it apply to landowners and tenants?  Or what about properties 
that have a main structure as well as other informal settlement structures on the same 
property?
417
     
 
The national directive to supply free basic services to those regarded as indigent has 
translated into local implementation challenges.  For example, many municipalities lack the 
capacity to verify the application details.
418
   Verification includes the need to visit 
households or relying on the ward councillors and ward committees to verify the respective 
applications.  As the chapter on political decentralisation highlighted, ward councillors or 
committees are not very effective or non-partisan and this may result in some households 
being excluded deliberately or inadvertently.  
 
The national mandate of free basic services requires municipalities to design an 
administratively affordable and sustainable service delivery approach.
419
  Some adopt a 
targeted approach which requires poor households to apply.
420
  This approach includes 
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drafting an indigence register and places the onus on municipalities to verify each 
application.  However, many municipalities find this impractical and too costly to administer.  
It also requires a system of constant monitoring and evaluating beneficiaries‟ indigence status 
in order to determine whether a household‟s status has changed since it applied and it is 




Some municipalities avoid the administrative costs associated with the targeted approach by 
using more loosely defined criteria.  For example, municipalities apply a blanket or universal 
approach in which all households receive a free portion of water and electricity, followed by 
progressive block-tariffs to subsidise the free portion of the service.
422
  Other municipalities 
use a self-targeted approach.  This entails the provision of free basic services to households 
which are within a specified property-value range and/or consume less than the free basic 
services amounts.
423
  In the eThekwini metropolitan municipality (KwaZulu-Natal), for 
example, indigent households which consume more than the free basic services limit start 
paying a step-tariff rate, which is higher than regular users.
424
   
 
Another approach by municipalities to provide free basic services may involve delineating 
geographical areas where households are predominantly poor, and then providing free basic 
services for the area as a whole.
425
 The trade-off here is to balance the administrative costs 
saved by the proportion of households which free-ride. However, it can cause such areas to 
become more densely populated by spurring the migration of other households to those areas, 
or it can also stigmatise the area for being poor.   
 
Regardless of the administrative approaches to free basic service delivery, the financial 
burden falls predominantly on local government.  The financial challenge for municipalities 
                                        
421
 Arntz, T., Bekker, K., and Botes, L. (2003) Strategies for Indigent Policy Formulation and 
Implementation in Urban Settlements in South Africa.  In Journal of Public Administration.  
Volume 38(22).  Pp. 102-117. 
422
 For example the Cape Town metropolitan municipality and the Buffalo City municipality.  
SACities Network.  (2007). State of Cities Finances Report.   
423
 For example the eThekwini metropolitan municipality (Durban) and the Manguang 
municipality (Bloemfontein).  SACities Network. (2007). State of Citoes Finances Report.  
424
eThekwini Tariff and Municipal Surcharge Policy.  Available at 
www.durban.gov.za/durban/government/.../tariff-policy-2009-2010. 
425
 Arntz, T., Bekker, K., and Botes, L. (2003) Strategies for Indigent Policy Formulation and 
Implementation in Urban Settlements in South Africa.  In Journal of Public Administration.  
Volume 38(22).  Pp.102-117. 
 
 
Page | 150 
is that free basic services are essentially subsidies, and, furthermore, revenue will not be 
generated by its beneficiaries. In other words, rolling-out free basic services increases the 
overall operating expenditures of municipalities, but without additional revenue collection.  
 
Municipalities are increasingly faced with demands for higher amounts of free basic service 
levels.  The critique is that 50 free kWh of electricity per household per month only runs a 
light bulb and a few small appliances, while 6kl of water per household per month is regarded 
as too little due to the relatively high average number of occupants per household.  Calls are 
increasingly made for 150kWh and 20kl per household per month, as well as for the 




The FFC aptly reflects on the current political debates on what constitutes adequate quality 
and quantity of basic services.  It recognises that many reject the notion that 6kl of free basic 
water and 50kW of free basic electricity are adequate, but argues that:  
[I]f standards were set that everyone could agree were desirable from a 
constitutional, equity and economic point of view, comparison of these standards with 




In other words, free basic services go beyond the practical challenges of recovering costs 
associated with the provision of basic services, but the obligation to provide these very 
services free or at highly subsidised prices may well threaten the financial viability of 
municipalities.
428
  All categories of municipalities are challenged by the financial burden of 
providing free basic services.  The argument here is that Category B municipalities 
experience added cost recovery challenges because of the two-tiered local government 
system, as well as the transfer of their basic service delivery authority to Category C 
municipalities:  this is a consequence of the Municipal Structures Amendment Act (2000).  
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5.4  Challenges of Cost Recovery Facing Category B Municipalities  
 
Category B municipalities face a number of cost recovery challenges that appear to have been 
overlooked.  There is a general expectation that local municipalities have the capacity to 
implement cross-subsidisation programmes.  However, this section will show that local 
municipalities are faced with diminishing avenues for cost recovery.   This limits their ability 
to cross-subsidise service delivery.  It will show that supposed sources of income such as 
service delivery surcharges and property rates are limited. This has been exacerbated by the 
Municipal Structures Amendment Act‟s transfer of basic service delivery authority from 
Category B to Category C municipalities, severely depleting local municipalities‟ cost 




All municipalities are expected to independently fund the provision of basic services, 
including free basic services.  The National Treasury claims that municipalities can do so by 
cross-subsidising service delivery.
429
 However, cross-subsidisation assumes that 
municipalities have the revenue at hand to spend in those areas where infrastructure is 
needed.   
 
District municipalities used to be able to collect Regional Services Council (RSC) levies.  
RSC levies were business taxes paid to district and metropolitan municipalities. These levies 
were based on company payrolls and turnover as well as charges on the provision of water 
and electricity. The RSC levy was subsequently abolished in June 2006 for a number of 
reasons, partly because of the extensive administration and collection costs to municipalities 
as well as the high incidents of evasion.  Moreover, the argument was often touted that RSC 
levies were taxes on staff or labour which disadvantaged labour-intensive firms, which thus 
could exacerbate unemployment.
430
  Prior to its abolition, the RSC levy constituted 7% of 
municipalities‟ own revenue.
431
  However, the division of national revenue to local 
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government for the 2007/08 financial year increased less than 1%, signalling, in effect, a 
sharp decrease in local government revenue from taxation.   
 
The previous chapter highlighted that the demarcation of municipal boundaries in 2000 
resulted in the creation of large local municipalities, which now include vast portions of 
underdeveloped land.  Municipalities are expected to fund the provision of basic services to 
households which reside in outlying areas where poverty is high and infrastructure is limited. 
This places a strong financial burden on municipalities, and the potential for recovering costs 
is limited given the prevalence of poverty.
432
  The national directive is to cross-subsidise 
service delivery through surcharges. 
 
A surcharge on a municipal service is a charge levied by a municipality in addition to the fee 
or tariff charged for the provision of the service. Surcharges are normally generated from the 
provision of bulk services, such as water and electricity reticulation, which are aimed at 
providing additional revenue to municipalities for subsidising other municipal activities 
where user fees or charges are impossible, minimal or impractical. 
 
Surcharges which are built into basic services are contentious.  Many argue that it is unethical 
to include a profit margin in the provision of basic services.  Yet their criticism is not 
accompanied by any alternatives.
433
  The Municipal Systems Act (2000) defines surcharges 
as fundamental to cross-subsidisation and necessary for the promotion of local economic 
development.
434
 The Act states that the surplus generated can then be utilised as: an 
appropriation to capital reserves; in differentiated rates structures; and general services; and 




Water and electricity are often major sources of extra income for municipalities. This surplus 
income enables municipalities to subsidise service delivery to poorer areas.  Without a 
surplus, households in poorer areas would pay more for services.  In theory, according to the 
economies of scale, those who consume more are charged less as the costs to the municipality 
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are less.  The converse is then that those who utilise less are charged a larger per-unit base.
436
   
The reason is that the costs of establishing and maintaining infrastructure are already 
included in service charges, so when there are fewer consumers, fewer funds are collected for 
operational costs.   
 
Municipalities must pursue full cost recovery.  But the important distinction is that poor 
households must have access to basic services through: 
(i) tariffs that cover only operating and maintenance costs;  
(ii) special tariffs or life line tariffs for low levels of use or consumption of services or for 
basic levels of service; or 




This is generally done through the application of progressive block tariffs, which is regarded 
as a cost recovery measure that has the potential to cross-subsidise service delivery to the 
poor.  Besides cross-subsidisation, progressive block tariffs are also considered to eliminate 
wastage or at least penalise high consumption, thereby promoting sustainable development.  
Progressive block tariffs enable municipalities to make the initial levels of consumption more 
affordable, or free, while progressively charging higher rates as consumption increases.  In 
theory, progressive block tariffs have the potential to balance the need for full cost recovery 
with the provision of free basic services.  However, in search of private investment, 
municipalities often offer water and electricity to industry at heavily subsidised prices, in the 
hope of making their cities attractive for private capital investment.
438
  The result is that the 
pressure of additional surcharges in the interest of cross-subsidisation is not geared at high 
consuming industries, but rests with middle-class households.   
 
While block tariffs are certainly one way of cross-subsidising, Bekker et al point out that 
block tariffs are not very effective in situations where consumption remains low as the first 
„block‟ is normally heavily subsidised in order to encourage consumption at a higher service 
scale.
439
 Many local municipalities have made substantial progress in eradicating service 
                                        
436
 Interview with Finance Officer.  (Msunduzi Municipality).  Pietermaritzburg. 28 August 
2008. 
437
 Section 74.2 (c) of the Municipal Systems Act. (Act 32 of 2000). 
438
 Interview with Member of the Pietermaritzburg Chamber of Commerce.  12 June 2007. 
439
 Bekker, B., Eberhard, A., Gaunt, T. and Marquard, A. (2008).  A. South Africa’s Rapid 
Electrification Programme. In Energy Policy.  Volume 36.  Pp. 3115-3127. 
 
 
Page | 154 
delivery backlogs in areas regarded as poor, but the national mandate of free basic services 
means that there is little or no potential for cost recovery.
440
   
 
Bekker et al argue that it can no longer be claimed that electrification generates surpluses.
441
 
Recent studies show that despite free basic electricity, consumption remains low because of 
continuing issues around affordability. Therefore, the assumption that consumption by 
electrified households would increase to a level where the operational and capital costs could 




The national mandate of free basic services has devolved onerous administrative obligations 
to local government. For example, local municipalities have the responsibility for compiling 
and maintaining indigence registers, while the surplus generated from water and electricity 
goes to district municipalities.  For most local municipalities the national instruction to 
provide free basic services is complicated by the absence of service delivery infrastructure.  
This means that such local municipalities must put the necessary basic service delivery 
infrastructure in place so that indigent households cannot access free basic services.  The 
challenge for these municipalities is to find avenues where surcharges can be levied as a 
revenue source to assist in meeting their service delivery expenditure obligations.  However, 
such surcharges do increase the tax burden on consumers.  The Minister of Finance 
prescribes the national norms and standards for imposing municipal surcharges, while the 
Municipal Systems Act prescribes the manner in which fees, charges or tariffs are levied.   
 
As the previous chapter explained, the Municipal Structures Amendment Act transferred the 
authority to provide water, sanitation and electricity from Category B municipalities to 
Category C municipalities.  The immediate implication of the Act was that it would result in 
a drastic cutback of their cost recovery potential.  As service providers (as opposed to service 
authorities) Category B municipalities would no longer derive surpluses from the sale of bulk 
services such as water and electricity.  In addition, the Municipal Structures Amendment Act 
transfers the power to impose and collect taxes, levies and duties in relation to the provision 
of basic services from local municipalities to district municipalities. Service fees have always 
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been local municipalities‟ main source of income.  The rationale for the Amendment Act was 
never made clear.  Some claim that it was intended to allocate more cost recovery potential to 
district municipalities.
443
  It supposedly aimed at empowering district municipalities by 
increasing their revenue generating capacity.  However, it may have increased district 
municipalities‟ access to resources, but in the process lessened access to resources by local 
municipalities.   
 
In most cases, however, local municipalities continue to provide basic services on behalf of 
the district municipalities since the latter have limited capacity.  The problem, however, is 
that there is no formal cost recovery mechanism, posing a real possibility of unfunded 
mandates becoming devolved from district to local municipalities.
444
  The reality remains that 
any such authority remains provisional. 
 
5.4.2 Property Rates 
 
The consequence of the Municipal Structures Amendment Act (2000) is that local 
municipalities now depend primarily on property rates as their major source of own revenue.  
The Municipal Property Rates Act (Act 6 of 2004) is a relatively new policy and theoretically 
devolves authority to municipalities to collect additional revenue.  Property rates are a 
general local tax or levy which municipalities may charge, which is not in return for a 
specific benefit but is rather for a set of general services such as municipal roads and street 
lighting. The residential property tax is administered by local governments based on an 
assessment of the value of land and improvements thereon.  It is a type of wealth or benefit 
charge to land-owners as the primary beneficiaries from most local services.
445
    
 
The national minister responsible for local government prescribes the rates and ratios 
distinguishing between business, commercial, industrial, mining or residential properties.  
This has been an issue of contention.  For example, according to policy, the rate on business, 
commercial, industrial and mining property may not be more than double that on residential 
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property.   The rate on agricultural property may not be more than a quarter of the rate on 
residential property, while the rate on public benefit organisation property may not be more 
than a quarter of the rate on residential property.
446
   
 
With regard to local government‟s supposed authority to levy property rates, the contention is 
that the national Minister has executive authority to cap the rate on state-owned property and 
public service infrastructure.  In other words, the determination of local user fees rates is a 
national prerogative with implications for the autonomy of local government.  The current 
Property Rates Act stipulates that rates on state-owned property and public service 
infrastructure cannot be more than a quarter of the rate on residential property.
447
  In addition, 
the Guidelines on Rates Act (2005) makes no distinction between the types of state-owned 
property:  in other words, whether they provide local services such as clinics, police stations 
and courts;  or whether they offer district-wide services such as prisons and hospitals; or 
whether they provide provincial or national services, such as defence and provincial or 
national departmental offices.  Rates for parastatals are altogether absent.
448
   The result is 
that a state-owned office block is only charged a quarter of what a business office block is 
charged - for exactly the same level of services. State-owned property is grouped in the same 
rates categories as agricultural land and public service infrastructure, while the former 
consumes and benefits relatively more from widespread municipal services.
449
   
 
Proposed rates ratio are also accompanied by rebate formulas.  For example: 
 7.5% rebate, if there are no municipal roads next to the property.  
 7.5% rebate, if there is no municipal sewerage to the property.  
 7.5% rebate, if there is no municipal electricity to the property.  
 20% rebate, if water is not supplied by the municipality.  




The critique is that the ratios of rates take away the power of municipalities to determine and 
adjust their property taxes, since the same formula applies across municipalities despite their 
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different growth and development challenges.
451
 Increases are based on the annual consumer 
price index (CPI), which do not reflect the fluctuation of property values.  Municipalities 
claim that the caps on state-owned property will force them to shift the tax burden to 
residential properties.  In addition, some municipalities (like Johannesburg) want to 
distinguish between residential land ownership and sectional title owners and offer the latter a 
rebate to encourage high density development.  While, in other cases, municipalities want to 
levy higher taxes on vacant land to encourage development.
452
   
 
In theory, the Minister is merely regulating the imposition of taxes by capping the rates for 
nonresidential property; however, the low ratios set for state-owned property as well as only 
allowing inflationary increases limits autonomous revenue powers of municipalities that was 
intended by the devolution of property rates taxes to local government.  For a municipality 
such as Msunduzi, the capping of rates on state-owned property has financial implications 
since it includes Pietermaritzburg, which is the capital city of the KwaZulu-Natal province, 
and therefore houses the provincial legislature and the majority of provincial government 
departments. Such municipalities can therefore not use the property rates tax as a means of 
cross-subsidisation or to collect additional revenue for increased service delivery.   
 
In short, while in legal terms administrative authority for cost recovery has been devolved to 
local government, the parameters prescribed by the national executive limit local 
government‟s autonomy and their discretionary powers in determining their own local tariff 
structures.  The outcome is that municipalities‟ legal authority of cost recovery becomes 




This chapter critically analysed the devolution of the cost recovery function to municipalities. 
It showed that cost recovery poses numerous challenges for municipalities in general, as well 
as for Category B municipalities in particular.  The general literature on decentralisation 
equates the devolution of cost recovery responsibilities to lower levels of government as an 
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indication of widespread decentralisation.  Transferring the function of cost recovery, the 
literature assumes, represents an increased devolution of powers.  In other words, 
decentralisation is evident when the devolution of service delivery powers and functions to 
local governments is supported by local financial autonomy to raise and collect their own 
revenue.   
 
This chapter has illustrated that cost recovery will continue to be a daunting task for 
municipalities as long as they are faced with growing service delivery responsibilities while 
revenue sources remain limited.  Some sources are limited due to low levels of payment; 
others because of national legislation such as capping levy rates on property; or through the 
removal of source of own revenue (such as the RSC levies); or uncertainty (such as the 
transfer of bulk service delivery to district municipalities). These realities are indications of 
local government being granted limited authority and means to raise and collect their own 
revenue, thereby severely limiting local financial autonomy.  Furthermore, the tentative 
devolution of water and electricity authority to local municipalities, combined with the 
limited discretion on property rates, the removal of the RSC levies, and the uncertainty with 
regard to the establishment of REDs, diminish the local municipalities‟ capacity for increased 
cost recovery.   
 
Based on the current basic service delivery policy framework in South Africa, one could 
conclude that municipalities have been authorised to implement full cost recovery measures.  
But the important proviso is the inclusion of free baseline services.  This requirement is 
financially and administratively onerous for municipalities because of widespread indigence.  
This is made even more complex by the national government‟s prerogative to determine 
property rates together with their authority to determine and remove potential sources of 
revenue.  This results in minimising municipalities‟ full cost recovery potential.    
 
The problems facing cost recovery in municipalities go beyond the practical challenges of 
recovering costs.  They are exacerbated by the obligation to provide the infrastructure 
necessary for the provision of basic services free or at highly subsidised prices.  This chapter 
has shown that the national government‟s claims that local municipalities have adequate cost 
recovery capacity is flawed.  Prior to the Amendment Act, the main source of income of local 
municipalities was the sale of bulk services.  Avenues for cost recovery now rely on 
municipalities‟ ability to collect property rates. However, national government restrictions 
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minimise the authority of municipalities over local sources of revenue, thus further limiting 
avenues for cost recovery. 
 
This chapter has illustrated that cost recovery is integral to the viability of municipalities and 
the sustainability of service delivery.  It has argued that without adequate cost recovery, 
municipalities are unable to finance or maintain service delivery.  The challenge of cost 
recovery is illustrated in Figure 5.1.  It shows the intrinsic relationship between the extent of 
revenue collection and the capacity to provide infrastructure and/or service delivery 
sustainably.  It shows that inadequate income results in low infrastructure investment, which 
in turn results in the deterioration of infrastructure.  The consequence of weak infrastructure 
is inferior or poor service delivery and the cycle repeats itself in that poor services levels 
mean inadequate income - and the challenge of cost recovery cycle is perpetuated.   
 





The National Treasury‟s assumption is that better cost recovery strategies will provide more 
funding for service delivery investments such as technical and human capacity.  This in turn 
will improve service delivery which will result in higher levels of service payments, which 
will make funds available for infrastructure investment and maintenance.  However, as this 
chapter has highlighted, such an interpretation ignores a number of fundamental factors, such 
as local municipalities‟ limited avenues for cost recovery, as well as the extent of indigence.  








Low user fees income 
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improved or of a higher quality, this would not necessarily translate into higher income given 
the prevalence of indigence and the extent of service delivery backlogs.   
 
Put bluntly, the challenges facing municipal service delivery are compounded by 
municipalities‟ limited cost recovery potential.  Coupled with this is the national directive to 
provide certain basic services free to poor households while simultaneously expanding and 
maintaining infrastructure in a socio-economic context characterised by rapid urbanisation, 
unemployment and limited economic growth.   The problem of indigence is one that in all 
likelihood will continue, while the lack of sufficient sources of revenue at local government 
level will continue to pose service delivery implementation problems.   
 
The Auditor-General and FFC argue that the provision of basic services in situations where 
the levels of poverty are high, and cost recovery low, or non-existent, will not only increase 
the threat to the financial viability of municipalities, but also risks the sustainability of service 
delivery as well as threatens the sustainability of local government as an autonomous sphere 
of government.
453
    
 
The implications of limited cost recovery places severe limitations on local government‟s 
ability to eradicate existing service delivery backlogs, as well as sustain service delivery to 
those households that have access to basic services.  It has been shown here that the fiscal 
capacity of municipalities is insufficient relative to their administrative functions and 
responsibilities.  Theories in the academic literature suggest that there can be no devolution 
of local government autonomy without adequate local fiscal capacity.  In legal terms, it 
appears as if local government has financial autonomy to recover fees associated with the 
provision of basic services.  However, this chapter concludes by arguing that local 
governments are unable in practical terms to recover adequate revenue.  Under such 
circumstances, political and administrative local autonomy diminishes. 
 
 
The conclusion reached here is that the devolution of the cost recovery function to local 
government - a sphere of government that is regarded as insufficiently resourced as well as 
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lacking the capacity to design and implement appropriate cost recovery practices - is by 
default fraught with implementation problems.
454
   Municipalities‟ general lack of own 
revenue sources limits their financial capacity to cross-subsidise free basic services.   Without 
financial capacity, devolution is meaningless.   
 
The next chapter focuses on the system of intergovernmental fiscal transfers and highlights 
the dependence of municipalities on fiscal transfers, and considers the implication of such 
dependence on local autonomy.  The argument that is mounting in this study is that 
decentralisation of the basic service delivery mandate to municipalities threatens their 
financial viability. This „threat‟ highlights the importance of appropriate fiscal arrangements 
between the national fiscus and local governments.  This is the domain of fiscal 
decentralisation, which is the focus of the next chapter. 
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This chapter is organised into four parts focusing on different but related broad themes. The 
first three parts of the chapter describe the current system of fiscal decentralisation in South 
Africa.  It commences by identifying some of the objectives of fiscal decentralisation and 
couches these against the historical context of fiscal intergovernmental relations in South 
Africa.  The second part considers the legislative framework and the assignment of fiscal 
powers and authority to local government under the new democratic dispensation.  The third 
part describes the current system of revenue sharing by explaining the national division of 
revenue, focusing particularly on the annual budgeting process and the fiscal transfer of 
national revenue through a system of conditional and unconditional grants.   
 
The fourth and final part of this chapter provides a critical analysis of the system of fiscal 
decentralisation in South Africa.  It does so by examining the allocation of national revenue 
to local government.  The argument that will be presented here is that the nature of both the 
unconditional and conditional grants is not conducive to furthering local fiscal autonomy.  On 
the contrary, it will be shown that the Equitable Share grant is far from being an 
„unconditional‟ grant.  This will be examined by critically analysing the relationship between 
the Municipal Infrastructure Grant and the Equitable Share formula. 
 
Fiscal decentralisation in essence refers to the allocation of fiscal powers and functions to 
lower levels of government. The literature claims that the nature of fiscal decentralisation in 
any particular country is a key indication of local government autonomy in general.
455
  It is 
argued, for example, that the manner in which nationally raised revenue is divided across 
different levels of government, or the degree of variation between sub-national units of 
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government‟s revenue capacity and expenditure responsibilities, indicates the extent of local 
fiscal autonomy.
456
   
 
This chapter looks at local government in a system of intergovernmental fiscal relations by 
examining the legal framework of fiscal decentralisation, focusing particularly on the system 
of dispersing funds across the spheres of government, and the implications thereof on local 
fiscal autonomy.  One of the questions posed here is to what extent fiscal authority is 
devolved to local government.  It will be seen that the nature of intergovernmental fiscal 
policy-making, fiscal transfers and the conditionalities attached to these transfers point to 
limited local fiscal autonomy.  Deconcentration, or at best delegation, appears to be the more 
prominent form of fiscal decentralisation, and not devolution as envisaged by the 
Constitution.   
 
The system of intergovernmental fiscal relations in South Africa is highly centralised.  The 
advantage for national government is that widespread central control over the dispersal and 
expenditure of funds to local government enables national government to influence the 
budget priorities in municipalities.  The disadvantage for municipalities is that under tight 
central control, municipalities have little financial decision-making authority which makes 
municipalities basic service providers as opposed to basic service authorities.  In other words, 
municipalities become the service delivery agents for national government as opposed to 
autonomous local authorities accountable to their constituencies for basic service delivery. 
   
Implementing fiscal decentralisation is not straightforward in South Africa.  The apartheid 
legacy of unequal development and inequitable access to revenue sources has created the 
need for financial redistribution and stability.  The literature argues that such objectives are 
better served under a centralised system of governance.
457
  In such a case, there is a need for 
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central control over local fiscal matters; and the redistribution or equalisation of resources is a 
fiscal function best served by national government.   
 
Based on the legal framework of South Africa, however, there are limits to fiscal 
centralisation.  According to the Constitution, the objective of national government is to 
financially assist and support municipalities so that they can „autonomously‟ and 
„independently‟ meet their administrative powers and responsibilities.
458
  One of the 
objectives of this chapter is to identify elements of both centralisation and decentralisation in 
the institutional framework for intergovernmental fiscal relations.  It critically investigates 
whether elements of centralisation are aimed at „assisting‟ municipalities or „controlling‟ 
municipalities, in particular whether central fiscal control over local financial matters is 
directed at assisting and supporting municipalities to provide basic services „autonomously‟ 
and „independently‟.   
 
The previous chapter demonstrated that the capacity of municipalities to meet its 
constitutional mandate of providing basic services depends on the availability of resources.  
At this point in time, there is no local municipality in South Africa that is able to fulfil its 
constitutional mandate of providing basic services without any national or provincial 
financial support.
459
  However, this does not mean that there can be no devolution of fiscal 
authority.  It means that for the time being, local governments will remain dependent on 
national government fiscal support.  What is more telling is the nature or conditions attached 
to such intergovernmental fiscal support.  How prescriptive is it?  Is it conducive to 
improving local government autonomy, or are intergovernmental transfers indicative of 
increasing central control? 
 
This chapter will commence by exploring what the constitutional obligations of fiscal 
decentralisation in South Africa are, and then consider how this has been put into effect by 
exploring the assignment of fiscal power and authority to the different spheres of 
government.  It is particularly concerned with how the division of revenue takes place, and 
what consideration is given to local government.  One of the key questions is whether or not 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers advance local autonomy in South Africa.  This will be 
                                        
458
 Section 40 of the Constitution of South Africa.  (Act 108 of 1996). 
459
 SACities Network.  (2007).  State of Cities Finances Report. 
 
 
Page | 165 
explored by analysing in some depth the nature of the current grant allocations and the 
inherent limitations this places on municipalities‟ service delivery autonomy.  
6.1 The Objective of Fiscal Decentralisation in South Africa  
 
The literature equates fiscal decentralisation with the devolution of financial autonomy.
460
  
Financial autonomy implies sub-national self-sufficiency, but this is proving to be impossible 
in South Africa for a number of reasons.  For one, although local government transformation 
was officially finalised in December 2000 with the completion of the demarcation process, it 
by no means settled the functional and financial arrangements between national, provincial 
and local government.  On the contrary, it highlighted the severity of municipalities‟ fiscal 
problems.  
 
In theory, fiscal decentralisation confers the necessary power on democratically elected sub-
national levels of government to collect and spend own revenue in line with their respective 
responsibilities for expenditure and revenue-making capacity.
461
 However, in South Africa 
this is complicated since post-apartheid municipalities were not created in a neutral context; 
they inherited diverse administrative and financial weaknesses.  As such, fiscal 
decentralisation entails more than devolving financial autonomy to sub-national governments 
to raise and spend own revenue.  It is also about redressing the financial disparities among 
municipalities across South Africa by revising how revenue should be dispersed among the 
different spheres of government in order to eradicate fiscal inequalities created by apartheid.   
 
The Constitution does not explicitly specify the framework of fiscal decentralisation.  (See 
Appendix 9).  However, it does state that the assignment of political and administrative 
powers and functions to sub-national levels of government must be accompanied by the 
transfer of adequate fiscal authority.  Parliament must “ensure that the provinces and 
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One can infer, therefore, that the objective of fiscal decentralisation is to assist local 
governments to fullfil their constitutional mandate of providing all South Africans with 
access to basic services. As such, a system of fiscal decentralisation must ensure that 
municipalities have the necessary fiscal powers and authority to provide basic services and 
perform the functions allocated to them by the Constitution.   
The redrawing of municipal boundaries in 1996 and in 2000 may have resulted in politically 
more representative local authorities, but it did not create financially viable ones.  This was, 
however, inevitable as the objective of demarcation was to equalise or eradicate the vast 
disparities that existed in municipal financial capacity.  The creation of wall-to-wall 
municipalities was aimed at amalgamating municipalities with revenue generating capacity 
with municipalities without such capacity. As the Demarcation Board stated:   
wherever possible, current TLCs and TRCs and/or other areas should be combined 
with a view to realising fiscally sustainable units, with ‘weaker’ areas being paired 
with ‘stronger’ areas so as to achieve a sharing of existing or potential resources.
463
 
As previous chapters have indicated, this had a particular impact on Category B 
municipalities since these newly demarcated areas quadrupled in geographical size, which 
often resulted in the incorporation of large tracts of underdeveloped land, areas that had been 
previously located in homelands or self-governing territories which had no or limited tax 
bases.  
While Category C municipalities are predominantly rural, they are less populated and service 
delivery is often provided by Category B municipalities.  Category A municipalities also 
increased in population size and became densely populated, but compared to Category B 
municipalities, Category A ones had a stronger revenue base and some basic infrastructure 
network.  The immediate challenge was and continues to be how a system of 
intergovernmental revenue sharing can address the weak, inoperable and diverse financial 
systems of the different municipal categories.   
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 Section 214.2 (d) of the Constitution of South Africa.  (Act 108 of 1996). 
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 Municipal Demarcation Board.  (1999).   The Board‟s Approach to the Determination of 
Category B Municipalities.  Page 6.    
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A first undertaking was to change the centralised monetary transfer system between the three 
spheres of government whereby national funds were allocated directly to metropolitan 
municipalities whereas funds to regional and local councils were channelled through 
provincial governments.
464
  The practice of transferring funds to provinces, which in turn had 
to allocate funds to Regional Councils, proved to be unwieldy and inoperable.
465
  Provinces 
were criticised for indirectly rewarding financially poor performing Regional Councils by 
granting them more funds the following financial year.
466
  The Financial and Fiscal 
Commission felt that provinces tended to allocate funds on the basis of „emergency‟ support, 
or according to the historical pattern of expenditure of the particular council. It stated in 1997 
that “the current intergovernmental transfers from the national government to local 




This system was open to abuse and exploitation since the funding allocation was not based on 
a particular framework.  Regional Councils were never sure how much and when they would 
receive funding.  This in turn meant that local councils would not know how much Regional 
Councils would transfer to them.  This unpredictability made accurate budgeting difficult for 
both types of municipalities, and municipalities found themselves dependent on the will of 
provinces.
468
 The recommendation then was that “[E]quity between the second and third 
                                        
464
 As shown in Chapter Three on political decentralization, Regional Councils were 
operational between 1994 and 2000.  They were a rather haphazard amalgamation of previous 
Joint Services Boards, Black Local Authorities, and in some provinces (especially in 
KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape) large traditional authorities.  In 2000, when the local 
government demarcation process was completed, Regional Councils were replaced by 
District Councils.   
465
 Municipal Demarcation Board (2005).  Review of the Adjustment of District Functions to 
Local Municipalities. 
466
 The Financial Fiscal Commision. (1997).  The Allocation of Financial Resources between 
the National and Provincial Governments: Recommendations for the 1996/97 Fiscal Year.  
And Whelan, P. (2002).  Local Government Finance Reform.  Pp. 233-251.   In Parnell,S., 
Pieterse, E., Swilling, M. and Wooldrige, D. (2002). Democratising Local Government:  The 
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467
 The Financial Fiscal Commision. (1997).  The Allocation of Financial Resources between 
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levels of government can be promoted only in a dispensation where no finance is made 




The chapter on political decentralisation illustrated that Regional Councils were large bodies, 
some with more than 300 councillors, and were criticised for being incapable of determining 
the allocation of appropriate funds to local municipalities.
470
  In addition, the system of 
political appointments to the Regional Councils lacked electoral accountability and 
transparency, making the whole system of intergovernmental fiscal transfers open to abuse 
and corruption.
471
 As such, the system of indirectly funding local municipalities was not 
conducive to local fiscal autonomy.  It was not only hierarchical, but provincial grants were 
highly prescriptive, which left municipalities with minimal discretion in executing their 
constitutional obligations. As such, there was no devolution of fiscal authority but fiscal 
resources were allocated top-down in a three-tiered hierarchical system of governance. 
 
The categorisation of municipalities and the finalisation of municipal boundaries in 
December 2000, together with the proliferation of local government policies detailing the 
administrative and political powers and functions of municipalities, necessitated a need to 
(re)consider the intergovernmental fiscal relations system.  The task at hand was to establish 
a regulated legislative framework that would determine the respective powers of the spheres 
to impose and collect taxes and fees, together with how nationally collected revenue was to 
be divided among spheres of government.  The resultant systems and processes depict fiscal 
decentralisation as it stands today in South Africa. 
 
The Constitution states that the system of intergovernmental fiscal relations must “ensure that 
the provinces and municipalities are able to provide basic services and perform the functions 
allocated to them.”
472
   It must also take into consideration the fiscal capacity and efficiency 
of the provinces and municipalities;
473
 the developmental and other needs of provinces, local 
                                        
469
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Intergovernmental Fiscal Relations in South Africa.    
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government and municipalities;
 474
 and the obligations of the provinces and municipalities in 




As such, fiscal decentralisation is not an option but a duty conferred upon national 
government by the Constitution.  Accordingly, national government has an obligation to 
ensure that municipalities have adequate fiscal powers to provide basic services and perform 
the functions allocated to them.
476
  In addition, the Constitution stipulates that any such 
decisions must be taken only after the provincial governments, organised local government 
(SALGA) and the Financial and Fiscal Commission have been consulted.
477
   
6.2 The Decentralisation of Fiscal Powers and Authority 
 
In South Africa, the determination of fiscal powers and authority is a central responsibility.  
The literature on fiscal decentralisation suggests that the devolution of political and 
administrative powers and authority must be accompanied by fiscal powers and authority.
478
  
The argument presented by Bahl et al is that local political decision-making or administrative 
authority cannot exist without a degree of autonomous local financial capacity.
479
    
 
Local government in South Africa is tasked with five key functions.  These are:  to govern in 
a democratic manner; to ensure the provision of basic services; to promote social and 
economic development; to promote a safe and healthy environment; and to encourage 
community participation in local government.
480
  These all have financial implications and in 
a system of cooperative governance this translates into a national government obligation to 
create a decentralised system of intergovernmental fiscal relations which devolves fiscal 
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Oxford University Press.   
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At its most basic definition, fiscal powers refer to sub-national governments‟ authority to 
raise, collect and spend local taxes.  In South Africa, the capacity for revenue generation is 
unequally distributed between the three spheres of government.
482
   Provinces, for example, 
are regarded as only being able to generate about 40% of their own revenue because of their 
limited revenue raising capacity.  For example, provinces cannot impose corporate income 
tax, value-added tax (VAT), excise levies or property taxes.  Their own revenue sources are 
limited to motor car license fees, hospital fees, casino and horseracing taxes.   
 
On the other hand, the National Treasury posits that municipalities can generate 90% of their 
own revenue.
483
  This consists primarily of revenue generated through services charges, 
property rates and income generated through investments or other public contributions.  
Despite the apparent revenue-raising autonomy, municipalities have no authority to set tax 
rates.  Sub-national government rates, fees or taxing powers are determined by the national 
Minister of Finance who sets the national norms and standards for imposing municipal user 
fees and surcharges.
484
   
 
The theory on decentralisation contends that when autonomous financial powers and 
functions are not devolved to municipalities, the latter cannot be held accountable by their 
local constituency since municipal officials will find themselves more answerable to national 
or provincial government who control their funding allocations.
485
 Such a scenario is 
indicative of fiscal decentralisation by delegation as opposed to devolution.   
 
In South Africa, municipal taxing powers are limited to a set of service fees or rates which 
compensate municipalities for general service expenditures but subject to national 
legislation.
486
  Municipalities, to a lesser extent, also generate other revenue in the form of 
                                        
482
 Whelan, P. (2002).  Local Government Finance Reform.  Pp. 233-251.   In Parnell,S., 
Pieterse, E., Swilling, M. and Wooldrige, D. (2002). Democratising Local Government:  The 
South African Experience. Cape Town:  University of Cape Town Press. 
483
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traffic fines, business licences, rental fees, entrance fees for use of municipal facilities and 
fresh produce markets.
487
   
 
Revenue from property rates is spent exclusively within a municipality. Property rates often 
finance street maintenance, lighting, storm drainage, cemeteries, parks and recreational 
facilities or other general administrative expenses.  Property rates may not exceed nationally 
determined rates.  National and provincial governments do not have the power to levy 
property rates, nor do they share in the revenue collected.
488
    
 
Besides property rate taxes, municipalities are legally entitled to levy surcharges on 
municipal services.  Municipal surcharges are charges in excess of the municipal base tariff 
that a municipality may impose on fees for a municipal service provided.
489
  Surcharges are 
normally generated from trading in bulk services such as water and electricity reticulation, 
and should be able to fund and cross-subsidise other municipal services where fees are not 
forthcoming.
490
  However, the chapters on administrative decentralisation and cost recovery 
illustrated that cross-subsidisation through surcharges has fallen away for Category B 





Municipalities have limited borrowing powers and may not seek international loans.  All 
applications need approval from the national Minister of Finance.
492
  But approval is not the 
only example of central control. The previous system of national government guarantees was 
abandoned in 1994, hence municipalities are forced to borrow on their own merits.  Given the 
poor state of local government finances, many private lending institutions do not regard 
municipalities as creditworthy enough and thus do not qualify for loans.
493
  According to 
National Treasury, only 26 out of a total of 283 municipalities in 2006 met the financial 
requirements necessary to access external loans.
494
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In short, while in legal terms municipalities have some fiscal powers and responsibilities, in 
reality their fiscal autonomy is limited.  While they may collect local revenue, the type and 
rates are determined by national government.  And as the previous chapter highlighted, while 
municipalities have the authority to collect property rates and user fees, problems of non-
payment and indigence limit revenue generating capacity.   The latest statistics presented in 
the Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Review (2003/04-2009/10), for example, 
show that municipalities were far from being able to generate 90% of their own revenue.  On 
the contrary:  it generated only 78%.  (43% in services charges, 19% through property rates, 
and 12% from other sources of income). Government grants comprised 22% of the total 
operating revenue of municipalities.
495
   
 
The lack of financial self-reliance of municipalities means that their fiscal autonomy is 
significantly dependent on the system of intergovernmental fiscal transfers.  In this respect, 
the Division of Revenue is probably the most revealing and crucial aspect of fiscal 
decentralisation in South Africa.   
6.3  The Division of Revenue 
 
The annual Division of Revenue is a system of intergovernmental revenue sharing aimed at 
subsidising the different spheres of government regarding their respective service 
expenditures.  National revenue primarily comprises individual income taxes, excise duties, 
value-added-tax (VAT) and a fuel levy.  At its most basic, dividing national revenue is 
determined by firstly deducting a contingency reserve and interest payments on state debts.  
The remainder is divided vertically between the three spheres of government.  These 
allocations in turn are divided horizontally – shared between the different national 
government departments; provinces; and the different municipal categories.
496
   
 
Figure 6.1 below provides a graphical illustration of the vertical and horizontal division of 
revenue for the 2009/10 financial year. (Appendix 10 provides a detailed breakdown of 
funding in percentage terms). 
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 National Treasury.  (2008).  Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Review 
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 Shared between Category A, B and C municipalities. 
 
Source:  Adapted from the Division of Revenue Act (Act 12 of 2009) 
 
The determination of the vertical and horizontal grant distribution has a direct impact on local 
municipalities‟ much needed access to revenue.   In this respect, the nature of the national 
budgetary process is a crucial factor for the fiscal state of local government, because it 
determines how much funding and the manner in which it will be transferred to the respective 
spheres of government.  This indicates the distribution of fiscal authority and the emerging 
form of fiscal decentralisation.   
6.3.1. The Budgetary Process 
 
The Division of Revenue process is a central government responsibility which resides with 
the National Treasury.  The National Treasury is a national government department that falls 
within the portfolio of the Minister of Finance.  It is responsible for national economic policy, 
as well as the drafting of the annual budget.  The National Treasury determines the amount of 
revenue available for vertical and horizontal distribution as well as the conditions (if any) 
attached.  The National Treasury drafts a Division of Revenue Bill that allocates nationally 
raised revenue across the three spheres of government.  This process happens annually, 
commencing in January each year and culminating in parliamentary approval which leads to 
the enactment of the Division of Revenue Act.  Diagram 6.1 illustrates the annual budgeting  
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March-April 
National portfolio 
committees & provincial 
standing committees hold 
hearings and report back to 
legislators. 
March-May  
National & Provincial Ministers of Finance 
and National & Provincial Treasury departments  




The National Minister and National  
Treasury finalises MTEF & a 
Medium Term Budget Policy 
Statement is published – i.e. the 
Division of Revenue Bill.  
September-October 
National Minister and National 
Treasury invite final input from 
intergovernmental forums such 
as the Budget Forum.  
July-August 
National Minister and Treasury  
combine the different provincial 
departmental estimates matched 
with Budget Council‟s allocation. 
January-March 
The Minister of Finance and the National 
Treasury draft budget policy, estimating 
revenue and setting an upper limit on spending. 
January 
National Minister seeks national 
parliamentary approval.  If 
granted, the President enacts the 
Division of Revenue Act. 
May-June 
National Minister of Finance and 
National Treasury determine 
guideline estimations for vertical 
and horizontal allocations. 
START 
cycle.  It is clear from the diagram that the National Minister of Finance and the National 
Treasury are the two fundamental drivers of the annual budgeting process.  It is also clear that 
the legislature (or Parliament) is only involved at the end of the annual budgeting cycle. Even 
more conspicuous is that legislative hearings at national or provincial government level only 
take place after the budget has been approved.  These point to national executive dominance 
and minimal parliamentary influence. 
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Diagram 6.1 illustrates a  predominantly  centralised annual budgeting process.  However, the 
Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act (Act 13 of 2005) formalised eight 
intergovernmental institutions which are regarded as integral to the national budgeting 
process insofar as they offer a channel for sub-national government input into the Division of 
Revenue.  These are: 
i. The Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC) 
ii. The Budget Council 
iii. The Budget Forum 
iv. Minister‟s Committee on the Budget (MinComBud) 
v. The Joint MinMecs497  
vi. The Technical Committee on Finance and the Joint Sectoral Technical 
Committees (4x4s) 
vii. The Treasury Committee 
viii. The Parliamentary Budget Committee. 
 
Table 6.1 defines each of the above intergovernmental institutions and their respective fiscal 
authority.  What is evident from the table is that local government is only represented on the 
FFC (two members from SALGA) and the Budget Forum (five members from SALGA and 
nine member representing each of provincial local government association but none 
representing specific municipal categories).  However, these forums are all chaired by 





Although the annual budgetary process is fundamentally a central responsibility and activity, 
a decentralised system of governance should promote sub-national government participation.  
As stated earlier, the Constitution requires that in order to ensure that adequate fiscal powers 
to provide basic services are allocated to the different spheres of government, such decisions 
must be taken only after the provincial governments, organised local government and the 
FFC have been consulted.
499
  Based on closer observation, the officially established 
intergovernmental forums responsible for the annual budget illustrates a general absence or 
                                        
497
A MinMec refers to a National Minister and related Provincial Ministers (MECs) 
pertaining to one particular sector.  For example, the Housing MinMec which comprises the 
National Minister of Housing and each of the provincial Ministers of Housing ) 
498
 Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act. (Act 36 of 2005). 
499
 Section 214 (2) of the Constitution of South Africa. (Act 108 of 1996). 
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underrepresentation of local government, with none representing any specific category of 
municipality. 
 
 Table 6.1:  Intergovernmental Institutions involved in the National Budgeting Process 
 
 
The Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC)  
Independent constitutionally established advisory body.  It makes recommendations on the 
budget and intergovernmental financial issues to Parliament, the provincial legislatures, and 
the Budget Council. There are 22 members of the FFC, who serve terms of five years: 
 Nine persons, each of whom is nominated by the Executive Council of a province; 
 Two persons nominated by South Africa Local Government Association (SALGA), 
and; 




The Budget Council makes recommendations to the Cabinet on the budget. The Budget 
Council was formalised and given specific functions by the IGFRA which requires the 
Ministry of Finance to convene the Council at least twice a year.  The Council is consulted on 
fiscal and financial matters affecting provincial government.  The core membership of the 
Budget Council is the: 
 Finance MinMEC (the Minister and Deputy Minister of Finance and the nine 
provincial MECs for Finance); 




The Budget Forum is a consultative forum pertaining to local government. It comprises: 
 five members of SALGA 
 one representative from each of the provincial local government associations.  
The Budget Forum is convened by the national Minister of Finance, while the national 
Minister of Provincial and Local Government may attend.  However, the Budget Forum is 
only expected to meet once a year. 
 
 
Minister’s Committee on the Budget (MinComBud) 
The MinComBud is a smaller technical subcommittee of Cabinet specifically tasked with 
budget matters, involved in the oversight of the developing budget and its compliance with 
government goals.  
 
Joint MinMecs  
These committees are MinMecs for sectors which are concurrent functions of  national and 
provincial government such as health, education and housing. Each committee is composed 
of: the national minister and the provincial ministers (MECs) for that sector. They meet 
throughout the year to identify trends in the sector, set priorities, and discuss budgetary 
implications of national policies for provincial service delivery. 
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Technical Committee on Finance and the Joint Sectoral Technical Committees (4x4s) 
Often referred to as 4x4s as they comprise four national and four provincial representatives, 
and bring together treasury and line departments, at both the national and provincial levels.  
The 4x4s are permanent bodies and support the Budget Council and discuss policy options of 
the particular sector, such as problems with service delivery. The 4x4s are permanent bodies 
which meet throughout the year to consider other sector-wide policy issues beyond 
budgeting. In addition to 4x4s for health, education, welfare, personnel, and justice, 4x4s 
have now also been convened to address infrastructure and transport. The purpose of the 4x4s 
is to enhance intergovernmental relations and the exchange of information, while taking a 
long term perspective on spending and policy. However 4x4s are advisory bodies and do not 




The Treasury Committee evaluates requests from provinces and national departments for 
additional funds.  The Committee is chaired by the Minister of Finance and includes a select 
number of Cabinet ministers. 
 
 
Parliamentary Budget Committee 
The Committee is an ad hoc committee and holds hearings on the Medium-Term Budget 
Policy Statement (MTBPS).  Its purpose is to offer the national legislature an avenue to be 
involved in the executive budgeting making process.  (However, hearings only take place 
once the budget has already been approved by the National Parliament, and the following 
year‟s budgeting process has commenced). It comprises: 
 15 members from the National Assembly (nine ANC members and six members of 
the opposition)  
 8 members of the National Council of Provinces (five ANC members and three 
opposition members).  
 
Source:  Adapted from the Intergovernmental Relations Framework Act. (Act 13 of 2005). 
 
 
Table 6.1 above reiterates the arguments made in the chapters on political decentralisation 
and administrative decentralisation that the national executive dominates the policy decision-
making processes of South Africa.  The implication of a nationally dominated budgeting 
process is that it unilaterally controls the division of revenue allocation. Local governments 
have minimal influence in the determination of the amount and conditions attached to 
intergovernmental transfers.   In addition, local government is treated as a uniform sphere, 
with no consideration for the implication of the division of revenue for the different 
categories of municipalities.   
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6.3.2 Conditional and Unconditional Grants 
 
Intergovernmental fiscal transfers to municipalities from national and provincial government 
are made through a range of different mechanisms and instruments. Some are directly 
transferred to municipalities as cash, either on a conditional or an unconditional basis.  Others 
come indirectly in the form of assets; and to a lesser degree, revenue can also be raised from 
borrowing and private sector equity in infrastructure.
500
   
 
As the term suggests, certain prescriptions to transfers are attached to conditional grants by 
stipulating both the content and the project outcomes of implementation.  As such, 
conditional grants limit local government autonomy since the allocation and renewal of 
conditional grants depend on whether funds are available and whether municipalities have 
met the requirements set out by the dispersing department.  Unconditional grants, on the other 
hand, impose few restrictions on how funds should be spent.  In theory, such grants determine 
the broad goals but do not specify the approach municipalities must take to achieve them.   
 
The ratio between conditional and unconditional grant allocations is often regarded as a key 
indicator of local government autonomy.
501
  The inference is that more unconditional funding 
means more local government autonomy.  The Constitution instructs national government to 
support the devolution of political and administrative powers and functions to local 
government by means of transferring adequate fiscal resources in order for local government 
to independently meet their Constitutional mandate.  This is determined by local 
government‟s right to an equitable share of national revenue, which is characterised as:   
(a) the equitable division of revenue raised nationally among the national, provincial and 
local spheres of government;  
(b)  the determination of each province's equitable share of the provincial share of that 
revenue; and  
                                        
500
 This is based on a review of the Division of Revenue Acts published between 2000-2009.   
501
 Oates, W. (1999). An Essay on Fiscal Federalism. In Journal of Economic Literature.  
Volume 37(3). Pp. 1120-1149. 
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(c)  any other allocations to provinces, local government or municipalities from the 
national government's share of that revenue, and any conditions on which those 




In this regard, the Constitution stipulates that an equitable share for the division of revenue 
must be expressed in national legislation.  In terms of the Constitution, provincial and local 
governments are entitled to an equitable share of the national revenue to enable them to 
perform their mandated functions and provide basic services.
503
  In the South African context, 
the reference to ‘equitable’ is significant because of the apartheid government’s practice of 
funding respective geographical areas based on race as opposed to fiscal need.  The 
Constitution requires that the division of revenue must be based on a consideration of 





well as economic disparities.
506
   In this respect, intergovernmental transfers are aimed at 
correcting the historical fiscal inequities and inefficiencies among the different spheres of 
government.  This type of intergovernmental approach to funding is aimed at achieving fiscal 
equality as well as local fiscal autonomy. 
The Equitable Share system was first proposed by the FFC in 1998/99 (but only applied in 
the 2002/2003 financial year) as a response to the inadequacy of the previous 
intergovernmental transfers to provincial governments.
507
  The purpose of this unconditional 
grant is to assist local government to cover their recurring operating costs associated with 
their constitutional service delivery mandate, thereby assisting municipalities to eradicate 
existing backlogs as well as extend service delivery by off-setting a portion of the 
municipalities‟ operating costs.   The Equitable Share is a formula grant, allocating funds 
based on demographic need.
508
  The Equitable Share does not include capital transfers. The 
latter are financed through a separate system of conditional grants, which target a specific 
service.   
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 Section 214 (1)(a, b and c) of the Constitution of South Africa. (Act 108 of 1996). 
503
 This is a vertical division of revenue between the three spheres of government. 
504
 Section 214 (2)(e) of the Constitution of South Africa. (Act 108 of 1996). 
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 Section 214 (2)(f) of the Constitution of South Africa.. (Act 108 of 1996). 
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 Section 214 (2)(g) of the Constitution of South Africa. (Act 108 of 1996). 
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 National Treasury.  (2008).  Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Review 
2003/04-2009/10. 
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 The Equitable Share formula with be analysed in more detail later on in this chapter. 
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Because conditional grants are prescriptive, municipalities have to comply with the specified 
requirements.  National government has the autonomy to decide how much, and on what 
funds must be spent. The parameters of these grants are determined by the dispersing national 
department.  In other words, the department designs criteria and parameters which determine 
on what provincial and local government can spend such funds.   
Conditional grants can be powerful mechanisms for central control.  They give national 
ministries strong leverage over sub-national spheres of government, leaving provincial and 
local government with no discretion in fund utilisation.   Conditional grants tend to be ad hoc 
grants in which the size of the divisible pool and the beneficiaries are determined annually by 
the national government.  Examples over the last decade have included: open-ended 
construction grants that require approval of each project; grant allocations decided on a 
discretionary basis by national government; and supplementary grants allocated for special 
purposes during the fiscal year.  (See Appendix 11 for a list of conditional grants).  Provinces 




In short, unconditional and conditional grants serve two distinct and separate purposes. As 
stated earlier, fiscal decentralisation is about the transfer of fiscal power and authority to 
democratically elected sub-national levels of government to collect, spend and raise own 
revenue in line with sub-national governments‟ respective expenditure responsibilities.
510
  
The previous chapter on cost recovery concluded that municipalities are far from financially 
self-sufficient and that given their limited taxing and revenue-raising capacity, they will 
remain dependent on intergovernmental transfers. Although a crucial element of fiscal 
decentralisation, intergovernmental fiscal transfers cannot by themselves increase local 
autonomy.  The problem is not with municipalities‟ reliance on intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers, but rather with the conditions attached to them. 
                                        
509
 National Treasury.  (2008).  Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Review 
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As Bahl and Linn point out: 
[A] system of grants is a step toward fiscal decentralization in that it finances local 
government services, but the degree of autonomy it gives local governments in making 
their budget decisions depends on the structure of the grant system.
511
 
6.4 Fiscal Decentralisation and Local Government Autonomy 
 
So far the chapter has presented the rationale for and broad framework of fiscal 
decentralisation in South Africa and identified the fiscal powers and authorities of local 
government.   As has been explained, substantial fiscal authority has been devolved to local 
government.  The Division of Revenue process, in principle, aims at redistributing national 
revenue vertically and horizontally across the different spheres and departments of 
government.  However, it was shown that the annual national budgetary process is primarily 
driven and controlled by the Minister of Finance and the National Treasury.  This has 
implications for local fiscal autonomy because while the envisaged system of 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers promotes redistribution, the amounts and conditions 
attached to such transfers are decisions taken primarily by the Minster of Finance and 
National Treasury.  This may result in fiscal allocations being based on the agenda of the 
ruling party, as opposed to the needs of local government. 
It is now necessary to take a more critical look at the nature of grant allocations over the last 
few years.  It will become evident that intergovernmental fiscal transfers in South Africa 
reflect both centralising and decentralising elements in the way that grants are defined and 
dispersed to local government.  It will be argued here that fiscal discretion at local 
government level remains limited.  This view is based on three factors:  (i) the nature of grant 
allocations to local government; (ii) the relationship between the Equitable Share and the 
Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG); and (iii) the Equitable Share formula.  Each will now 
be discussed in turn. 
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6.4.1  Grant Allocations to Local Government  
The National Treasury claims, as noted previously, that municipalities can generate more 
than 90% from own operating revenue and that the shortfall between national revenue 
allocation and own revenue can be self-financed through, for example, investments and other 
income generating opportunities.
512
  Figure 6.2 illustrates that for the 2009/10 financial year, 
municipalities received 7.7% of the total amount of national revenue as opposed to 43.4% 
that was transferred to provinces and 48.9% to national governments.
513
    
 
Figure 6.2:  The Vertical Division of National Revenue 2003-2010 
 
Source:  Adapted from National Treasury. Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Review 2003/04-2009/10. 
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 National Treasury.  (2008).  Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Review 
2003/04-2009/10. 
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The vertical division of national revenue to the different spheres of government has since 
2003 led to a progressive increase in local government funding, thus making more resources 
available to municipalities.  Figure 6.2 indicates that local government allocations have 
increased from 4.1% in the 2003/04 financial year to 7.7% in the 2009/10 financial year.  
Provincial allocations have remained fairly consistent (43.44% in 2003/04 as well as in 
2009/2010), and allocations to national government departments have slowly decreased (from 
52.5% in 2003/04 to 48.9% in 2009/10). 
The percentage share of national revenue which is allocated to local government is the total 
amount of funding allocated to local government.  In other words, it includes conditional as 
well as unconditional grants.  In the 2003/04 financial year, the Equitable Share grant 
constituted approximately 51%, and conditional grants approximately 49% of the total share 
(4.1%) of national revenue allocated to local government.  In the 2009/10 financial year, the 
total allocation has risen to 7.7%, with the Equitable Share portion increasing to 62%, while 
conditional grants dropped to 38%.  This is reflected in Figure 6.3. 
 
Figure 6.3:   Annual Equitable Share and Conditional Grants Allocation to Local                                       
Government 
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As seen in Figure 6.3, the Equitable Share is increasing significantly, whereas conditional 
grants are decreasing.  At first glance, the immediate assumption is that local government 
discretion is on the increase, and by implication, local fiscal autonomy too, because a larger 
percentage of local government grants are transferred through the unconditional Equitable 
Share grant. Based on the notion that more unconditional transfers means more local 
autonomy, it would appear as if fiscal power and authority is increasingly being devolved to 
local government.  This trend - theoretically - signifies a move towards greater local financial 
autonomy.  Such an interpretation, however, is misleading.  Consider the divergence 
illustrated in Figure 6.4.  It shows that while in percentage terms, conditional grants have 
decreased from 49.19% (in 2003/04) to 37.86% (in 2009/10), in real terms allocations for 
conditional grants allocations continue to increase.  This is because the overall allocation of 
national revenue to local government increased from 4.1% in 2003/04 to 7.7% in 2009/10.  
(See Figure 6.2).   
Figure 6.4:  Percentage Growth in Equitable Share and Conditional Grants Allocations 
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Figure 6.4 demonstrates that, on average, there has been in steady increase in conditional 
grant allocations; from 2.02% (in the 2003/04 financial year) to 2.92% (in the 2009/10 
financial year).  What it does indicate, however, is that the weighting favours the Equitable 
Share allocation.  The latter increased from 2.08% (in the 2003/04 financial year) to 4.78% 
(in the 2009/10 financial year).   
The general tenet, cited earlier, is that the larger the unconditional component of fiscal 
transfers, the more financially autonomous local governments are.
514
   Based on this 
hypothesis, it would then appear as if local fiscal autonomy in South Africa is increasing 
because of the continual growth in the Equitable Share allocation.  (As illustrated in Figures 
6.2;  6.3 and 6.4).  However, the apparent increase in the Equitable Share allocation should 
not be interpreted as central government devolving more fiscal autonomy to local 
government.  There are many underlying factors that underlie the apparent „growth‟ of the 
Equitable Share grant such as: the abolishment of Regional Service Council levies (RSC 
levies) in 2002;  the hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup; and the declining capacity-
building grant.
515
 These factors account for the growth in Equitable Share allocation.   
For example, it was estimated that RSC levies on average constituted approximately 7% of 
municipalities own operating revenue.
516
 Since the abolition of these levies, municipalities 
have been compensated for their loss through the Equitable Share allocation.  In addition, the 
National Treasury acknowledged that the Equitable Share allocation has increased since 
2006/07 in order to subsidise the operating costs associated with the preparations and hosting 
of the FIFA 2010 World Cup.
517
  These two factors have contributed significantly to the rise 
in the Equitable Share allocation.  In addition, there has been a marked decline in the 
conditional grants for local government capacity-building.  This type of conditional grant 
decreased from 7.7% (in 2003/04) to 1% (in 2009/10) and thus contributes to the overall 
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lessening of conditional grant allocations.
518
  In other words, it is therefore incorrect to 
interpret an increase in Equitable Share allocation as an indication that fiscal autonomy is 
being devolved to local government.   
By contrast, the relationship between conditional and unconditional grants is a more 
significant indicator of local fiscal autonomy.  The devolution of fiscal power and authority 
means that central government transfers an adequate amount of unconditional funds to local 
government, without any central government conditionalities attached.  According to Bahl et 
al, the devolution of local fiscal powers and authority is diminished when municipalities rely 
on intergovernmental fiscal transfers, especially when these funds are accompanied by certain 
conditionalities.
519
  According to the Constitution, the Equitable Share grant is supposed to 
serve this purpose.  It is meant to enable municipalities to meet their constitutional mandate 
autonomously and effectively.  However, on closer examination, the Equitable Share is far 
from unconditional or discretionary.  On the contrary, there are a number of factors that 
indicate that the Equitable Share allocation is integrally linked to conditional grants, such as 
the Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG), which limits local fiscal autonomy.  
6.4.2 The Equitable Share and the Municipal Infrastructure Grant 
Prior to 2004, numerous conditional grants existed, each administered by different 
departments.  (See Appendix 11).  Some of these grants were incorporated into the Equitable 
Share, while others were consolidated into the Municipal Infrastructure Grant (hereafter 
referred to as MIG), which is currently the largest infrastructure transfer programme.
520
  
MIG currently includes a range of specific conditional grants that provide capital investment 
for particular service delivery infrastructure to municipalities with backlogs and high levels 
of poverty.   It accounts for an average of 54.1% of all infrastructure transfers between 
2003/04 and 2009/10.
521
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The objective of MIG was to consolidate conditional grants in order to streamline their 
management. Conditional grants by their very nature and objective depend on central control 
and oversight.  Currently, programme co-ordination takes place at the national MIG Unit, 
located in the national Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs
522
 
which is the lead department.  However, coordinating and streamlining the grant across the 
different transferring departments is complex.
523
 MIG stretches across a number of 
government departments, across different spheres of government.  Table 6.2 summarises the 
key responsibilities of the respective national government departments in the implementation 
of MIG, and shows the extensiveness of the conditions attached to MIG. 
The national Minister of Finance stated that the objective of MIG grant allocations would 
provide:  
... all South Africans with at least a basic level of service by the year 2013 through the 
provision of grant finance to cover the capital cost of basic infrastructure for the 
poor. It is part of government’s overall strategy to eradicate poverty and to create 
conditions for local economic development.
 524
 
MIG is especially targeted at infrastructure necessary to provide poor/indigent households 
with free basic services but focusing primarily on water.  Municipalities must spend funds on 
the provision of infrastructure necessary to supply 25 litres of potable water per person per 
day supplied within 200 metres of a household and with a minimum flow of 10 litres per 
minute (in the case of communal water points), or 6 000 litres of potable water supplied per 
formal connection per month (in the case of yard or house connections); or to upgrade and 
build new infrastructure up to a basic level of service in existing formal settlements.
525
  
Capital investment in electricity infrastructure is not yet included in MIG and has been 
postponed until the system of regional electricity distribution has been finalised.
526
   
                                        
522
 The Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs was previously 
known as the Department of Provincial and Local Government. 
523
 The departments from which the funds originate are referred to as the transferring 
departments. 
524
 Department of Provincial and Local Government.  Municipal Infrastructure Handbook. 
2004-2007. 
525
 Department of Provincial and Local Government.  Municipal Infrastructure Handbook. 
2004-2007.. 
526




Page | 188 
Table 6.2:  The Municipal Infrastructure Grant (MIG) 
Department Breakdown of Departmental Responsibilities 
 
 National Treasury 
Overall allocation of MIG funds through the Division of Revenue Act (DORA). 
Determine specific MIG conditions and funding allocation. 
Monitor financial reporting, revenue related criteria and spending trends. 
Ensure that municipalities operate within the macroeconomic framework. 
 
 Public Works 
Set criteria for poverty alleviation and employment generation. 
Advise municipalities on labour construction, procurement, techniques and approaches. 
Monitor poverty alleviation and employment generation conditions. 
Monitor municipal performance in terms of labour, SMME involvement and compliance with 
Expanded Public Works Programme (EPWP) conditions. 
 
 Water Affairs and Forestry 
Setting the norms and standards for water services infrastructure. 
Implement Water Services Development Plans (WSDPs). 
Monitor progress in meeting targets for water and sanitation. 
Complete feasibility studies, business plans and implement water services capital projects on behalf 
of municipalities. 
Initiate intervention related to water services activities. 
 
 Transport, 
 Sports & Recreation 
 Minerals and Energy  
Setting the norms and standards for the sector. 
Sector planning support to municipalities. 
Monitor municipal performance in the provision of sector infrastructure and compliance with sector 
conditions. 
Ensure that funds for sector infrastructure are properly spent. 
Once the Integrated National Electrification Programme is incorporated into the MIG - DME to plan, 
support, design, monitor and implement electrification programmes. 
 Housing Coordinate policy and planning of housing development and the provision of infrastructure. 
Coordination between the MIG and the Housing Fund.                                                                 
Source:  Adapted from the Department of Provincial and Local Government.  Municipal Infrastructure Handbook. 2004-2007. 
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The objective behind establishing one consolidated conditional grant was to assist with 
streamlining the grant application process, but as a result, it has also standardised the 
conditions attached.  MIG has been criticised for being a nationally determined and driven 
process, which is applied uniformly to the different municipal categories and linked to the 
national service delivery mandate, without being informed by local need or capacity.  MIG 
has become a channel where national and provincial government departments engage with 
municipalities on sectoral priorities. One comment made, for example, was that MIG has 
immense influence on how municipalities draft their local IDPs because municipalities want 
access to as much funding as possible, even if this is conditional.
527
  Another critique raised, 
is that MIG emphasises quantity above quality.
528
  For example, municipalities may not opt to 
provide fewer households with better basic service infrastructure (such as flush toilets) as 
opposed to providing all households with „at RDP level‟ sanitation (which means ventilated 
pit latrines).
529
   Such prescriptions leave municipalities with no discretionary power.  It also 
leaves municipalities with the operating cost of maintaining MIG infrastructure investment.  
This is proving to be challenging for municipalities because, as discussed earlier, the high 
levels of non-payment and indigence make cost recovery difficult.  Municipalities currently 
rely on the Equitable Share to maintain MIG infrastructure.
530
 
The assumption is that increased capital investment in basic infrastructure will contribute to 
poverty alleviation and/or local economic development.  However, the FFC noted a growing 
reliance among municipalities on MIG (even if they did not want it) to cover general 
municipal operating costs.  The consequence in some cases is that investments are made in 
unwanted infrastructure, thereby increasing the operating costs and the burden of 
maintenance that may be too demanding for municipalities to sustain, or in the long-run will 
need upgrading.
531
  The question that emerges here is whether the Equitable Share allocation 
is adequate.    
The argument made earlier in this chapter was that the steady growth in the Equitable Share 
allocations and the apparent decline in conditional grants should not be interpreted as an 
indication of increasing devolved local fiscal autonomy.  Figure 6.5 reinforces this contention 
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by illustrating in graphical terms that the MIG and the Equitable Share allocations are 
aligned.  In other words, as the MIG allocation has increased, so too has the Equitable Share.  
Figure 6.5:  The Equitable Share and the Municipal Infrastructure Grant Allocations 
 
Source:  Adapted from National Treasury. Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Review 2003/04-2009/10. 
 
The data reveals that in order for municipalities to afford the ongoing operating costs of MIG 
infrastructure, the Equitable Share allocation needs to increase exponentially more than the 
MIG.  In other words, if MIG in one particular financial year transfers funds to build 100 
toilets, the Equitable Share portion should allocate enough funds to cover the operating costs 
associated with these 100 toilets.  If the MIG allocation for the following financial year 
results in the building of an additional 100 toilets, the operational costs increase 
proportionately yet again.  In this example, the operation costs have doubled for 
municipalities, and the Equitable Share allocations should therefore increase more 
substantially.   This is not currently the case and, as a result, the Equitable Share ends up 
being directed at covering the running costs of the MIG.  As such the Equitable Share in 
practice is no longer a discretionary or unconditional grant and therefore fiscal 
decentralisation increasingly takes on forms of deconcentration and delegation. 
6.4.3  The Equitable Share Formula 
The chapters on administrative decentralisation and cost recovery indicated that 
municipalities do not all have access to adequate revenue raising capacity.  Category B 
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municipalities, in particular, are affected by the transfer of water, electricity and sanitation to 
Category C municipalities, limiting their cost recovery potential even more.  The purpose of 
the Equitable Share is to support municipalities financially.  The National Treasury needs to 
ascertain the revenue raising capacity of municipalities in order to do this effectively.   
This is why the Equitable Share formula is so important.  The literature on fiscal 
decentralisation indicated that a characteristic of fiscal devolution is that the majority of fiscal 
transfers are formula-based and unconditional.
532
  In principle, this is the case of the 
Equitable Share formula.  However, the formula is yet to be applied in full. 
The formula currently is:   
Basic Services component [BS] + Development component + Institutional support 
component [I] - Revenue-raising capacity correction [R] ±  Correction factor [C]
533
   
Grant = BS + D + I – R ± C 
The Equitable Share has since its inception in 2002 been criticised for being applied 
uniformly across different categories of municipalities regardless of capacity.   In 2005 
components [R] and [C] were included in the Equitable Share formula.
534
   
The Basic Services [BS] component is there to assist municipalities in providing a poor 
household with four basic services:  electricity, water, refuse and sanitation. One challenge is 
to determine the associated average costs, and another is what constitutes a poor household.  
The formula regards households which earn R800 month or less as indigent and entitled to 
free basic services.  This assumes that households that earn R1 above the R800 threshold are 
able to afford the entire cost of these services. 
The Equitable Share currently supports municipalities with the eradication of remaining 
service delivery backlogs to the value of R175 per indigent, regardless of municipal 
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category.
535
  However, this assumes that the costs associated with the provision of the very 
same services are the same for all municipalities.  Yet costs depend on population size, 
density and economies of scale.  In other words, the formula does not take into account where 
the remaining service delivery backlogs are situated, and to what extent service delivery costs 
vary from municipality to municipality.   
The Development [D] component has not yet taken effect.  It is aimed at supporting 
developmental local government objectives, beyond basic services, as envisaged in section 
214 of the Constitution.  
 
The Institutional Support [I] component supports low or medium capacity municipalities 
(defined as those municipalities that operate in rural areas or small towns, without a 
significant urban core).  The municipalities tend to spend more than half of their own revenue 
on administrative costs.  The formula is: 
 
I = Base allocation + [Admin support * Population] + [Council Support& Number of Seats] 
Where the values used are: 
I = R350,000 + R1*population] + [R36,000 *councillors] 
Source:  National Treasury.   Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Review 2003/04-2009/10. 
 
The National Treasury has acknowledged that it has not yet successfully applied the revenue-
raising capacity correction [R] component or the Correction  [C] component which are meant 
to account for the varying fiscal capacities of municipalities. This can partially be explained 
by a lack of accurate data to determine the specific costs associated with the provision of a 
specific service in a particular locality.  As the chapter on cost recovery pointed out, there is 
no existing data on what the costs are of any particular municipal service in any particular 
locality.  Where data exists, the validity of the demographic data (such as the definition of 
households, the income level used to measure poverty, and the basic services cost element) 
used in compiling the formula remains questionable.
536
   
                                        
535
 National Treasury.  (2008).  Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Review 
2003/04-2009/10. 
536
 Yu, D.  (2009).  The Comparability of Census 1996, Census 2001 and Community Survey 
2007.  Stellenbosch Economic Working Papers: 21/09.  The Department of Economics and 
The Bureau For Economic Research. The University of Stellenbosch. 
 
 
Page | 193 
Figure 6.6 illustrates that the distribution of the Equitable Share transfers largely concentrates 
on metropolitan municipalities.  In 2003/04, metropolitan municipalities received only 20% 
of the equitable share, while local municipalities received 64.2% and district municipalities 
the remainder. In 2009/10, 39.7% of the total grant went to metropolitan municipalities, 
38.5% to local municipalities and 21.8% to district municipalities.
537
    
 
Figure 6.6:  Local Government Equitable Share Allocation per Municipal Category 
 
R Million 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 
Category  A 1,276 1,657 2,300 7,348 8,441 10,015 11,983 
Category B 4,077 4,847 5,873 6,727 7,560 9,281 11,609 
Category C 1,001 1,174 1,471 3,983 4,674 5,593 6,564 
TOTAL 6,350 7,678 9,643 18,058 20,676 24,889 30,156 
 
Source:  Adapted from the Division of Revenue Act (Act 12 of 2009) 
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The rationale behind the high allocation to metropolitan areas is that these areas have higher 
number of households compared to district and local municipalities.
538
   Based on the 
findings of the chapters on administrative decentralisation and cost recovery, most Category 
B municipalities also have substantial numbers of households but their economic base is less 
than that of Category A municipalities.   
Were the [D], [R] and [C] components of the Equitable Share formula applied, then Category 
B municipalities might be allocated a larger Equitable Share allocation, since metropolitan 
municipalities tend to have more revenue raising capacity and less need for institutional 
support – whereas many Category B municipalities are located in the former independent and 
self-governing territories, characterised by high basic services [BS] backlogs, weak 
development [D], institutional capacity [I], as well as revenue raising capacity [R].   
The FFC noted that there are currently no formal channels through which funds are dispersed 
from Category C to Category B municipalities in cases where Category B municipalities 
provide basic services on behalf of Category C municipalities.
539
   Most service delivery 
agreements are through a Memorandum of Understanding which is often not adhered to.
540
  
The full implementation of all five of the Equitable Share components might therefore prove 
to be beneficial to Category B municipalities. 
In addition to the above, provinces are also decreasing their allocation of funding for 
Category B municipalities.  Figure 6.7 illustrates that based on the current provincial 
transfers, funds to Category A and C municipalities are increasing substantially whereas there 
has been a steady decline in grant allocations to Category B municipalities.  The latter 
experienced more than a 4% decrease in the last financial year. 
                                        
538
 National Treasury.  (2009).  Budget Review 2009/10. 
539
 Financial and Fiscal Commission.  (2009). Annual Submission on the Division of 
Revenue:  2009/10. 
540
 Financial and Fiscal Commission.  (2009). Annual Submission on the Division of 
Revenue:  2009/10. 
 
 
Page | 195 
 
Figure 6.7:  Provincial Grant allocations to Local Government 
 
Source:  Adapted from the Division of Revenue Act (Act 12 of 2009) 
 
Overall, therefore, allocations from national and provincial governments to Category B 
municipalities are on the decrease.  However, the Equitable Share formula is yet to take into 
consideration the Revenue-raising capacity correction [R] and the Correction [C] components 
of the Equitable Share formula.  More active steps should be taken to put this into effect. 
Only then can the Equitable Share allocations be truly redistributive and in the interest of 
promoting local fiscal autonomy.  
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has examined the framework for fiscal decentralisation in South Africa with the 
objective of highlighting its contribution to facilitating local autonomy.  Fiscal 
decentralisation in South Africa has devolved certain roles and responsibilities to 
municipalities. There are a number of features in South Africa‟s current system of fiscal 
decentralisation that are characteristic of fiscal decentralisation through devolution. For 
example, the intergovernmental fiscal system allocates a proportion of nationally raised 
revenue based on a formula, and devolves to municipalities the authority to formulate their 
own budgets and, in principle, to determine their own resource allocation.  In addition, the 
intention of the Division of Revenue process is to be (re)distributive and promote equity.  
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Grants are formula-based, benefitting the poorer provinces and municipalities.  By definition, 
the Equitable Share is an unconditional grant which (theoretically) awards municipalities 
discretion in how funds are spent.  Unlike conditional grants which vary from year to year, 
the Equitable Share introduces greater consistency and predictability, hence enabling 
municipalities to formulate their annual and medium term budgets more accurately.
541
  As 
such it is indicative of fiscal decentralisation through devolution.  Intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers are no longer ad hoc or inconsistent as they were when the division of revenue took 
place through a hierarchical system of channelling local municipal funds through districts 
and/or provinces. 
 
Other features of fiscal devolution include the extent to which intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers are transparent, regular and predictable. Allocations for each province and 
municipality are made annually, and the Division of Revenue Bill is gazetted five months 
prior to enactment.   This has introduced greater consistency and predictability into the 
revenues of local authorities, thus improving their capacity to budget properly.  Despite 
continuous problems of intergovernmental coordination, conditional grants have become 
more streamlined and simplified with the consolidation of conditional grants into one 
Municipal Infrastructure Grant.  The latter is coordinated by the Department of Provincial 
and Local Government, as opposed to the numerous conditional grants which previously 
were controlled by all the various departments which administered the service in question.  
The Equitable Share remains fairly consistent, and the overall sum transferred to local 
government remains relatively constant.  
 
Even though substantial progress has been made in designing an equitable system of fiscal 
decentralisation, a number of features demonstrate that while fiscal decentralisation entails 
the devolution of fiscal responsibilities and functions it does not meaningfully extend local 
fiscal powers and autonomy.   
This chapter has highlighted the implication of local government fiscal transfers for the 
financial autonomy and capacity of local municipalities.  The allocation of grants and a 
municipality‟s ability to raise revenue from its residents are significant determinants of 
whether or not a municipality will be able to ensure the provision of services to communities 
in a sustainable manner. 
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Theoretically, conditional grants are devised to finance the infrastructure necessary to provide 
basic services, whereas the Equitable Share compensates municipal operating expenses which 
are associated with eradicating service delivery backlogs as well as the delivery of basic 
services.
542
  This chapter has shown that conditional grants are particularly targeted at 
funding the capital expenditure of specific infrastructure necessary for the provision of free 
basic services, but it is not clear that the Equitable Share has increased accordingly to 
compensate municipalities for the operating expenses associated with the accumulative 
provision of free basic services.  This means that, in reality, the Equitable Share allocation is 
in essence a local government revenue stream to maintain capital infrastructure as opposed to 
unconditional revenue for the general operating costs associated with the constitutional 
mandate of local government.  Such a situation will not further local fiscal autonomy, but will 
instead heighten the dependence of municipalities on intergovernmental fiscal transfers.    
In theory, fiscal decentralisation is about devolving greater local government financial 
autonomy.  However, this chapter has shown that local government relies heavily on 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers.  Local autonomy cannot become fully realised until the 
vertical imbalance between revenue and expenditure is eradicated.  With the introduction of 
free basic services, this imbalance will become even more pronounced.   
The fact that the revenue-raising capacity [R] and correction [R] components of the Equitable 
Share formula are yet to be put into effect illustrates that the intergovernmental fiscal transfer 
system is unable to accurately determine the real capacity of the three different categories of 
municipalities, and may very well overestimate the capacity of Category B municipalities to 
afford basic service delivery.  The challenge is to allocate grants in terms of the Equitable 
Share which are not only based on demographic needs, but also on the fiscal capacity of 
municipalities. 
 
This chapter has shown that South Africa‟s system of fiscal decentralisation is characterised 
by centrally dominated financial policymaking where local government representation is 
marginal. It cannot be denied that South Africa needs fiscal equalisation.  The disparities are 
too vast:  between provinces, between urban and rural municipalities, even among urban 
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municipalities.  Some degree of central control is necessary if fiscal equality is to be 
achieved.  However, from an administrative perspective, municipalities have extensive 
decentralised service delivery obligations.  But the financial discretion of local government is 
minimal and confined to meeting national service delivery directives.  As such, fiscal 
decentralisation is little more than delegation. 
 
At this point in time, provinces and local governments in South Africa continue to depend on 
sizeable intergovernmental transfers.  Municipalities receive substantial financial transfers 
from central government.  The extent to which they do so is not the problem, but the 
conditions attached to intergovernmental transfers - including those indirectly attached to the 
Equitable Share allocation – limit local autonomy.  
 
Municipalities have no choice but to spend intergovernmental transfers according to national 
directives.  So as long as municipalities have limited resources and depend on national 
transfers, fiscal relations will remain centralised.  This impacts on political decentralisation 
as, firstly, local politicians have little alternative but to serve national mandates, and, 
secondly, administrative decentralisation is nationally determined by the allocation of 
responsibilities for the provision of nationally mandated services.   
 
National decisions on the amount and type of intergovernmental fiscal transfers depend on 
proper budgeting and costing assessments by local municipalities. In addition, this is reliant 
on up-to-date information and statistical data, stressing the importance of proper planning and 
financial management at local government level.  It is a multiple challenge.  Fiscal 
decentralisation depends on municipalities having the capacity and revenue to implement 
sound financial management practices.  And suitably designed intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers depend on accurate data, which municipalities have been struggling to generate, 
with little success.   
 
The optimum model remains to be designed, but significant progress has been made.  South 
Africa‟s current intergovernmental fiscal relations system has succeeded in narrowing the 
fiscal inequalities across and within the different spheres of government, but this is far from 
complete.  It is unquestionable that local government cannot meet its Constitutional 
obligations with its current revenue base.  Hence, the necessity for a proper system of 
intergovernmental relations and fiscal transfers is indisputable.  But how can an appropriate 
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system of intergovernmental fiscal transfers be determined when the requisite date for 
planning is deficient, and when increasing legislative provisions relating to local government 
continue to confer additional responsibilities and functions on municipalities? 
 
Based on the theories on fiscal decentralisation, local fiscal autonomy exists when: 
- municipalities have the authority to set the rates for local revenue 
- the majority of fiscal transfers are formula-based and unconditional 
- local government revenue more or less match responsibilities  
- local government revenue finances the majority of local expenditure, and 
- when local government have the autonomy for procurement.543  
 
Based on the above criteria, one can conclude that municipalities in South Africa can be 
regarded as having limited local fiscal autonomy.  South Africa‟s system of fiscal 
decentralisation is characterised by centralised taxation and decentralised service delivery 
obligations. Whether intergovernmental transfers are conditional or not, central government 
continues to delineate the parameters attached to each transfer.  National government sets the 
regulatory framework; determines the division of revenue; approves municipal budgets; 
determines local user fees; sanctions municipal development plans; and has the authority to 
allow or disallow municipal borrowings.  And the National Treasury has recently proposed 
the centralisation of municipal procurement.
544
 The argument is that it will end the corruption 
prevalent in municipal tender processes.  However, if this proposition comes into effect, local 
autonomy will yet again be further constrained by central control. 
 
To conclude, the fiscal challenges facing municipalities partially emanate from the system of 
intergovernmental fiscal relations. The current system of grant allocations to local 
government does not support an argument that fiscal authority is increasingly being devolved 
to local government. It is also doubtful whether the centralised manner of intergovernmental 
fiscal relations is conducive to efficient and effective basic service delivery.  On the contrary, 
there are more signs that the current system may increase the service delivery burden on local 
government without local government having the necessary financial authority to act 
autonomously.  The growing dependence on national fiscal transfers erodes the devolved 
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fiscal authority that might have been created in principle.   This translates into a number of 
fiscal challenges.  These will be explored in the following chapter.   
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
FISCAL CHALLENGES TO BASIC SERVICE DELIVERY 
 
The restructuring of local government is ... far from over. Municipalities will be required to 
amalgamate administrations and restructure administrations and service delivery 
arrangements, among other things. At the same time local government must ensure continued 
access to municipal services for all citizens. Enormous pressures will initially be placed on 
municipalities during this process. It is therefore critical to provide financial assistance to 




The quotation above is cited in the Department and Provincial Government‟s 2001/02 Annual 
Report.  Seven years later, municipalities continue to depend on „financial assistance‟.  The 
objective of this chapter is to examine some of the key fiscal challenges that continue to face 
municipalities in their provision of basic services.  These, it will be argued, severely diminish 
local government autonomy. 
 
The argument is often touted that municipalities face financial problems because they are 
inefficient, corrupt and have poor financial management skills.
545
  However, the previous 
chapters have illustrated that there are other underlying factors, some of which are systemic 
and others which are informed by the socio-economic context of poverty and service delivery 
backlogs.  It was shown, for example, that there is room for substantial improvement in 
municipalities‟ cost recovery approaches, although, at the same time, municipalities do have 
a limited revenue base. 
 
The National Treasury regards the financial problems of municipalities as largely 
administrative problems - that municipalities must just improve their financial management 
practices.  This thesis has shown that the problems are more complex than being managerial.  
Previous chapters highlighted that the demarcation of local government and the resultant 
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establishment of new municipalities resulted in the amalgamation of different financial 
management systems and processes.  In many cases, it meant that municipalities inherited the 
debt accumulated in townships and the self-governing territories.    The devolution of powers 
and functions to local government were primarily political executive decisions, and as has 
been highlighted, this resulted in administrative and organisational restructuring in 
conjunction with growing functional responsibilities.  The argument here is that much of this 
history underlies the fiscal challenges experienced by municipalities today. 
 
Whether municipalities are successful as institutions of local government is often determined 
by their financial health or financial sustainability.  At its most basic, financially sustainable 
municipalities are regarded as those municipalities that can meet their expenditures with own 
revenue, and do not depend on national fiscal transfers.   But in the South African situation 
this is highly unlikely now or in the near future.  In fact, this chapter will show that the 
financial health of a significant number of municipalities is declining in that they are not able 
to cover their expenditure even if they are supported by national transfers or borrowings.  
According to the 2009 Division of Revenue Act, municipal expenditures continue to outgrow 
municipal revenue capacity despite increasing intergovernmental grant allocations.  This 
chapter aims to explore and examine possible reasons for this imbalance, and questions the 
financial viability of municipalities.  The argument is that in order for local government to be 
an autonomous and independent sphere of government, it needs to be financially self-
sufficient.  In other words, there can be no devolution of political and administrative authority 
if municipalities depend on fiscal transfers from central government. 
 
This particular chapter identifies a number of fiscal challenges facing basic service delivery 
which are often analysed separately from one another.  However, it will be shown that the 
different fiscal problems are interrelated and emerge from the political, administrative and 
financial dimensions of decentralisation.  It will also illustrate how some of the underlying 
factors contribute to municipalities‟ general lack of autonomy.   
 
Municipal debt is one of the most obvious indications that the financial viability of 
municipalities is in question.  According to the National Treasury, municipal debt is a result 
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of inefficiency, corruption and inadequate financial management skills.
546
  However, a 
number of additional factors will be considered here.  For example: remaining service 
delivery backlogs;  increasing service delivery demands; widening revenue and expenditure 
discrepancies; insufficient service infrastructure maintenance; concurrency and unfunded 
mandates; theft and non-payment; limited borrowing powers and dependence on grants. 
 
All of these are contributing factors to the escalation of municipal debt, which in turn limit 
local fiscal autonomy.  The objective is to show that the financial challenges facing local 
government in general, and Category B municipalities more specifically, are a result of 
broader systemic and socio-economic dynamics, as much as a lack of financial management 
competence.  Such conditions are not conducive to the devolution of local government 
autonomy. 
 
7.1 Fiscal Challenges to Basic Service Delivery 
 
Municipal debt has become a serious challenge facing local government.  As at December 
2007, municipalities are owed approximately R44.2 billion in outstanding user fees which 
amount to 60% of national consumer debt.
547
  Category A municipalities are owed the biggest 
portion of this debt (57.4%), amounting to R25.4 billion.  Category B municipalities are owed 
R17.9 billion (40.4%) and Category C are owed almost R1 billion.
548
   
 
These figures are high and substantial. The National Treasury estimated that if municipalities 
were able to collect half of these debts, they would have about 18% more revenue with which 
to fund the delivery of basic services.
549
  Whelan explains that a situation where payment 
levels are low, leads to “a depletion of reserves and an increase in a bid to solve cash-flow 
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shortages, and an increase in short-term debt.”
550
  This, he argues, would affect 
municipalities‟ ability to access loan capital which may result in services being cut back and, 
as the chapter on cost recovery concluded, could set in motion a cycle of non-payment and 
inferior service delivery.
551
  Of significance is the fact that the debt of Category B 
municipalities has increased by R3 billion, from R14.9 billion in December 2006 to R17.9 
billion in December 2007.
552
   This is illustrated in percentage terms in Figure 7.2 below. 
 
Figure 7.1  Percentage Consumer Debt by Municipal Category 
 
Source:  Adapted from National Treasury. (2008).  Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Review 2003/04-2009/10. 
 
 
The significant increase in consumer debt of Category B municipalities reiterates the point 
made in the chapter on cost recovery, where it was argued that the transfer of authority over 
basic services from Category B to Category C municipalities would result in the former 
having significantly less access to own revenue. According to the National Treasury, 
Category A municipalities were owed almost 35% of their total annual budgets, Category B 
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municipalities 39% and Category C municipalities 11%.
553
  This is far from the National 





A large percentage of debt is long overdue.  This questions the ability of municipalities to 
collect outstanding arrears.  Municipalities like Msunduzi, Ekurhuleni, the City of Tshwane 
and the City of Johannesburg, have resorted to writing-off long outstanding consumer debt as 
part of their debt management strategies, arguing that all avenues to collect these debts have 
been exhausted, making further debt legal efforts to recover debt expensive and futile.
555
    
 
The amount of debt is not the key concern here. Rather it is how such debt has accumulated. 
As such, municipal debt becomes a sign of escalating financial unsustainability, making 
municipalities unviable sub-national entities. This, in turn, diminishes the ability of 
municipalities to be autonomous as they will become more and more dependent on central 
government funding.   
 
A number of fiscal challenges facing municipalities in their delivery of basic services will be 
identified and considered here.  These challenges are interrelated and contribute to the 
escalation of municipal debt.    
 
7.1.1 Remaining Basic Service Delivery Backlogs  
 
Remaining basic service delivery backlogs pose a fiscal challenge for municipalities because 
they require municipalities to plan for and invest in additional service delivery infrastructure.  
However, in order to do this effectively, municipalities need to know where the remaining 
service delivery backlogs are situated and the costs associated with eradicating these.  The 
chapters on administrative decentralisation and cost recovery demonstrated that 
municipalities often lack the capacity to determine indigence or to calculate the full costs 
associated with service delivery.   
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Figure 7.2 illustrates how many households have access to basic services and how many lack 
them.  8.2% of the 13 million households in South Africa lack access to potable water; 22.9% 





Figure 7.2:  Households with Access to Basic Services 
 
Source: Adapted from Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs.  (2009). State of Local Government in South Africa. 
 
While there is data on how many households have access to particular basic services, there is 
no specific data on the extent or locality of the remaining backlogs.  For example, whether 
remaining backlogs are located in rural underdeveloped areas and in informal settlements.  In 
the absence of specific data, one is left to make approximations and value-judgements.    
 
Figure 7.3 below, for example, provides no breakdown in actual figures of the number of 
households with or without access to basic services.  However, it does appear (based on the 
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Figure 7.3:  Households with Access to Basic Services by Municipal Location 
 
 
Source: Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs.  (2009). State of Local Government in South 
Africa. Page 13. 556 
 
 
If the remaining backlogs are indeed mostly located in predominantly rural areas, then 
eradicating these backlogs will be more difficult than those that are already served.  For 
example, in some rural areas it is geologically not feasible to provide in-house electricity or 
flush toilets. In addition, their remoteness makes service delivery as well as infrastructure 
maintenance expensive.  Services charges and debt collection are complicated when 
households are often indigent and where some have no physical address.
557
     
 
The costs of delivering services in rural underdeveloped areas are higher than in urban areas.  
The average cost of a single connection for electricity in urban areas, for instance, is 
approximately R5000 per household, but this rises significantly with the provision in rural or 
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peri-urban areas, where the average cost of connections is estimated to be R7000 due to the 
costs associated with servicing outlying areas.
558
 The implication is that the remaining 
backlogs are relatively more difficult and more expensive to eradicate than those in urban 
areas.  It also makes the provision of free basic services more expensive for municipalities 
because supplying free water, sanitation or electricity is not merely covering the costs of 
usage, but also includes the establishment of service delivery infrastructure in areas far 
removed from current infrastructure, together with the maintenance costs of that 
infrastructure.  Widespread distribution increases infrastructure and administrative costs,  
especially in the cases of sanitation and water which also incur costs for the erection of 
waste-water treatment facilities, and so on.
559
  It remains uncertain what the costs would be to 
eradicate remaining backlogs, and whether such households would qualify for free basic 
services.  The potential of cost recovery may also be minimal since rural areas experience 
higher levels of poverty and most households would probably be entitled to free basic 
services.  Such factors may contribute significantly to the escalation of municipal debt. 
 
In addition, the data that exists is often inconsistent.  One example is the case of how many 
households have access to basic electricity.  Figure 7.4 demonstrates that according to the 
National Treasury‟s 2008 Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Review, 80% of 
households have access to electricity for lighting.  However, the Department of Cooperative 
Governance and Traditional Affairs‟ 2009 State of Local Government in South Africa 
Report, indicates that only 73% of households have such access.
560
    This is a discrepancy of 
7%; attending to it could impose a severe fiscal strain on the perhaps already precarious 
financial status of the municipalities concerned. 
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Figure 7.4:  Datasets on Households with Access to Basic Electricity   
 
Source: Adapted from the National Treasury.  (2008).  Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Review 2003/04-
2009/10.  And the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs.  (2009). State of Local Government in 
South Africa. 
 
Increasing Service Delivery Demands 
 
In urban areas, the challenge is different but also complex.  The rapidly growing economy 
experienced between 2002-2008 has resulted in increased demands for infrastructure and 
service delivery. These demands are not restricted to residential consumers, since country-
wide economic growth has resulted in increased water and electricity demands from private 
industries too.
561
  Existing municipal infrastructure is proving to be limited, strained, and in 
some cases in need of upgrading or full replacement.
562
  This has caused erratic service 




Rapid urbanisation and the burgeoning of informal settlements forced municipalities to 
provide basic services as speedily as possible, despite the limited resources available.  The 
services often included the installation of community standpipes, bucket system sanitation, or 
the provision of pit-latrines, and high mast electricity.  Now these communities are 
demanding better quality services and improved infrastructure, such as in-house water 
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connections and water-borne sanitation.
564
  However, a number of these settlements are not in 




According to the National Treasury, municipalities in the urban areas have been relatively 
successful in addressing basic service backlogs in urban areas.  However, as attested to by a 
local government official, cities have rapidly provided basic services to townships and 
informal settlements in peri-urban areas, but some of this service delivery has become 
physically unsustainable as infrastructure was haphazardly installed, and in some cases was 
of inferior quality.  Municipalities are now confronted with significant cost pressures for 
maintaining such ill-planned infrastructure, or upgrading it.
566
   
 
Van Aardt et al identify a continuous growth trend in urban population.
567
   However, the 
implication of this is not immediately obvious.  While urban population growth continues, the 
average size of households has decreased.  This disparity is particularly high in metropolitan 
areas.  Figure 7.5 shows that between 2001 and 2007, metropolitan areas and large Category 
B municipalities have experienced a 5.7% and 3.8% increase in population size; while Figure 
7.6 shows that the average household size has decreased by approximately 12% from 4.0 to 
3.6.
568
   This means that the challenge of ongoing population growth will become even more 
demanding because it is exacerbated by more households which are also forming through the 
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Figure 7.5:  Share of Population and Annual Growth Rate by Municipality 
 
National Treasury.  (2008).  Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Review 2003/04-2009/10.  Page 11. 
 
Figure 7.6:  Average Household Size by Municipality  
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According to Van Aardt et al, the African population is expected to grow by about 15.4% 
during the period 2001–2021 (See Appendix 12).  African households are expected to 
increase by about 60.7% over the same period.
569
  Van Aardt et al attribute the declining 
average in household sizes to factors such as “urbanisation, lower fertility preferences, 
greater preference for single-person households and household mitosis, where existing 
African households are split into two or more separate households.”
570
 Such trends increase 
the demand on urban municipalities for service.   
 
In other words, while service delivery backlogs in urban areas may be lessening in some 
instances, in others it will increase as long as urbanisation continues to grow and household 
sizes continue to decrease.  In such a situation the national government‟s claim that backlogs 
are close to eradication is misleading as it does not reflect that these backlogs are being 
replaced by new, and in rural areas more expensive, service delivery demands.  The increase 
in service delivery demands, therefore, adds further financial pressures to municipalities 
which are trying to meet their service delivery mandate.  Calls for additional service delivery 
infrastructure make municipalities dependent on capital infrastructure grants, such as MIG, 
which the previous chapter argued, leads to lessening local fiscal autonomy. 
 
7.1.3 Municipal Operating Revenue versus Expenditure  
 
Ever since the inception of the three spheres of government there has been a strong disparity 
between the spheres‟ sources of revenue and their service delivery functions.   The chapter on 
cost recovery highlighted that despite the devolution of cost recovery to municipalities, 
revenue generation remains limited.   
 
But this is not only an administrative problem.  Expenditure that was incurred by the 
provision of new infrastructure is not always recovered through user fees, since most are 
targeted at low income households.  The chapter on cost recovery demonstrated that low 
income households tend to return low levels of payment.  Low income houses also tend not to 
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consume much water or electricity which means that supplying additional infrastructure does 
not necessarily result in the generation of additional surcharges that are necessary for 
sustainable local service delivery.    
 
Table 7.1 provides a breakdown of the average national amounts for municipal operating 
revenue between 2003/04 and 2009/10.  Figure 7.7 illustrates these amounts in percentage 
terms.  What is of significance is that service charges as a source of income have decreased 
from 49% in 2003/04 to 42.9% in 2009/10 while government grants have increased from 
12.2% to 22.3% during the same period.  This indicates a decrease in user fees associated 
with service delivery, and an accompanying increase in central fiscal support.  
 
Table 7.1:  Municipal Operating Revenue 2003/04-2009/10 in Rands 
 
R Million 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 
Property rates 13,980 16,396 17,401 18,521 21,486 22,770 24,136 
Service 
charges 
36,146 38,735 40,201 44,498 49,223 51,549 54,777 
RSC levies 4,983 7,009 7,604 386 95 0 0 
Investment  1,673 2,115 2,357 2,970 3,845 3,818 4,133 
Grants 8,980 13,742 17,398 27,223 26,571 28,311 28,491 
Own Revenue 8,025 8,784 10,375 11,763 17,184 16,260 16,167 
Total 
Revenue 
73,788 86,781 95,336 105,361 118,405 122,710 127,705 
 
Source: Adapted from National Treasury.  (2008). Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Review 2003/04-
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Source:  Adapted from National Treasury.  (2008). Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Review 2003/04-2009/10. 
 
 
Figure 7.7 illustrates that municipalities are increasingly relying on intergovernmental grants 
and subsidies.  At the same time, it shows that there is currently no indication that service 
charges can generate surplus funds in order to cross-subsidise service delivery as proposed by 
the National Treasury.  Such a trend is not conducive to increasing local autonomy.   
 
The National Treasury has criticised municipalities for not containing their expenditure costs.  
This is so, but as this chapter has already illustrated, the growth in expenditure can also be 
attributed to other factors, such as higher costs of eradicating the remaining service delivery 
backlogs, or new demands for service delivery infrastructure which incur further losses since 
they do not yield the requisite levels of payment. 
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7.1.4 The Maintenance of Service Infrastructure 
 
Closely linked to the widening gap between municipal operating revenue and municipal 
expenditure revenue is the demand for more or better maintenance of service infrastructure. 
The National Treasury notes that municipalities fail to adequately budget for the maintenance 
of capital expenditure.
571
   The chapter on cost recovery emphasised the importance of 
calculating the full costs of delivery, including maintenance costs. The National Treasury‟s 
Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Review (2003/04-2009/10), found that most 
municipalities‟ expenditure on maintenance tends to be reactive, rather than proactive.
572
  As 
such maintenance is not incorporated in any routine or regular programme which is linked to 
managing municipal assets.   
 
There is a disjuncture between the political expectations of national government departments 
such as those of the Department of Provincial and Local Government, and the Department of 
Water Affairs and Forestry and calls for financial prudence by the National Treasury.  The 
latter has warned local government not to neglect maintenance: 
 
[T]o ensure sustainable uninterrupted delivery of municipal services and certainty in 
own revenue streams, municipalities will have to increase their investment in repairs 
and maintenance. This is even more important for these large cities given the growing 




The national emphasis is on delivery, despite a lack of resources.  The five-year political 
cycle favours delivery above maintenance.  In order to be re-elected into office, local 
councillors are pressurised to deliver services quickly, quite possibly at the expense of 
allocating adequate funds to allow for infrastructure maintenance.   There are political 
imperatives involved. There are national political mandates to eradicate backlogs by a certain 
time - gearing municipal operating expenditures towards service delivery while hardly 
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catering, if at all, to infrastructure maintenance.  The Minister of Provincial and Local 
Government announced that all municipalities had to eradicate the bucket sanitation system 
by 2008 (which they did not achieve).
574
  He later pledged that every household should have 
access to electricity by 2010.
575
   
 
A municipal official attested to numerous conflicts experienced between themselves and 
politically elected councillors over service provisions.  This official claimed that he had 
warned the municipal council that some proposed service projects are technically and 
environmentally unfeasible and would prove too costly to install and maintain.  Yet such 
advice was ignored.
576
  He cited an example of the municipal council instructing city 
engineers to provide water and sanitation infrastructure to an informal settlement area in an 
attempt to upgrade the area despite the fact that it was located near a wetland.  He claims that 
this infrastructure is unsustainable, and in some locations the sanitation infrastructure has 




Municipalities are experiencing widespread pressure on existing service infrastructure in each 
of the three basic services:  water, sanitation, as well as electricity.  This, it is argued, is a 
direct result of years of neglect which have left municipalities with ageing infrastructure 
which is beyond maintenance, and needs replacing. Collapsing or underperforming service 
delivery infrastructure results in service disruptions (electricity being the most severe) and 
would require substantial investment to repair or upgrade.
578
   
 
With regard to water, the National Treasury acknowledges that there has been a growth in water 
sales, in increased spending on infrastructure investment, as well as more monies for repairs 
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and maintenance of existing infrastructure.  However, it notes that this as inadequate.
579
  Figure 
7.8 illustrates that investment in new and existing water services infrastructure appears to be 
lagging behind as it does not correspond to the growth in water sales. This places a strain on 
existing infrastructure assets to cope with increased service delivery requirements.
580 
 In 
addition, as argued earlier, the increase in the demand for water does not necessarily translate 
into sales because most of the water supply is either offered at highly subsidised rates in order 
to attract local economic investment; or it is directed at indigent households which qualify for 
free basic services. 
 
Figure 7.8:  Water Demand and Investment 2002/03-2006/07 
  
National Treasury.  (2008). Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Review 2003/04-2009/10. Page 106 
 
 
In addition to water, there is also widespread pressure on existing sanitation systems.  Serious 
allegations have been made that municipalities are not able to manage waste-water treatment 
                                        
579 National Treasury.  (2008).  Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Review 2003/04-
2009/10.  This review only provided a graphic illustration, but did not elaborate on the actual 
amounts. 
580
 Interview with Umgeni Water Employee.   Pietermaritzburg, 26 March 2009. And 
National Treasury.  Intergovernmental Fiscal Review (2008).   
 
 
Page | 218 
facilities.  Media reports revealed a high number of municipalities where water purification 
works had badly deteriorated and in some instances totally collapsed.
581
  Other reports 
claimed that contaminated water was being distributed to users in certain areas.
582
  In the 
2008 Dusi River Marathon canoe race between Pietermaritzburg to Durban (in KwaZulu-
Natal), a number of participants suffered from chronic diarrhoea and/or vomiting after the 
race.  Water quality tests done along the Umsunduzi River nine days before the race showed 
E-Coli levels measuring up to 115,000 per 100ml.
583
   
 
In September 2007, and in the first few months of 2008, thousands of fish and other marine 
life washed up dead in and around the harbour in Durban.
584
  The cause was identified as a 
sewage overflow into the Umhlatuzana river catchment area due to a lack of sanitation 




Improved pit latrine toilets (VIPs) are currently regarded as an acceptable minimum level of 
sanitation.  Besides installing the VIPs, municipalities must also empty each VIP at least 
every ten years, which some municipalities have not been able to do.
586
   This example 
illustrates that the provision of basic services, whether „at RDP level‟ or „above RDP level‟, 
has long-term infrastructure maintenance implications.  In fact, some argue that service 
delivery „at RDP level‟ (such as VIPs) incur higher maintenance costs than services provided 
„above RDP level‟ (such as waterborne sewerage systems).
587
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The state of South Africa‟s electricity infrastructure has received widespread criticism over 
the last few years.  According to the National Electricity Regulator of South Africa 
(NERSA), demands for electricity have increased significantly, and reports have indicated 
that investment in electricity infrastructure is not accompanied by expenditure on 
maintenance.  This is demonstrated in Figure 7.9. 
 
Figure 7.9:  Electricity Demand and Investment 2002/03-2006/07 
 
 




Electricity infrastructure, like water and sanitation, is under severe strain, and given the 
increased demand for electricity, will not decrease.
588
 Besides investing in capital 
infrastructure projects, municipalities are expected to make funds available for the 
maintenance and refurbishment of existing assets.    In recent years, some municipalities have 
experienced technical problems and power outages due to failures in existing distribution 
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lines and networks, which are separate from Eskom‟s.
589
 Older networks are being 
increasingly damaged by supply disruptions, leading to more frequent distribution failures.   
 
The National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) indicated that electricity 
distribution equipment is ageing and unreliable.  They too argued that few municipalities 
have infrastructure and asset databases, claiming that “many rely on their corporate memory 
for their maintenance strategy.”
 590
  Most equipment is overloaded due to unplanned or 
unanticipated development programmes.  Municipalities have made insufficient provision for 
the refurbishment of electricity networks, causing black-outs or in some instances power 




NERSA claims that maintenance is uncontrolled and inadequate, and that this is leading to a 
substantial loss of sales. The national average of technical electricity losses emanating from a 
lack of network maintenance amounts to approximately R4 billion annually.
592
 Concerns 





In short, a great deal of existing basic service delivery infrastructure is overloaded.  The 
neglect of service infrastructure points to municipalities trying to keep up with the pace of 
continuously growing service delivery demands.  The chapters on administrative 
decentralisation and cost recovery explained that many service delivery mandates emanate 
from national and/or provincial governments but these mandates are often not accompanied 
by sufficient funds.   
 
The national service delivery mandates place additional strain on the existing service delivery 
infrastructure of municipalities. It also increases the burden of maintaining infrastructure, all 
of which are a considerable financial burden.   
 
                                        
589
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It was argued earlier on in this chapter that municipalities are facing increasing demands for 
more services, which means that municipalities need to expand their service infrastructure.  
Calls for improving infrastructure maintenance add to the financial burden of municipalities.   
This reiterates the point made in the previous chapter regarding the need for the Equitable 
Share to lead to the transfer of adequate funds in order to assist municipalities with the 
operating and maintenance costs emanating from the installation of infrastructure, which is 
funded by conditional infrastructure grants, such as MIG.  The maintenance of service 
infrastructure presents a significant financial burden for municipalities, which will only 
increase as more and more capital infrastructure investment takes place in local 
municipalities. It is a burden which cannot be evaded since municipalities are constitutionally 
responsible for providing everyone with access to quality and sustainable basic services.   
 
7.1.5 Concurrency and Unfunded Mandates 
 
The legislative and policy framework in South Africa has assigned a degree of political, 
administrative and financial authority to local government.  It also protects local government 
as autonomous entities with regard to their constitutionally mandated responsibilities.  But as 
the previous chapter on fiscal decentralisation concluded, national departments intervene 
directly in municipal affairs through the use of conditional grants that prescribe to 
municipalities what basic services to deliver to the poor.    
 
The previous chapter showed that fiscal decentralisation is difficult to pursue in areas of 
shared or concurrent constitutional responsibilities.  In addition, some local government 
services are mandated by the national government to be provided for free. Municipalities 
complain that such mandates mean that their revenue expenditure is limited to providing 
basic service delivery infrastructure and maintaining it regardless of whether user fees can be 
collected.
594
 The State of the Cities Finances Report (2007) noted that national and provincial 
governments‟ conditional fiscal transfers were often directed to locations that were not part of 
the broader spatial development or infrastructure plans of municipalities.
595
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This is especially prevalent in Category B municipalities which are not only affected by 
national and provincial service delivery mandates, but also by mandates emanating from 
Category C municipalities.  As it currently stands, the decentralisation framework is 
adjustable and allows for the national government Minister of Provincial and Local 
Governments to adapt this framework as and when deemed necessary.  As the chapters on 
political decentralisation and administrative decentralisation explained, the continuous lack of 
clarity on the power and responsibilities of these two different tiers of local government 
translates into operational uncertainties. 
 
One such example is the provision of water and sanitation.  Section 4B of the Constitution 
lists water and sanitation services (limited to potable water supply systems and domestic 
wastewater and sewage disposal systems) as a local government function.  All Category A 
(metropolitan) municipalities are defined as water authorities, whereas Category B (locals 
municipalities) are so authorised in certain instances and Category C (district) municipalities 
in others.  The two-tiered local government system requires that powers and functions be 
divided between Category B and C municipalities in order to avoid duplication and co-
ordination problems. However, an asymmetric and inconsistent approach has been 
implemented in relation to water and sanitation.   
 
The sharing of the water services function between Category B and C municipalities has been 
contentious on a number of fronts.  The distinction between service authorities and service 
providers is fluid and shifts from time to time between district and local municipalities. From 
a financial position, it has resulted in problems in the allocation of resources through the 
intergovernmental fiscal system. The current practice is that only authorised municipalities 
are recipients of the national grant for water and sanitation. This becomes a problem in cases 
where authorised district municipalities delegate the responsibility for service provision to 
local municipalities but without transferring adequate funds.  Furthermore, such funding is 
often not transferred timeously between service authorities and service providers.   
 
In addition, concurrent or shared functions between different spheres of government are often 
not clearly delineated, thus causing confusion as to where the responsibilities for expenditure 
lie. Before 1994, the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry provided water services 
schemes in predominantly rural and poor areas across South Africa.  These water schemes 
have long been a problem of intergovernmental relations.  With the constitutional transfer of 
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water delivery functions to local government, water schemes were no longer the sole 
responsibility of the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry, but instead became a 
concurrent function.  The transfer of responsibilities to local government entailed the transfer 
of assets and staff as well as increased municipal operating costs.  Fifteen years later, the 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry is still administering some of these schemes, while 
others are in the process of being transferred to municipalities.
596
  SALGA emphasised that 
for those schemes which had been transferred, municipalities received no funding for 





The chapter on administrative decentralisation highlighted that with the passing of the 
Municipal Structures Amendment Act, the assignment of bulk service delivery functions 
remains open to adjustment, making future municipal budgeting difficult.  This uncertainty 
results in financial managers struggling to budget appropriately.
598
 In some instances, 
Category B municipalities have been delivering water at their expense on behalf of the 
district municipalities, but the financial responsibility for infrastructure maintenance remains 
unclear, leading to neither districts nor local municipalities taking responsibility. 
 
Related to the problem of cross-sectoral service delivery is the issue of unfunded mandates. 
According to Shah et al unfunded mandates are seen as a shift of social expenditures 
downward without providing additional sources of revenue: 
These largely unfunded mandates have therefore been seen as attempts by national 
governments to shift deficits downward, creating disharmony and conflicts among 
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Sentiments expressed by Shah et al are similar to those voiced in the numerous submissions 
made by Category B municipalities to the Ministerial Advisory Committee,
600
 and confirmed 
by SALGA.
601
  Municipalities are expected to be self-funding through levying service 
charges and collecting revenue from property rates.  However, given the service delivery 
backlogs and extended expenditure responsibilities, such as the Free Basic Services mandate, 
municipalities increasingly rely on a range of national and/or provincial transfers to meet 
these shortfalls.  These shortfalls are referred to as „unfunded mandates‟.  Municipalities have 
been complaining about unfunded mandates since the sphere of local government was first 
established in 1996. Most of the time, this is justified. The complaint is that the delegation of 
powers and responsibilities to municipalities has not been accompanied by sufficient 
financial revenue, which has resulted in their operating expenditure costs exceeding their 
operating revenue, giving rise to administrative problems which local financial officers are 
meant to solve. 
 
Unfunded mandates also refer to the delegation of provincial and/or national government 
functions to local government without the necessary funding.  It refers to the impact of 
provincial or national government service delivery projects which municipalities must service 
and maintain.  The previous chapter on fiscal decentralisation argued that intergovernmental 
fiscal relations remain largely centralised.  National departments regulate national norms and 
standards in areas of concurrent responsibilities and dictate that municipalities must deliver 
services of a particular quality and quantity.  Doing so imposes explicit spending obligations 
on municipalities.   
 
SALGA argues that the biggest failing of South Africa‟s current local government fiscal 
relations system is the lack of alignment between functions and funding.
602
   There are a 
number of examples where municipalities provide services which other spheres are meant to 
offer, such as libraries (which are a provincial function).  Other functions have service 
maintenance implications such as housing which is a national government function.  Yet the 
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provision of basic service infrastructure to housing developments, and the maintenance of 
housing programmes, have increasingly become the responsibility (and problem) of local 
government.    
 
Table 7.2 shows a substantial increase in the capital expenditure costs on basic services 
incurred by municipalities country-wide. Water and sanitation remains the largest local 
expenditure Of specific significance are municipalities‟ rapidly increasing housing 
expenditure costs.  Municipalities are currently spending approximately 11% of their total 
expenditure on housing infrastructure, which is more than that spent on electricity.
603
  This 
reveals the obligations that have been incurred for expenditure that is associated with the 
delegation of a function which, in legal terms, is not a local government responsibility. 
 
Table 7.2 :  Municipal Capital Expenditure 2003/04 to 2008/09 
 
R Million 2003/04 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 
Water & sanitation 1,839 2,925 4,014 4,957 10,397 9,434 
Electricity 1,267 1,599 2,295 2,725 4,426 4,255 
Housing 658 718 658 1,269 3,893 4,586 
Roads &               
stormwater 
1,775 1,751 2,517 3,222 5,536 6,466 
Other 5,157 6,329 7,747 8,718 14,484 14,510 
Total 10,696 13,323 17,232 20,891 39,736 39,252 




SALGA pointed out that there is no clarity on how to fund municipalities for the operating 
costs associated with the provision of services related to concurrent functions.
604
  Functions 
that are not local government functions (such as housing) are currently assigned to local 
government by way of sectoral legislation which takes place in isolation of the fiscal  
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The FIFA World Cup has highlighted some examples of intergovernmental tensions over 
fiscal decentralisation and the assignment of revenue to provinces and municipalities.  In the 
Western Cape Province, the Cape Town metropolitan municipality refused to go ahead with 
construction for a stadium until the province provided the agreed R500 million, while the city 
would fund the remaining R1bn.
606
  It remains to be seen whether the Equitable Share 
allocation will continue to be distributed to municipalities in lieu of operating costs 
associated with maintaining FIFA infrastructure after the World Cup event.  In theory there is 
no obligation to do so since the infrastructure does not pertain to the provision of basic 
services.  (If this does not happen, the FIFA infrastructure could be regarded as yet another 
unfunded mandate). 
 
Theories on fiscal decentralisation suggest that fiscal autonomy depends on responsibilities 
for expenditure being closely linked to sub-national government units‟ allocated powers and 
functions, which in South Africa means in alignment with Schedule 4 and 5 of the 
Constitution.  However, experience has shown that when service delivery functions are 
shared between different spheres, or between different municipal categories, the 
responsibilities for expenditure and revenue sources become uncertain.  The argument here is 
that under circumstances where municipalities are already faced with escalating municipal 
debt and outstanding basic service delivery needs, the delegation of functions by higher levels 
of government not only adds to the financial pressures of municipalities, but also reinforces 
hierarchical service delivery arrangements – thus reducing local autonomy.   
7.1.6 Theft and Nonpayment 
 
Table 7.3 summarises water losses experienced in 2005.
607
  It indicates that water losses are  
due to a combination of nonpayment, administrative incapacity, illegal connections and 
inferior infrastructure maintenance, with the majority attributed to illegal connections or 
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water theft.
608
  For example, it was estimated that 70% of the total water losses in medium-to-
high income areas was due to leakage on „service connections up to point of customer 
meter‟.
609
  This is understood to refer to the illegal bypassing of the water consumption 
meter.  In low income areas, 55% of total water losses stemmed from unbilled meter 
consumption, which is an indication of ineffective administration. 
 








Unbilled meter consumption 
(ineffective administrative) 
2% 55% 
Unbilled unmetered consumption 
(administrative and/or free community 
supply) 
2% 





Customer meter inaccuracies 
(administrative) 
5% 1% 
Leakage on service connections up to 
point of customer meter 
(illegal bypassing) 
70% 18% 




Leakage on overflows at storage 
(infrastructure maintenance) 
1% 2% 
Source: National Treasury. (2008). Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Review 2003/04-2009/10.  Page 105. 
 
 
With regard to electricity, it has been estimated that 35% of revenue is lost in the provision of 
electricity provided in residential areas due to illegal connections.
610
  This amounts to R2.8 
billion not being paid annually.
611
  Yelland argues that illegal electricity usage amounts to 
                                        
608
 National Treasury. (2008).  Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Review 2003/04-
2009/10. 
609
 National Treasury. (2008). Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Review 2003/04-
2009/10.  Page 105. 
610
 Parker, F.  House Calls with Pliers.  In Mail and Guardian.  23-29 October 2009. 
611 No figures exist on how much electricity is lost due to administrative incapacity. 
In fact, while the National Treasury’s 2009 Local Government Budgets and 
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10% of the national demand.  The issue of electricity theft and nonpayment is contentious at 
present because of the recent tariff increase.  The National Electricity Regulator of South 
Africa (NERSA) in October 2009 called for a 45% tariff hike in the next three years in 
addition to the 31.3% tariff increase implemented in June 2009 in order to meet increasing 
demands for electricity.
612
  Yelland argues that if electricity theft and mismanagement were 
addressed, than there would be no need for such drastic tariff increases.
613
   
 
The significance of the extent of water and electricity revenue losses is that it has a serious 
impact on municipalities‟ operating revenue.  As the chapter on cost recovery explained, 
surcharges associated with water and electricity are a major source of municipal revenue, 
which municipalities rely on for the cross-subsidisation of other services.  Losses are an 
indication of municipalities‟ general lack of administrative capacity to oversee and 
implement cost recovery mechanisms, but the extent of illegal water and electricity 
connections also highlights the degree of nonpayment and/or indigence.  Such factors 
contribute to municipalities‟ escalating debt problems, which add significantly to the 
unsustainability of basic service delivery, thus threatening the overall financial viability of 
municipalities in the long term. 
 
These types of administrative challenges all translate into financial shortcomings.  
Consequently, municipalities become increasingly dependent on intergovernmental fiscal 
grants.  This chapter has already noted that under such circumstances, local fiscal autonomy 
will only continue to diminish.  
 
7.1.7 Limited Borrowing Powers and Grant Dependence 
 
According to the National Treasury (and the literature on fiscal decentralisation), 
municipalities should be largely self-financing.
614
  Municipalities, as indicated previously, are 
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regarded as having the ability to generate up to 90% of their own revenue.
615
  As such, the 
National Treasury argues that local governments have a relatively substantial revenue base. 
The bulk of their resources can be raised from local taxes and service charges.  Income can be 
generated via property rates and service fees such as water, electricity and sanitation.
616
   
However, the chapter on cost recovery showed that for a number of reasons most 
municipalities have not been able to raise adequate revenue to offset, for example, the costs 
associated with the extent of indigence and municipalities‟ mandate to provide free basic 
services.   
 
The National Treasury is calling on creditworthy municipalities to explore opportunities for 
leveraging private finance for the expansion and delivery of services.
617
  Levels of borrowing 
are relatively low. Prior to 1994, the national government took responsibility for sub-national 
borrowings.  This no longer applies.  The borrowing powers of provincial and local 
governments have been sharply reduced.  According to Section 230 of the Constitution a 
municipality may raise loans for capital expenditure but not for current expenditure.  
Borrowing powers are limited by the requirement that borrowings do not fund budget 
deficits. This means that the Constitution effectively “prohibits deficit budgeting at the local 
sphere”.
618
 The Municipal Finance Management Act (MFMA) stipulates that in the interest of 
macro-economic policy, national government needs to approve loan agreements and 
supervise debt management at provincial and local level.
619
 
The MFMA further limits borrowing to local credit markets,
620
 prohibiting loans in foreign 
currencies in order to minimise municipal exposure to external market volatility. 
Theoretically, direct administrative restrictions like central government control and approval 
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for local government borrowing is inconsistent with fiscal decentralisation.
621
  However, in 
South Africa‟s situation, it may be appropriate to place strict limitations on, or even prohibit, 
sub-national governments accessing foreign capital markets as South Africa‟s local economy 
is susceptible to short-term currency speculators and international volatility.   
The literature on fiscal decentralisation promotes local government borrowing in order to 
finance capital projects. These projects have long-term benefits, and it is reasonable that they 
are paid for as they are being utilised.   It is claimed that not to allow this form of financing is 
to introduce a bias against capital spending in favour of consumption spending, which is not 
in the interest of developing local governments in low income or transition countries.
622
 As a 
result of these restrictions on financial borrowing, municipalities are experiencing a growing 
reliance on intergovernmental grant allocations.   
Yemek alludes to a worrying trend where municipalities are beginning to pledge future 
Equitable Share allocations as a means of qualifying for loans from lending institutions.  
Equitable share allocations are meant to cover operating expenditures associated with the 
provision of basic services. He warns that in case of defaulting on debt, this practice could 
lead to massive underprovision of basic services.
623
 
Figure 7.10 illustrates that the value of grant revenue is on the increase while municipal 
revenue is on a downward curve. The implication of this trend is that it depicts municipalities 
as being inadequate at recovering costs or in managing their own finances - which, in turn, 
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Figure 7.10:   Municipal Revenue and Grant Revenue 
 
Source: National Treasury.  (2008). Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Review 2003/04-2009/10.  Page 52. 
 
 
The credit worthiness of municipalities is integrally linked to the extent to which they rely on 
government grants. Figures 7.11, 7.12 and 7.13 illustrate the degree of reliance on grants 
according to the three municipal categories.  These figures identify a large variation between 
the different categories of municipalities and their capacity for generating own revenue.  
Municipalities vary widely in their revenue generating abilities - from 97% in the 
metropolitan municipalities to 3% in small and rural municipalities.
624
  The chapter on cost 
recovery argued that each category of municipality was characterised by different levels of 
poverty, service delivery backlogs, number of households, employment rates and/or property 
values. These variations influence the ability of municipalities to generate their own revenue 
as well as collect user fees. 
  
According to Figure 7.11, metropolitan councils are able to generate substantial revenue from 
property rates.  Of the six Category A municipalities, only two do not rely on 
intergovernmental grants.  However, Figures 7.12 and 7.13 indicate that the majority of local 
and district municipalities rely heavily on intergovernmental grants. Category C 
municipalities, in particular, have a limited resource base.  Property values here are far less 
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than in metropolitan areas.  Category C municipalities are often characterised by high 
unemployment rates, and people are truly unable to pay for service charges.
625
    
 
Figure 7.11:  Grant Dependence of Category A Municipalities (Total of 6) 
 
Source: Adapted from Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs.  (2009). State of Local Government in South Africa. 
 
Figure 7.12:  Grant Dependence of Category B Municipalities (Total of 231) 
 
% 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 
30% 129 55.8% 142 61.5% 153 66.2% 154 66.7% 159 68.8% 163 70.6% 
50% 70 30.3% 83 35.9% 98 42.4% 98 41.6% 102 44.2% 108 46.8% 
75% 28 12.1% 33 14.3% 41 17.7% 37 16% 38 16.5% 47 20.3% 
total 231 100% 231 100% 231 100% 231 100% 231 100% 231 100% 
Source: Adapted from Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs.  (2009). State of Local Government in South Africa. 
                                        
625
 SACities Network. (2007). State of Cities Finances Report.   
 
 
Page | 233 
Figure 7.13:  Grant Dependence of Category C Municipalities (Total of 46) 
 
% 2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09 2009/10 
30% 37 80.4% 33 71.7% 43 93.5% 40 87% 41 89.1% 43 93.5% 
50% 28 60.9% 22 47.8% 40 87% 36 78.3% 38 82.6% 40 87% 
75% - - 1 2.2% 23 50% 20 43.5% 24 52.2% 31 67.4% 
Source: Adapted from Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs.  (2009). State of Local Government in South Africa. 
 
 
Although it is difficult to compare categories of municipalities with one another, it is clear 
that all categories of municipalities experience growing revenue shortages and therefore will 
remain dependent on intergovernmental fiscal transfers; a dependence which will 
compromise the local autonomy of every category of municipality. 
7.1.8 Financial Management Capacity 
 
The National Treasury and Auditor-General continuously identify municipalities‟ weak 
financial management practices.
626
  According to the National Treasury, financial 
management comprises four elements:  (i) planning and budgeting; (ii) revenue and 
expenditure management; (iii) reporting; and (i) oversight.  Schoeman argues that 
municipalities lack capacity in all four.
627
  However, this chapter has shown that some of 
these shortcomings emanate from a combination of factors, and cannot singlehandedly be 
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ascribed to incompetence in financial management.  There are a number of elements that 
contribute to this „incompetence‟, with a lack of suitably qualified personnel being only one 
of many. 
 
The National Treasury reports that there is ongoing lack of any significant improvement in 
the credibility of municipal budgets.
628
 It has also has identified concerns regarding 
municipalities‟ submission of their annual financial statements. Figure 7.14 illustrates that 
there are some inconsistent tendencies.  For example, there has been an increase in the 
submission of financial statements on time - from 135 (48%) in 2004/05 to 162 (57%) in 
2006/07.  But at the same time there has been a substantial growth in non-submission - from 
45 (16%) in 2004/05 to 86 (30%) in 2006/07. 
 




Source:  National Treasury.  (2008). Local Government Budgets and Expenditure Review 2003/04-2009/10.  Page 166. 
 
The increasing gap between expenditures and revenue; the lack of budgeting for maintenance 
allocations; non-payment; inappropriate data-capturing; and debt management strategies - all 
                                        
628
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highlight the importance of having suitably qualified personnel capable of implementing 
rigorous financial management practices.  It was estimated in 2008 that 43 municipalities are 
under investigation for corruption and maladministration.
629
  Posts for Chief Financial 
Officers (CFOs) in 63 of municipalities are currently vacant, some having been so for more 
than four years.
630
  This amounts to about one-fifth of all municipalities.  Given the lack of 
suitably qualified personnel, high vacancy rates, and inadequate auditing procedures, it 
becomes quite understandable why municipalities are battling to implement effective 




This chapter has identified a number of underlying factors that inform some of the fiscal 
challenges that municipalities face.  The argument here is that these issues cannot be analysed 
separately from one another.  For example, statistics presented by the Auditor-General on the 
lack of credibility of municipal budgets cannot be examined in isolation from SALGA‟s 
critique of unfunded mandates or rising expenditure obligations.  Such issues are interrelated 
and explain to a large extent the underlying causes of escalating municipal debt.   
 
While many municipalities do lack financial management expertise, this chapter has shown 
that ongoing issues like persistent service delivery backlogs, widening revenue and 
expenditure ratios, unpredictable revenue streams, and a growing reliance on 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers all contribute to municipal budgeting processes being less 
than straightforward. 
 
The instruction from on high is that local governments need to improve their financial 
management, budgeting and cost recovery.  The national message is that local governments 
must contain their operating expenditure based on their operating revenue, and that this will 
lead to financial sustainability.  The most basic interpretation of financial sustainability 
means having enough revenue to cover expenditure. Put simply:  operating expenditures 
should not be allowed to exceed operating revenue.  However, this chapter has shown that the 
discrepancy between operating revenue and expenditure is not due primarily to financial 
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mismanagement or incapacity.  There are real trends in losses of revenue and increases in 
expenditure which are beyond local government control.  The reality in most municipalities is 
that there is a large number of residents who simply do not pay, or are too poor to pay, for 
services despite different cost recovery mechanisms.  Limited financial management capacity 
together with low levels of service payments translate into a number of fiscal challenges for 
basic service delivery. 
 
Reports conclude that municipalities lack financial management expertise, compounded in 
some instances by a lack of political will to enforce unpopular debt collection processes, 
within a confused or unclear administrative system of powers and functions.
631
  All these 
combine to threaten the financial viability of a municipality.  Financial viability and 
sustainability are necessary if local municipalities are to meet their constitutional and 
legislative responsibilities.
632
  Operating expenditures that are higher than revenue; ailing 
infrastructure; decreasing intergovernmental grants; and minimal financial management 
expertise, are all factors contributing to increased municipal debt and thereby threaten the 
financial viability of municipal service delivery.   
 
This chapter has argued that the severity of municipal debt is challenging municipalities 
beyond their financial limitations and control. Under such circumstances local fiscal 
autonomy is severely constrained by the dependence of municipalities on national 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers.  As long as this dependence continues, devolution is in 
practice non-existent, and delegation and deconcentration will continue to typify the nature of 
fiscal decentralisation in South Africa. 
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This concluding chapter has three objectives.  Firstly, it will reflect critically on the apparent 
disjuncture in South Africa between decentralisation as presented in the constitutional and 
policy framework and how decentralisation has been put into effect in practical terms.   
Secondly, it aims to illustrate that a number of unresolved governance issues will continue to 
diminish the autonomy of local municipalities.  And thirdly, it will identify some of the gaps 
in research that have come to the fore during the course of this study and how these gaps 
warrant further investigation and more critical consideration. 
 
8.1 Assessing Decentralisation 
 
While the objective of this study is not to assess the extent of decentralisation in South 
Africa, it does investigate the nature of political, administrative and financial decentralisation 
in South Africa.  The intention is to show to what extent the constitutional expectations have 
been met.  In doing so, it highlights some of the structural gaps and contradictions in the 
current system, which contribute to a broader understanding of the many basic service 
delivery challenges facing local government in South Africa.  
 
8.1.1 Political Decentralisation 
 
The legislative policy framework for decentralisation in South Africa is well-established.  
With regard to the political dimension, South Africa has a unitary and decentralised system of 
government.  The 1994 post-apartheid system created three spheres of government: national, 
provincial and local.  The national legislature (or Parliament) comprises two houses: a 
National Assembly (Cabinet), and a National Council of Provinces (NCOP).  The latter has 
representatives from provincial legislatures and organised local government (SALGA). 
Provinces are accountable to provincial legislatures, and local governments to local municipal 
councils. The system of election at the national and provincial level is one of proportional 
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representation, whilst at the local level, there is a mix of directly elected and proportional 
representation.
633
   
 
Table 8.1 presents key measures of political decentralisation (as presented in the chapter on 
conceptualising decentralisation) and reflects these in relation to South Africa. 
 
Table 8.1:  Measures of Political Decentralisation 
 
Theoretical Measure In Practice 
Is there a constitutional safeguard for local government? Yes. 
Is there substantial local input in national decision-
making processes? 
No. 
Are political parties organised along national or local 
lines? 
Political parties are organised 
along national lines. 
Are local councils elected by local constituents? Yes. 
Are the heads of local councils elected by local 
constituents? 
No. 
Is the administrative head or chief local operating officer 
elected by local council? 
No.  He/She is appointed by 
the executive head of the 
local council. 
Are there effective mechanisms for popular participation? No. 
Are there provisions for popular recall of local officials? No. 
Is there contestability in local elections? 
Yes, although negated by the 
dominance of the ANC. 
Is there popular participation in local budgeting? No. 
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Local government in South Africa is a distinctive sphere of government in terms of the 
Constitution. Political authority is devolved to local government and local councillors are 
elected democratically at the local level.  In reality, however, the degree of contestability of 
local government elections is low because of the strength of the national ruling party. Apart 
from local elections, residents do not have the power to recall their local councillors or 
officials.  These shortcomings translate into a range of political weaknesses, such as 
patronage and a lack of local accountability.   
 
According to the literature on decentralisation, accountability is central to democratic 
governance.
634
  The literature on decentralisation contends that at a national level the most 
important aspects of accountability reside in the checks and balances between the judiciary, 
legislature and executive, as well as in the presence of independent specialized and oversight 
entities such as human rights commissions, electoral commissions, public service 
commissions, public protectors, auditors-generals, and anti-corruption bodies.
635
  In South 
Africa, such institutional systems are in place and are constitutionally guaranteed.   
 
Theories on decentralisation support the need for devolving political authority to local 
government.
636
  The premise is that devolution brings government closer to the people, and 
thereby increases accountability.  In South Africa, the principle of public participation is 
entrenched in legislation and policies pertaining to local government, and most municipalities 
have set up ward committees for this purpose.
637
  However, empirical evidence suggests 
widespread failure of these institutions for public participation.  Some authors claim that  
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ward committees are little more than political party forums.
638
  The policy framework in 
South Africa decentralises power from the centre to provinces, metropolitan, district and local 
municipalities and is aimed at promoting public participation in local decision-making.  This 
intention has not been fully realised.  At local government level, ordinary people usually have 
little say in budget formulation, and policy-making remains the prerogative of local 
government councillors. 
 
Local political autonomy is limited by a number of factors, such as the strength of the ruling 
party (the ANC) in the national legislature.  Based on the 2009 national elections, the ANC 
collected 65.9% of the vote with the major opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), 
receiving only 16.6%.  This translates into the ANC taking up 264 of the 400 parliamentary 
seats, the DA 67 parliamentary seats, with the remaining 71 seats shared among ten other 
political parties.  The ANC has thus no serious party opposition. (See Appendix 3).    
 
In addition to the dominance of the ruling party, the chapter on political decentralisation 
showed that the independence and separation of powers between the legislature, executive 
and judiciary is undermined by the system of proportional representation whereby Members 
of Parliament are elected through a party-list system, who in turn elect the President.  The 
President appoints the national executive.
639
  The outcome is that the national executive 
represents the interests of the ruling party.  The outcome of the party-list system is that 
Members of Parliament in reality do not represent any particular territorial constituency.   
 
This study has also demonstrated that the annual budgeting process is predominantly a 
national executive exercise. Neither the national or provincial legislatures have any 
significant influence and the draft budget is only discussed in Parliament during the final 
stage of the annual budgeting process.  Members of Parliament have no power to amend the 
budget, and may only approve or reject it.  However, rejection would go against the will of 
the national executive, and by implication, party leadership.  This executive dominance 
extends to municipal councils since political parties are predominantly organised along 
national lines.  
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This study has shown that the Constitution provides for the devolution of political authority 
to sub-national levels of government by instituting local elections and local appointment of 
municipal government officials.  But devolution should mean that, once elected, local 
councillors are free and politically independent of other spheres of government.  The chapter 
on political decentralisation has illustrated that local political autonomy is curtailed by factors 
such as central party dominance, the associated strength of the national executive system, as 
well as by the incompetence of ward councillors and lack of public participation. 
 
Coupled with the limitations of local political independence is the hierarchical nature of the 
intergovernmental relations framework, which allows for minimal local government 
participation in national decision-making forums.  This is evident by the SALGA delegation 
having only two representatives in the national legislature. Ruling party dominance extends 
across the provinces where currently only one province (the Western Cape) is not under ANC 
leadership.   The implication for local government is that the respective provincial local 
government associations reflect the same leadership patterns. In essence, therefore, the 
policies that bind local governments such as those specifying the quantity and quality of 
service provision, and those setting local government service delivery tariff rates and ratios, 
are largely determined by national government. 
 
In short, the devolution of political authority is firmly entrenched and protected in the 
legislative framework of South Africa; however, aspects such as one-party dominance, a lack 
of local accountability and public participation in local policy-making translate into 
substantial limits to local political autonomy.  Under such conditions, political 
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8.1.2 Administrative Decentralisation  
 
Since 1994, local government in South Africa has steadily moved away from a racially 
segregated and discriminatory local government system towards one that is egalitarian and 
non-racial.  The decentralisation of administrative powers and functions to local government 
in South Africa means that municipalities are no longer merely responsible for day-to-day 
services such as refuse removal, but are now designated as the primary authorities responsible 
for the provision of universal basic service delivery.  The provision of municipal services are 
no longer restricted to the few and privileged.   
 
Demarcation has successfully reorganised the geographical landscape of local government.  It 
has amalgamated previously marginalised rural areas with urban areas. However, this has 
resulted in very large municipalities with vast underdeveloped land without an additional 
revenue base.  Wall-to-wall municipalities have been established throughout South Africa, 
but considerable differences between and within the different categories of municipalities 
continue to exist. Each municipality is faced with unique demographics; population sizes; 
infrastructure and service delivery backlogs; poverty levels; as well as varying management 
capacity.  
 
This study has explained that administrative decentralisation has been challenged by the 
complexity concerning the integration of formally separate administrative and financial 
systems, while municipalities have simultaneously been assigned extensive powers and 
functions for service delivery, which are compounded by rigorous and demanding local 
development planning processes and responsibilities. Local government transformation has 
had to take place in a rapidly changing political environment, which is characterised by a 
degree of political distrust between local councillors and local government officials. This 
distrust or tension between councillors and officials has been compounded by a shortage of 
skills and experience in managing the transformation processes of local government in 
general.   
 
Metropolitan municipalities have been granted extensive independent administrative 
autonomy because of their economic strength and economic growth potential.  The argument 
has always been that metropolitan municipalities should not be sources of cross-subsidization 
 
 
Page | 243 
for rural areas.
640
  This responsibility has fallen onto district and local municipalities.  
However, the technical and administrative capacities of these two municipal categories are 
uneven, with some (such as local municipalities) proving more capable than others (such as 
district municipalities).   
 
These disparities are becoming more obvious as district and local municipalities continue to 
grapple with the remaining service delivery backlogs.  The chapter on administrative 
decentralisation showed that the national government perceives that local municipalities have 
adequate capacity and access to revenue and hence has transferred surplus generating 
functions, such as water and electricity, to district municipalities in an attempt to strengthen 
the latter.  The result is that the local autonomy of municipalities has been seriously 
diminished.    
 
Table 8.2 presents the theoretical measures of administrative decentralisation and illustrates 
to what extent these are evident in South Africa.    
 
Table 8.2 Measures of Administrative Decentralisation 
Theoretical Measure In Practice 
Is administrative authority protected by a 
constitution? 
Yes. 
Do municipalities have autonomy to 
contract out own responsibilities? 
Municipalities have limited autonomy, 
need provincial approval.  There is 
currently a policy review underway 
proposing to centralise this authority. 
Do local municipalities have administrative 
regulatory authority (to make by-laws) 
Yes. 
Do municipalities have adequate expertise 
and capacity? 
No. 
Do municipalities have autonomy to fire or 
hire municipal employees? 
Yes. 
Do municipalities have autonomy to set 
terms of employment of municipal 
employees? 
There is currently a draft Public 
Services Bill which aims to standardise 
remuneration and service standards 
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across all spheres of government. 
Do municipalities have autonomy over all 
municipal services? 
No, autonomy over municipal services 
is shared with other spheres of 
government, and other tiers of local 
government 
Do municipalities have autonomy for 
planning? 
Yes, but within nationally determined 
parameters. 
Do municipalities have autonomy for 
procurement? 
Yes.  However, in October of 2009 it 
was proposed that local procurement 
should become a centralised function. 
 
Local councils have the authority to pass by-laws with respect to the implementation of their 
legally assigned functions and responsibilities as stipulated in Schedule 4B and 5B of the 
Constitution, without having to gain clearance from higher-level governments.  While 
decentralised service provision is prescribed in Schedules 4 and 5, authority over such 
provision tends to remain central.  Access and the allocation of resources to supply basic 
services also remain centrally controlled.   
 
In legal terms, municipalities have autonomy over planning.  However, this study has shown 
that planning depends on capacity.  The national directive is to provide free basic services, 
and any local development planning must prioritise the eradication of service delivery 
backlogs.   Authority over local service delivery functions is therefore largely determined by 
national government policy.  The tendency is that rather than devolving administrative 
autonomy to local government, national government (and provincial governments) tends to 
delegate specific functions and responsibilities to local government.  The result is that 
municipalities have become more accountable to national and provincial government than 
they are to their local constituents.   
 
The devolution of the cost recovery function to municipalities is of particular interest. 
National government and financial institutions such the National Treasury and the FFC 
regard this as crucial for local autonomy.  The argument advanced by national institutions is 
that unless municipalities become better at recovering costs, they will not become 
autonomous government entities.  This is true; however, one of the key arguments of this 
study is that there are broader systemic factors at work. This study explored the complexities 
facing municipalities regarding the assignment of cost recovery as a fundamental local 
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administrative responsibility.  The legislative framework devolves the responsibility for cost 
recovery to local government.  But, as the chapter on cost recovery illustrated, municipalities 
also face a range of implementation problems, most of which are beyond their control, such 
as the widespread prevalence of indigence.   
  
National legislation establishes the basis for the division of powers and functions across the 
spheres of government as well as pronouncing on matters of local governance. However, 
there is central administrative authority to modify or revoke powers, thus making 
municipalities susceptible to change. For example, the precise division of power and 
responsibilities between spheres of government as well as between tiers of local government 
is not embodied in any specific legislation, but is determined rather by administrative 
delegation.  National government can with relative ease shift powers and functions across 
spheres of government.  As highlighted throughout this thesis, such fluidity results in sectoral 
turf battles, in inconsistencies and in what municipalities commonly refer to as unfunded 
mandates.  In this respect, administrative functions become delegated functions.  This results 
in municipalities becoming the delivery agents of other spheres of government, which in 
turns diminish local governments‟ authority and autonomy over the implementation of their 
own administrative functions. 
 
8.1.3 Fiscal Decentralisation 
 
The Constitution prescribes that the designation of political and administrative powers and 
functions to sub-national levels of government must be accompanied by the transfer of 
adequate fiscal authority.
641
  In legal terms, therefore, fiscal decentralisation implies that 
municipalities should have the necessary fiscal authority and powers to provide basic services 
and perform the functions allocated to them in terms of the Constitution.   
 
The chapter on fiscal decentralisation demonstrated that South Africa‟s current system of 
fiscal decentralisation points to a steady increase in the centralisation of fiscal autonomy.  
Whether steps towards fiscal centralisation are appropriate depends on what the objectives of 
centralisation are. Bahl and Linn argue that if fiscal autonomy is highly devolved, central 
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government relinquishes control over its major fiscal instruments.
642
   If so, it becomes 
difficult to increase revenue in order to reduce the national budget deficit; or to pass 
structural tax reforms; or to adjust levels of inflation that might be aimed at stimulating 




South Africa‟s fiscal policy does ascribe to central fiscal control, which is geared towards 
maximising tax collection, equalization, as well as oversight and stimulation of local 
expenditures for particular activities such as the provision of basic services.
644
  It is about 
establishing macroeconomic stability, hence the justifiable emphasis on limiting municipal 
taxing and borrowing powers, and spending autonomy.  The primary objective is to attain a 
degree of macro-economic stability, combined with socio-economic equalization, while at the 
same time ensuring the implementation of national policy mandates, such as the provision of 
free basic services by local governments.
645
   Defined as such, fiscal centralisation is in the 
interest of local fiscal autonomy as it is aimed at achieving fiscal equalisation.  
 
A centralised system of intergovernmental fiscal transfers can be a step towards fiscal 
decentralisation in a context where financial resources and capacity vary according to region.  
However, the nature of such grants and the conditions attached thereto are indicative of the 
extent to which grants aim to increase local fiscal autonomy.  Intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers are a compromise solution to the division of revenue-raising authority and 
expenditure responsibility. They permit national governments to retain the authority to tax 
productive resources bases, but guarantee state and local governments a flow of revenues.
646
     
 
Based on the Constitution, local government has the authority to independently spend its 
Equitable Share allocation.  However, the transfer of revenue from national to local 
government continues to have strong conditions attached, while spending is closely 
monitored. The chapter on fiscal decentralisation demonstrated that even the supposedly 
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unconditional Equitable Share transfer has implicit conditionalities attached, since the 
amount allocated is primarily determined by the service delivery backlogs of municipalities 
as opposed to their overall operating expenditure.  This study has shown that local fiscal 
autonomy is limited by the structure and conditions of the intergovernmental grant system.   
 
Table 8.3 illustrates that, in reality, fiscal decentralisation in South Africa remains largely 
deconcentrated.  It highlights some of the restrictions and limitations of local fiscal 
autonomy, such as the centralised framework for revenue collection and grant dispersal, as 
well as municipalities‟ reliance on intergovernmental grants due to a lack of own revenue.  
The collection of revenue is limited to cost recovery for the delivery of local public services, 
and property rate taxes.  Local government does not have the authority to implement local 
taxes, while rates on property, electricity, water and sanitation are determined nationally.   
 
Table 8.3:  Measures of Fiscal Decentralisation 
 
Theoretical Measure In Practice 
Is fiscal authority protected by a constitution? Yes. 
Do local municipalities have the authority to 
determine rates, and local taxes?   
No.   
Are the majority of transfers formula-based and 
unconditional? 
Marginally more formula-based.  
Are unconditional grants unrestricted? No. 
Are local municipalities accountable for 
expenditure? 
Yes, but not to local constitutents. 
Is there alignment between local expenditure 
responsibilities and own revenue capacity? 
No. 
Are local municipalities reliant on 
intergovernmental transfers? 
Yes. 
Do local municipalities have autonomy in 
determining local budgets? 
Yes. 
Are salaries of local government employees 
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Is there local government representation and 
participation in national budget-making processes? 
Limited. 
Do local municipalities have autonomous borrowing 
rights? 
Limited to domestic market, only 
when financial creditworthy, and 
approved by central government. 
 
 
This study explained that there are multiple reasons for the financial shortcomings of 
municipalities.  For example:  ill-planning by municipalities; improper or incompetent 
budgeting; weak financial management; as well as ineffective cost recovery strategies.  
However, it was found that finance does not follow function. Local governments continue to 
encounter unfunded mandates.
647
  National government has delegated extensive functions to 
local government without the necessary accompanying funds which are specific to the 
function in question.   
 
The nature of intergovernmental fiscal relations is a crucial factor in striking the right balance 
or in resolving tensions between the different roles and functions of each sphere of 
government. If central government prescribes the terms on which fund and resources are 
released or transferred, then fiscal relations translate into increased central regulatory control.  
This minimises administrative decentralisation and limits political autonomy over fiscal 
decision-making.   
 
As noted in this study, the administrative authority of national government to shift social 
expenditures to local governments has resulted in unfunded mandates.  The critique is that 
functions are delegated to local government without providing additional finances.  
Intergovernmental fiscal transfers are the dominant source of revenue for local government.  
One of the major shortcomings of the current intergovernmental fiscal configuration is that it 
fails to align the expenditure responsibilities of local governments with its revenue-raising 
powers.   Local expenditure controls are tight, and revenue powers are limited, while 
administrative powers and functions are extensively decentralised.  This is evident in the cost 
                                        
647
 Interview with Municipal Councillor.  (Msunduzi Municipality).  Pietermaritzburg.  23 
March 2009.  And Atkinson, D. Taking to the Streets. In Buhlungu, S., Daniel, J., Southall, R. 
and Lutchmann, J. (Eds.). (2007). State of the Nation:  South Africa 2007.  Pretoria:  Human 
Sciences Research Council Publishers. 
 
 
Page | 249 
recovery challenges of municipalities which increase municipal debt and lead to a growing 
reliance on intergovernmental fiscal grants. 
 
The argument is not whether fiscal decentralisation is desirable or not.  Its appropriateness is 
related to what extent it enables local municipalities to be financially autonomous and 
provide all South Africans with equitable and quality basic services.  While the central 
government‟s tight fiscal regulations may foster macro-economic stability and address 
regional imbalances, there is uncertainty as to whether its central control supports or stifles 
local autonomy.    The factor of uncertainty is whether the tight central controls are 
temporary and whether central government aims to devolve more fiscal autonomy to local 
government in the future.   
 
The chapter on fiscal decentralisation demonstrated that the manner in which fiscal 
decentralisation has evolved in South Africa remains little more than a theoretical concept.   
Rather than devolved fiscal autonomy, it signifies a set of hierarchical intergovernmental 
fiscal relations.  South Africa‟s system of fiscal decentralisation is characterized by 
centralised taxation and decentralised service delivery obligations.  Local government 
discretion is minimal and translates into being little more than the power to prioritize among 
the abundance of national directives, while hoping that the functions delegated to local 
government will be accompanied by adequate financial resources.  
 
Fiscal local autonomy is limited as long as unfunded mandates remain; as long as the 
delegation of responsibilities for expenditure continue without adequate funding; and as long 
as municipalities lack institutional and technical capacity.   
 
8.2 Devolution, Delegation and Deconcentration  
 
Examining the political shortcomings coupled with the administrative and financial 
limitations sheds light on some of the current problems facing local government in their 
provision of basic services.  Determining whether the type of decentralisation is an 
appropriate form of governance depends in large part upon its objectives.  Based on a reading 
of the various policy documents pertaining to local government in South Africa, the 
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objectives of decentralisation are to create democratic local governance, as well as ensuring 
universal access to basic services.
648
    
 
The legislative framework for local government assumes the form of devolution, but in 
practice local autonomy is diminished by overriding national mandates, thereby rendering 
local government accountable to central government.  This has created a system where 
municipalities‟ autonomy for delivering basic services has been minimised by a top-down 
system of central government oversight and control in order to ensure that the national 
services delivery mandate is addressed, as opposed to meeting the needs of local 
communities.  
 
Table 8.4 constructs a summary of the key characteristics of the three different dimensions of 
decentralisation and the three different forms of decentralisation as discussed so far in this 
chapter.  This illustrates the widespread variations in local government authority and 
autonomy with regard to local government authority for basic service delivery.  (Table 2.1 in 
the chapter on political decentralisation presented a similar preliminary table summarising the 
various characteristics based on the literature on decentralisation).  Table 8.4 shows that 
while in theory decentralisation is entrenched in the legal framework, in practice 
decentralisation is characterised by various forms of deconcentration and delegation, with 
minimal devolution.  It indicates how the respective powers and functions are decentralised 
through delegation, deconcentration and/or devolution.   
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DIMENSIONS OF DECENTRALISATION IN SOUTH AFRICA 














organised along national 
lines. 
Introduction of a Public 
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Justifying certain centralist tendencies has been easy for national government.  For example, 
government‟s contention that the severity of service delivery backlogs and the lack of 
municipal capacity necessitates greater central involvement to eradicate inequality; to ensure 
national quality standards for public services; to nurture national cohesion; and to coordinate 
cross-sectoral service delivery.  In addition, this study has shown that the autonomy of 
municipalities is exacerbated by: poorly qualified personnel; weak institutional capacity; 
weak coordination among government institutions; conflicts between the tiers of local 
government; as well as a lack of accountability to local constituencies.   
 
However, some signs point towards a central „unwillingness‟ to devolve more autonomy to 
local government.  According to the Constitution, central oversight and intervention in South 
Africa are supposed to be in the interests of supporting local government and capacity-
building in order to promote the devolution of political, administrative and financial 
authority.  However, this study has shown that it is doubtful whether the characteristics of 
deconcentration or delegation are in the interest of local autonomy, since oversight and 
intervention are at times motivated by other reasons, such as ensuring adherence to the 
national agenda. 
 
The current tendency is to address local service delivery problems by increasing national 
government intervention as opposed to local empowerment. The chapter on fiscal 
decentralisation highlighted the decrease of the capacity-building grant from 7.7% of the total 
local government allocation in 2003/2004 to 1% in 2009/10.
649
  Local government 
weaknesses are addressed by imposing more regulations as opposed to capacity-building.  
For example, when the Auditor-General and National Treasury pointed out that 
municipalities lack financial management and budgeting capacity, or that they are often not 
able to identify costs and revenue streams from a particular service and are therefore unable 
to calculate the full cost of water provision and revenue potential, the national government‟s 
response was not to increase the focus on capacity-building but rather to implement tighter 
fiscal controls over tariff rates and accounting procedures.
650
    
 
The consequence is that the insistence on uniform regulation effectively removes autonomy 
from those municipalities that are, indeed, capable of managing their own financial affairs.   
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The extent of deconcentration and delegation in all three dimensions of decentralisation 
indicates the expansion of central control at the expense of local autonomy.  The 
decentralised system of governance currently in place sets up local government as service 
delivery agents for national and provincial governments, as opposed to autonomous entities.   
 
The strength of the ruling national political party means that, in reality, local councillors 
regard themselves as being accountable first and foremost to the national government, in 
contrast to the local population that they serve.  The conclusion reached here is that in some 
instances deconcentration or delegation is practised more as a matter of controlling local 
government, at the cost of local autonomy, as opposed to assisting local government.  In 
other words, it appears to extend central control rather than empowering local government.   
 
8.3 Unresolved Issues in Basic Service Delivery 
 
Authors caution that decentralisation which entails wide-ranging institutional change takes 
time to mature.
651
  In the South African case, the transformation of local government has 
been a lengthy process, and it is perhaps unrealistic to expect municipalities to have become 
autonomous entities.  Local government reforms officially began in 1993 and final municipal 
jurisdictions were determined in 2000. A comprehensive local government policy framework 
has been in place since 2000.  However, nine years have passed and a number of recent 
studies identify the same challenges facing local government that were first experienced prior 
to and during the demarcation period.
652
   
 
At the end of 2009, the newly established national Department of Cooperative Governance 
and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) presented a working document on the state of local 
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government in South Africa.   This document identifies nine key challenges which are listed 
verbatim below: 
 
i.  Huge service delivery and backlog challenges, e.g. housing, water and sanitation; 
ii.  Poor communication and accountability relationships with communities; 
iii.  Problems with the political administrative interface; 
iv.  Corruption and fraud; 
v.  Poor financial management, e.g. negative audit opinions; 
vi.  Number of (violent) service delivery problems; 
vii.  Weak civil society formations; 
viii. Intra- and inter-political party issues negatively affecting governance and 
delivery; and 
ix.  Insufficient municipal capacity due to lack of scarce skills.653 
 
This thesis has shown that most of these challenges have reference to the delivery of basic 
services and also have implications for local government autonomy.  This chapter identifies 
two main additional issues which contribute to some of the service delivery challenges facing 
municipalities.   The first issue centres around the lack of differentiation between the 
different categories of municipalities.  The second issue pertains to the ongoing ambiguity 
with regard to the assignment of functions to local municipalities. 
 
8.3.1 The Categorisation of Municipalities 
 
The chapters on cost recovery and fiscal decentralisation demonstrated a standardized central 
government approach to local government support, oversight and funding.  The criticism 
raised was that Category B municipalities, in particular, were treated uniformly as if they 
have equal capacity.  These chapters concluded that there is a need for a more differentiated 
approach with regard to the division of revenue or borrowing powers, for example.   
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The very recent 2009 State of Local Government Report classifies the 283 municipalities into 
more than just the three categories but also into subcategories: 
 
 6 Category A municipalities:  
Metropolitan municipalities: with large urban complexes with populations over 1 
million and accounting for 56% of all municipal expenditure in the country. 
 
 31 Category B1 local municipalities:  
Local municipalities: with large budgets and containing secondary cities. 
 
 37 Category B2 local municipalities:   
Local municipalities with a large town as a core. 
 
 31 Category B3 local municipalities:  
Local municipalities with small towns, with relatively small population and 
significant proportion of urban population but with no large town as a core. 
 
 32 Category B4 local municipalities: 
Local municipalities which are mainly rural with communal tenure and with, at most, 
one or two small towns in their areas.   
 
 25 Category C1 district municipalities: 
District municipalities which are not water service authorities. 
 
 21 Category C2  district municipalities: 




This is a significant development and acknowledges that municipalities face different 
challenges.  For example, this report recognizes that many urban and relatively more stable 
Category B local municipalities also face challenges of increased poverty due to rapid 
urbanization, a growing population and an increasing number of households, thus placing 
unsustainable pressure on existing service delivery infrastructure.  Of the 131 Category B 
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municipalities, only 31 (or 24%) are identified as having a substantial rates base. This 
differentiation between municipalities may assist the National Treasury in implementing the 
[R] component (revenue-raising capacity correction) and [C] component (correction factor) 
of the Equitable Share formula which are currently not yet in effect. (This was discussed in 
the chapter on fiscal decentralisation.). 
 
8.3.2 The Assignment of Functions to Local Municipalities 
 
Compared to metropolitan and district municipalities, local municipalities are most affected 
by the ongoing uncertainty regarding the (re)assignment of basic service delivery functions.  
This is a crucial factor because it pertains to their core functions and revenue generating 
capacity and therefore ultimately shapes their political, administrative and financial 
autonomy.  Three functional areas in particular warrant clarification and finalization: (i) the 
establishment of Regional Electricity Distributors (REDs); (ii) the housing accreditation 
system; and (iii) the establishment of a national water regulating authority. 
 
i. Regional Electricity Distributors (REDs).  
 
Beyond metropolitan municipalities, electricity distribution is mainly exercised by local 
municipalities.  However, in 2005 Cabinet approved the establishment of seven Regional 
Electricity Distributors (REDs). One will be located in each metropolitan area, with one 
responsible for distribution in non-metropolitan areas.
655
   
 
The rationale behind establishing REDs is that this would pool assets and supply areas, thus 
allowing scale economies to emerge, which would lead to more efficient and less expensive 
distribution. Each region would have its own tariff structure, as opposed to the current 
different tariff structures. In other words, the REDs would consolidate the delivery of 
electricity as opposed to authorising individual municipalities to deliver electricity.  
However, it would also mean a loss of revenue and possibly assets, too, for local 
municipalities which currently provide electricity.
656
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 To date, it remains unclear what the final configuration will be of these distributors.
657
  The 
delay in finalising their implementation is resulting in the lack of infrastructure maintenance 
of the current electricity network because municipalities anticipate having to hand over 
existing electricity infrastructure to the respective REDs.
658
   
 
As discussed in the chapter on cost recovery, the provision of electricity is a major source of 
municipal revenue.  Another concern regarding REDs is that no assessment has been 
undertaken of their impact on municipalities‟ revenue flows, nor on how municipalities will 
be compensated for this loss of income.
659
  One outcome could be increased 
intergovernmental fiscal transfers, but as this thesis has argued, intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers minimise local fiscal autonomy. 
 
The main concern is what effect REDs will have on local municipalities which currently 
provide electricity.  The implication of introducing REDs would be that local municipalities 
operating in an electricity distribution region would have to transfer their assets and liabilities 
to the RED responsible for the distribution of the electricity in that region.  
 
ii. Housing Accreditation 
 
In 2005, the Department of Housing introduced an accreditation system especially designed 
to officially enable municipalities to perform certain housing functions.  This was included in 
the Housing Development Agency Act (Act 23 of 2008).   Yet to date little progress has been 
made.   
 
The FFC indicated that since its introduction, 18 municipalities had applied for accreditation 
but no decisions have yet been taken.
660
   The significance of accreditation is that it would 
formalise the delegation of housing functions to local government.  Housing is a concurrent 
function shared by national and provincial government.  Housing projects tend to be 
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undertaken in isolation from local government development planning.  As a result, housing 
projects are poorly integrated into the overall municipal development objectives, with 
inadequate consideration being given to the capacity of local infrastructure.
661
   
 
According to the local government policy framework, municipalities are responsible for 
overall planning at the municipal level. This would include decisions on housing 
infrastructure, planning and development.  However, the financial allocations to local 
governments are determined by the provincial sphere while planning for housing 
infrastructure is done at the municipal level.
662
   
 
The objective of accrediting municipalities is that it would authorise them to administer 
national housing projects.  This includes receiving, evaluating and approving applications for 
subsidies. An advantage for accredited municipalities is that they would receive their fiscal 
transfers directly from the national government rather than from the provincial sphere.  At 
this point in time, provinces tend to act as a transferring agent between the national and local 
spheres, thereby adding a further layer to service delivery.
663
   
 
The National Treasury described the accreditation principle as an example of subsidiarity 
because it devolves responsibility to the lowest possible level.
664
  Yet its failure to materialise 
gives credence to those (such as Heller) who adamantly argue that central government is 
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Iii Regional Water Distributors 
 
In addition to the unresolved arrangements regarding REDs and housing accreditation, there 
is now also talk about establishing regional water distributors.  The 2009 Division of 
Revenue Act (Act 12 of 2009) suggests that regional water distributors might be established, 
based on the same principles of REDs.  The Financial and Fiscal Commission has recently 
proposed that government establish an independent National Water Regulator that would 
report to Parliament.
666
   Its proposed functions, as the name suggests, appear to aim at 
overall control, leaving little room for local discretion.  The proposed Water Regulator would 
standardise the entire water supply industry.  This includes: 
 
Issuing licences; regulating tariffs; monitoring water integrated resource plans for 
infrastructure investments; regulating compliance to industry norms and standard; 
regulating the supply of water and sanitation services and their compliance to quality 
standards; regulating water efficiency and demand-side management; developing 
regulatory frameworks for PPPs and alternative service delivery models in the water 
sector; ensuring regulatory instruments support the achievement of universal access 
to water and sanitation services; and monitoring supply and demand trends in the 
water supply industry.
667
   
 
If this is the case, then water would cease to be one of the key sources of surplus revenue for 
municipalities and would further diminish local avenues for cost recovery. 
 
These various ongoing and unresolved issues in basic service delivery suggest areas for 
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8.4 Areas for Further Research 
 
During the course of this study, a number of issues and concerns came to the fore warranting 
far more critical analysis.  Five areas for further research are considered here:  (i) the 
suitability of the two-tiered local government system;  (ii) the sustainability of basic service 
delivery;  (iii) redressing outdated and inconsistent data; (iv) the significance of public 
participation; and (v) the prospects for local economic development. 
  
8.4.1 The Two-Tiered System of Local Government. 
 
It remains to be determined whether the two-tiered system of local government is in the best 
interest of both Category B and Category C municipalities.  This study has shown that it is a 
misconception that traditional urban municipalities are able to cross-subsidize the provision 
of basic services in underdeveloped, poor and remote areas.  As such, their ability to further 
sustainable development in these areas is doubted.   
 
Whether or not the two-tiered system of local government is constructive and in the interest 
of sustainable basic service delivery merits further investigation.  Administrative 
decentralisation in South Africa has entailed the transfer of basic service delivery functions 
and responsibilities to local government.  However, based on Section 156(4) of the 
Constitution, a municipality is entitled to the assignment of the administration of a function if 
it can most effectively be administered locally and if a municipality has the capacity to do 
so.
668
 It also states that powers must go to or stay at the local level unless they are better 
performed at a higher level.
669
  It is not clear here whether „the local level‟ refers to local 
municipalities or to district municipalities.   
 
The chapter on administrative decentralisation demonstrated how the Municipal Structures 
Amendment Act (2000) transferred the authority over basic service delivery from local 
municipalities to district municipalities.  However, after the promulgation of the Municipal 
Structures Amendment Act, the Department of Provincial and Local Government issued a 
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general notice in which it reiterated the constitutional expectation that in order to promote 
local accountability, the powers and functions of basic services should be as close as possible 
to the communities the services are meant to serve.
670
   Such statements illustrate that 
government itself is unsure of where authority is or should be located. 
 
It is worth considering whether districts should be abolished altogether. This study has 
indicated that many districts lack the capacity to fulfil their basic functions.  It is generally 
accepted that district municipalities in South Africa experience problems of incompetence.
671
  
District municipalities are regarded as the weakest sphere of government, with the least 
capacity.
672 
 They are seen as lacking expertise and management skills.  Few district 
municipalities have received „a clean bill of health‟ by the Auditor-General.
673
  Their lack of 
financial capacity compromises the financial viability and capacity of local municipalities 
within their jurisdiction.  
 
Steytler et al argue that the creation of a second tier of local government has been costly in 
unnecessarily replicating administrative structures and staffing. For example, the Alfred Nzo 
District Municipality in the Eastern Cape consists of only two local municipalities, and 





In South Africa there are 47 district municipalities and 231 local municipalities.  According 
to the Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs, as well as the 
Demarcation Board, more than 50% of district municipalities are not performing the core 
functions of delivering water, sanitation and electricity as stipulated in the Municipal 
Structures Amendment Act (2000).
675
  Table 8.5 illustrates the extent to which local 
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municipalities are assuming district municipal functions.  If one scrutinizes the table below 
more closely, on average almost 70% of the core basic municipal service functions are 
provided by local municipalities. 
 
Table 8.5  Number of District Functions Performed by Local Municipalities 
 
Function Number of Local Municipalities  Percentage 
Municipal roads 189 81% 
Refuse removal 189 81% 
Cemeteries 183 79% 
Water (potable) 165 71% 
Electricity reticulation 160 69% 
Storm water drainage 159 68% 
Sanitation 158 68% 
Traffic and parking 149 64% 
Fire fighting 130 56% 
Municipal planning 123 53% 
Municipal health services 106 46% 
Source:  Adapted from Municipal Demarcation Board. (2005).  Review of the Adjustment of District Municipality 
Functions to Local Municipalities. 
 
 
The Municipal Demarcation Board claimed in its 2006/07 Capacity Assessment Report that 
more and more functions in terms of Section 84(1) of the Municipal Structures Act had been 
shifted to local municipalities.
676
 There are also numerous examples of provincial 
intervention in district municipalities. In fact, provincial government intervention is going 
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beyond district municipalities to local municipalities as the district municipalities have no 
capacity to monitor local municipalities, or to intervene where necessary.  The Provincial 
Executive Council (PEC) of KwaZulu-Natal, for example, has taken over the administration 
of the Amajuba District Municipality as well as the Umzinyathi District Municipality.  These 
municipalities have failed to compile budgets, and the Auditor-General disclaimed their 
municipal reports. They also experienced several financial constraints as well as a severe 
shortage of qualified staff.
677
 In addition, the administrations of the Newcastle, Kokstad, 
Impendle, Emandlangeni and Abaqulusi local municipalities were taken over by the province 
since their district municipalities did not have the capacity to administer the affairs of these 
local municipalities.   
 
The two-tiered system of local government has created district municipalities as a tier of 
government that regards itself as the „watchdog‟ of Category B municipalities, and yet is not 
accountable to the local municipalities within its respective area of jurisdiction. The 
hierarchical nature of the two-tiered local government system diminishes the authority of 
local municipalities, whereas in most cases the local municipalities are self-sufficient and can 
be trusted to operate independently of the district. Further investigation into the suitability of 
the current two-tiered system of local government and whether it is practical and conducive 
to the provision of sustainable basic services would be valuable.  
 
8.4.2 Inconsistent and Outdated Data 
 
One of the key challenges faced throughout this study was verifying and consolidating data.  
Census 1996 and Census 2001 are regarded as the only all-inclusive censuses which were 
conducted by Statistics South Africa (Stats SA). These surveys provide information on 
demographics and access to basic services by households.  The next Census was due to take 
place in 2006, but the Cabinet postponed this until 2011.
678
   
In 2007 StatsSA compiled a Community Survey which provided statistics on similar 
categories of information in the two censuses.   However, arguments have been made that the 
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data presented in the 2007 Community Survey is unreliable and that the sample size was too 
limited.
679
  At this point in time, some government departments use 2001 Census data, 
whereas others use 2007 Community Survey data.   
The Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs has based its 2009 State 
of Local Government Report largely on the 2007 Community Survey.  However, the 
Department of Water and Environmental Affairs (DWEA) and the Department of Energy 
(DE) currently use 2001 Census data as a base, and update their data sets annually based on 
figures supplied by the municipalities.  In this latter case, the reliability of current data on 
access to water, sanitation, electricity and the backlogs per household depend primarily on 
the quality of data that municipalities collect and submit to various government departments.  
This has obvious implications for the reliability of data which are used currently by DWEA 
and DE.   
Given that the datasets are variable and inconsistent, the best one can do is to identify trends.  
However, even interpreting data based on trends alone can result in drawing inconclusive or 
inaccurate interpretations.  For example, Figure 8.1 was presented in the 2009 State of Local 
Government in South Africa Report.  According to this figure, access to basic sanitation has 
decreased in three provinces:  the Free State, Gauteng and the Northern Cape.  Even more 
pronounced is Figure 8.2 which indicates that access to electricity has decreased in every 
single province in South Africa.  This indicates either a vast discrepancy in datasets, or if the 
data are reliable this indicates a substantial decline in access to basic services.  The latter has 
serious implications and would point to the increasing inability of households to afford basic 
service delivery fees and hence suggests that they are being denied access to basic sanitation 
and electricity. 
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Figure 8.1  Number of Households without Access to Basic Sanitation 
 
Source:  Department of Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs.  (2009).  State of Local Government in South Africa 
 
Figure 8.2  Number of Households without Access to Basic Electricity 
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A lack of access to verifiable data has been a problem since the inception of the present 
dispensation of local government.  The Ministerial Advisory Committee on Local 
Government and Transformation indicated in its 2001 Report that the newly amalgamated 
municipalities had no reliable data on households, income, poverty levels, service delivery 
levels or on outstanding backlogs.
680
  A municipal official noted that Census information was 
not entirely reliable due to, for example, constantly changing migration patterns and a high 
number of informal settlements.  This is not a matter of financial or administrative 
mismanagement, but a real consequence of the comprehensive political reorganisation of 
local government country-wide.  Problems which, he argues, persist today.
681
    
 
The chapter on cost recovery explained that municipalities experience great difficulties in 
determining indigence, access to services and illegal connections.  Many municipalities lack 
appropriate technology and accurate databases to receive, process and store information on 
service delivery.
682
  This has complicated billing, metering and the overall revenue 
administration systems, and there appears to be „a lack of a workable automation of processes 




SALGA pointed out that many municipalities continue to encounter difficulties in compiling 
and/or updating their indigence registers.
684
  Some of this was ascribed to municipalities‟ 
inability to determine the socio-economic status of communities.  The lack of local 
demographic data not only makes it difficult for municipalities to plan and provide basic 
services, but this is also true for national government departments, like the National Treasury, 
which is responsible for determining the division of revenue.  The Financial and Fiscal 
Commission argues that in order to accurately determine resource allocation, it is necessary 
to measure the extent to which municipalities are able to raise their own revenue.
685
  The 
chapter on fiscal decentralisation highlighted current inability of the National Treasury to 
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measure or determine municipalities‟ revenue capacity and hence its inability to apply the [C] 
and [R] components of the Equitable Share formula.
686
   
 
In short, access to reliable and verifiable data is fundamental in all respects:  for 
municipalities;  for government departments;  as well as for the National Treasury.    
 
8.4.3 The Sustainability of Basic Service Delivery 
 
During the course of this study, it became apparent that there is a fundamental lack of 
assessment or consideration of the potential implications of national policy decisions for local 
government.  There are numerous aspects that warrant further investigation and critical 
analysis.  The general opinion currently is that municipalities are financially in a precarious 
position, which is likely to worsen.  This makes it essential for more concerted research into 
the impact of free basic services and non-payment for services on the sustainability of basic 
service delivery.   
 
Numerous government reports claim that since 1994 substantial progress has been made with 
respect to basic service delivery. According to the National Treasury, the number of people 
with access to potable water increased from 59% to 86%.  Electricity access increased from 
36% to 79%, while sanitation increased by 25% to 73%. The number of people using the 
bucket system in 2006 was estimated at 67,000 compared to 250,000 in 1994.
687
  This thesis 





One hypothesis worth exploring is whether eradicating the remaining backlogs means that 
more households will gain access to service infrastructure, which would increase the number 
of households which would be entitled to free basic services.  This would raise infrastructure 
and service delivery costs but would probably not increase revenue potential.  If this is the 
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case, then municipal consumer debt may very well increase, making basic service delivery 
unsustainable. 
 
The Auditor-General and National Treasury are of the opinion that municipalities have not 
demonstrated significant improvements in collecting all revenue due, or in increasing their 
revenue potential from current sources. However, the extent to which households are able to 
afford to pay for basic services has not been determined, nor has consideration been given as 
to how this inability to pay will affect the long-term sustainability of service delivery 
investments.  
  
No official assessments seem to have been undertaken to ascertain the ability of households 
to afford basic service delivery.  There are ongoing complaints of frequent interruptions in 
the water supply owing to vandalism and burst pipes.  In addition, reports abound of people 
resorting to illegal connections.
689
  However, it is unknown to what extent water and 
electricity „theft‟ are due to non-payment or whether it is a question of affordability.  Nor is 
there any quest to determine how the inability to pay will affect the long-term sustainability 
of service delivery investments. If illegal connections abound because of a lack of 
affordability, then service delivery will not be sustainable. The chapter on cost recovery 
presented the argument that a willingness to pay and the affordability of user fees are 
prerequisites to investing in basic service delivery infrastructure.  Providing basic services to 
those who are unable or unwilling to pay will result in infrastructure being underutilised and 
falling into disrepair at huge cost to the public sector.  
 
There has also been no estimation of the real costs associated with free basic services.  Free 
basic services are largely financed through cross-subsidization from the rich to the poor.  The 
implications of cross-subsidization on a municipality‟s overall service standards have not yet 
been ascertained. Van der Berg notes that attempts at measuring the fiscal impact of free 
basic services depends on the availability of relatively good micro-data at the household 
level, which he argues is currently non-existent.
690
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It remains to be proven that the health and social benefits associated with access to free basic 
services outweigh the financial costs of municipal service delivery.
691
 There is a need to test 
the assumption that access to free basic services improves peoples‟ living conditions to such 
an extent that they will become economically active, which in turn will result in people being 
able to afford user fees.  
 
There has been no official assessment thus far into the viability and sustainability of 
providing basic services.  The lack of reliable and up-to-date data makes it impossible to 
consider whether basic service delivery will be sustainable.  An assumption is often made 
that access to basic services will lead to development, which in turn will lead to users being 
able to afford paying fees for them.
692
  There is no evidence to suggest that government is 
able to afford and maintain the delivery of basic services.   
 
There has also been no assessment of the reliability and quality of municipal services.  While 
impressive basic service delivery rollouts have taken place, some question the quality, cost-
effectiveness and sustainability of services.  Hemson, for example, claims that almost two-
thirds of the water projects put in place since 1994 have fallen into disuse.
693
  According to 
Hemson, many water delivery programmes to poor households are unsustainable because of 
low household consumption levels which have resulted in insufficient income levels for 
municipalities.
694
   
 
Reports abound on the poor quality of RDP housing.
695
 Some housing projects are far 
removed from the city centre, making service delivery expensive. Other housing 
developments are furthering pressure on existing infrastructure such as sanitation and 
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sewerage which are not capable of handling increased service delivery.
696
   The Local 
Government Budgets and Expenditure Review 2003/04 – 2009/10 highlighted the backlogs in 
serious repairs and maintenance and renewal that exist in relation to municipal infrastructure, 
particularly pertaining to electricity, water reticulation, sewage and storm water and road 
systems.  The Minister of Human Settlements, Tokyo Sexwale reported in November 2009 





Since 1995, Eskom has provided universal basic service infrastructure as opposed to 
connecting only those households which applied and paid for connections.  As such, access to 
electricity did not discriminate against the poor.  The assumption was that the consumption of 
poor households, through tariff subsidies, would generate adequate income to recover the 
costs of electrification.  However, the average consumption was low and revenue fell short of 
the total operating costs.
698
  (Then) President Mbeki announced in the 2004 State of the 
Nation Address that by 2012, all households would have access to electricity.  According to 
Bekker et al, by 2008 an estimated 6.9 million households still needed to be electrified.  This 
means approximately 1.15 million connections per year.  This figure is almost double that 
estimated by the Department of Minerals and Energy‟s 2007 Universal Access Plan, which 
will cost between R5 billion to R6 billion a year.  Yet the Integrated National Electricity 
Programme (INEP) grant for 2007/2008 was only R1.4 billion.
699
   
 
In short, there are many separate yet interrelated issues which impact on the sustainability of 
basic service delivery.  Further investigation into the sustainability of basic service delivery, 
especially those of free basic services, is necessary bearing in mind the remaining backlogs; 
issues of non-payment, affordability and indigence; quality; and the maintenance of service 
delivery infrastructure. 
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8.4.4 Public Participation 
 
The chapter on political decentralisation has demonstrated that a comprehensive legislative 
framework has been set up to enable community participation. The national Department of 
Provincial and Local Government contends that: 
 
[l]ocal government must be committed to work with citizens and groups within the 
community to find ways to meet their social, economic and material needs and 




However, reports increasingly cite examples of communities protesting against inadequate 
service delivery.
701
  In 2009, newspaper articles reported on the escalation of country-wide 
protests.
702
  The severity and recurring nature of protests has resulted in the Public Protector 
investigating the underlying causes.
703
  Factors identified were community dissatisfaction 
with poor service delivery. Common complaints identified were financial mismanagement 
and allegations of fraud and corruption coupled with complaints of poor communication with 
communities.   
 
According to the Public Protector, perceptions of corruption and maladministration have led 
to public discontent and a lack of confidence in the government‟s ability to deliver.
704
  The 
Public Service Commission set up the National Anti-Corruption Forum (NACF) in March 
2007 and has since its inception received a total of 4726 cases.  Of these, 2689 (57%) relate 
to corruption (bribery, embezzlement, fraud, favouritism and nepotism, conflicts of interest, 
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maladministration and abuse of government equipment) and 1199 (25%) cases relate to 




The escalation of service delivery protests occurring across South Africa conveys a general 
attitude of dissatisfaction with local government.
706
  The underlying causes warrant further 
investigation and it would be worthwhile to explore to what extent the escalating protests are 
informed by citizens expressing their dissatisfaction with local government‟s poor 
participatory practices.   
 
Further research into the significance of participation may also test the extent to which fuller 
or better participation can result in enhancing the accountability of local government.  The 
literature on decentralisation states that public participation informs local leaders about local 
needs and preferences.  Of interest would be examining the extent to which public 
participation can force or influence local governments to explain or justify what they have 
done or failed to do. 
 
According to the literature on decentralisation, the advantage of decentralisation is that 
“getting government closer to the people will lead to more participation in government”.
707
  
The assumption is that this will provide “an outcome that is closest to the preferences of the 
median voter, and will allow the political process to guarantee a more efficient operation of 
local government.”
708
 As a result, local government would become more accountable to 
voters for the quality of services they provide, which in turn would persuade local 
populations to pay for public services. 
 
The chapter on political decentralisation revealed that there is no evidence that voter 
preferences are translated into budget outcomes. Nor is there any evidence that this has 
improved a willingness to pay for local services. On the contrary, there is increased public 
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unrest over inferior service delivery.  The question emerges: just how responsive is South 
Africa‟s system of local government?   
This shortcoming may yield an opportunity for further research into the relationship between 
local electoral power and local accountability for service delivery. 
 
8.4.5 The Prospects for Local Economic Development  
 
My particular study did not consider local government‟s responsibility for local economic 
development (LED). This is a complex and largely unfulfilled local government obligation, 
facing multi-faceted implementation problems which are beyond the aims of this thesis. 
Nevertheless, it is a vital focus area, worthy of critically analysis and substantial 
investigation.   
 
LED is undoubtedly an important component of local government and is integral to the 
ability of municipalities to become autonomous entities.  But the prospects for LED are not 
promising in a context where basic service delivery backlogs remain.  The limited autonomy 
of local government as described in this thesis poses a significant hindrance to municipalities 
being capable of independently pursuing local economic development opportunities.   
 
The same political, administrative and financial shortcomings facing municipalities regarding 
their ability to provide basic services will challenge municipalities in their endeavours for 
local economic development.  While they have powers to formulate local economic 
development plans, they do not have the control over, or access to, resources necessary to 
implement plans.   
 
The principle of local economic development is integral to the transfer of authority to local 
government.  The White Paper on Local Government (1998) envisaged that local government 
would facilitate local economic development by mobilizing both people and local resources.  
The chapter on political decentralisation demonstrated that ward committees are the primary 
avenue for public participation at local government level but they remain predominantly 
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An area for further investigation is the relationship between access to basic services and local 
economic development.  A common argument is that the role of local government is to 
alleviate poverty through the use of LEDs.  This will  
eradicate poverty by generating more jobs, free up fiscal resources for poverty 





To date, there is no data on the impact of the provision of free basic municipal services on 
either human development or on economic development.  The World Health Organization 
and UNICEF argue that the health and social benefits associated with access to basic services 
outweigh the immediate and largely irrecoverable financial costs of public service delivery.
710
 
It is argued that as long as people have no access to basic services, there can be no income 
generation, poverty alleviation or local economic development. The assumption is that access 
to basic services will improve peoples‟ living conditions, making them economically active 
which, in turn, will lead to economic development, resulting in users being able to afford user 
fees, and therefore in government being able to recover costs. However, this is a 
questionable, if not oversimplified, assumption.  It ignores the importance of having basic 
service infrastructure in place.  It is doubtful whether local economic development can take 
place when there is a lack of access to service infrastructure.  This thesis argues that the 
severity of remaining service delivery backlogs places pressure on economic infrastructure.  
Poor access and connectivity is widespread making the provision of basic services difficult.  
Under such circumstances, it is difficult to attract investment.   
 
Service delivery backlogs continue to be a fundamental challenge for municipalities.  The 
majority of national revenue transfers to local government is earmarked for service delivery, 
leaving municipalities with limited financial discretion to pursue independent local economic 
development.  Such fiscal restraints limit local government development planning, and 
explain why municipalities‟ IDPs are more a list of basic service delivery needs as opposed to 
proposals for local economic development.   
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According to the legislative framework, local governments should become the drivers for 
local economic development so that they become less dependent on national government.  
However, LED requires local skills to direct economic investment.    Despite these 
limitations, local governments have been assigned the responsibility for local economic 
development.  One of the central tenets of this thesis is that the pursuit of local economic 
development is too ambitious as long as municipalities are incapable of providing sustainable 
basic services.  Many local economic development projects have failed or are unsustainable 
because cash-strapped municipalities do not have the resources to maintain such projects.
711
  
Projects require municipalities to provide service delivery infrastructure, and when such 
projects fail, municipal infrastructure often becomes redundant.  
 
This chapter has identified and discussed a number of unresolved governance issues: the 
argument is that these contribute to the basic service delivery problems of municipalities.  It 
is proposed here that it is unrealistic to expect municipalities to be the drivers of economic 
development as long as municipalities are confronted by the basic service delivery challenges 
as well as by the broader governance problems discussed throughout this thesis.   
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8.5 Closing Comments  
 
This thesis has shown that local government is far from being a capable and autonomous 
sphere of government.  A number of underlying factors were identified by exploring the 
political, administrative and financial dimensions of decentralisation. What has been 
illustrated is that municipalities in South Africa face widespread capacity shortages.  The 
majority are in a financially precarious situation, faced with limited, underutilised and 
diminishing revenue potential.  It is undeniable that expertise is lacking; cost recovery is 
insufficient; and that financial management remains inadequate.   
 
This study has also demonstrated that one of the significant challenges of basic service 
delivery remains establishing an appropriate working relationship between the three spheres 
of government.    This should be a relationship based on cooperative governance where each 
sphere is treated with respect and regarded as an autonomous entity and where the local 
sphere is not regarded as subservient to either the provincial or national sphere of 
government.   
 
Development planning must be aligned across the three spheres of government. This has 
brought to the fore the dual challenge of increasing local government autonomy while 
maintaining central control.  The pursuit of decentralisation in South Africa requires 
balancing the transfer of powers and functions with the need to coordinate service delivery 
across all spheres of government, while establishing appropriate structures and avenues for 
cooperative intergovernmental relations. 
 
A key overall challenge for intergovernmental relations is achieving an appropriate balance 
of power.  Although there is a need for central and provincial oversight, the intention of the 
Constitution is that such oversight be directed at supporting and assisting local government.  
The system of intergovernmental relations in South Africa is not conducive to cooperative 
governance, but appears in practice to be hierarchical.  While it is understandable that central 
government should provide the legislative framework as well as oversee and evaluate service 
delivery, it has a constitutional obligation to support local government to become 
autonomous and capable sub-national units of government in all three areas:  political, 
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As it stands, the design of the intergovernmental governance system does not promote the 
objectives of decentralisation.  It does not empower local government to become more 
distinctive and autonomous.  The problem in many cases is not what to decentralise or 
whether a basic service should be provided by national, provincial or local government, but 
rather how to align shared rule or concurrency of the particular service among the various 
levels of government.  How this is put into effect is something that cannot be legislated for. 
 
Some of the service delivery problems do emanate from municipal incompetence, corruption 
and insufficient capacity.  However, this study concludes that the ineffectiveness of 
municipalities goes beyond such human failings.  The system of decentralised governance in 
South Africa has set up a range of intergovernmental relations that fluctuate between 
devolving autonomous responsibilities and delegating responsibilities that are inconsistent 
and vary from being highly prescriptive to being vague and ambiguous.  Such a structural 
arrangement makes local government autonomy indistinct.   
 
Insight into the nature of decentralisation in South Africa offers a different view of some of 
the current policy implementation issues facing local government.  The manner in which 
local government has been delivering basic services has been influenced by the division of 
powers and functions as well as resources across the three spheres of government in a system 
that perpetuates hierarchical intergovernmental relations. 
 
By separating decentralisation into three conceptual areas, this study was able to demonstrate 
that local government autonomy exists in some respects and not in others.  It identified the 
limitations on local government autonomy, and some of the causes underlying this lack of 
autonomy by exploring what has been decentralised and what remains under central control.  
This study fills a gap in the literature on local government in South Africa by having 
developed a means of exploring to what extent the problems of municipalities in providing 
basic services are influenced by the political, administrative and financial configuration of the 
decentralised system of governance.   
 
The general intention of decentralisation is to share power, resources and responsibilities with 
sub-national levels of government.  The question often posed in the literature is how one 
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designs an optimal system of decentralisation.
712
  There is no template for successful 
decentralisation, nor was it the objective of this study to design one.  Grindle aptly points out 
that there is no right strategy or design for decentralisation.
713
  However, this thesis has 
shown that there are elements of design that can promote the devolution of local authority 
whereas others can impede or thwart local government autonomy. 
 
Decentralisation is not presented here as an alternative to centralisation.  This thesis does, 
however, identify the structural and procedural characteristics in the overall framework for 
decentralisation and argues that these further one‟s understanding of the existing 
shortcomings in service delivery that are confronting municipalities. The relationship 
between centralisation and decentralisation is South Africa is more complex than it might 
appear.  It is not realistic to have either a fully centralised or fully decentralised system of 
government.  Both options of centralised and decentralised government have relative 
advantages in their ability to deliver public services.  The optimal governance system is one 
that combines the strengths of both while avoiding universal central autonomy.   
 
While this study cannot conclusively report on the impact of decentralisation on basic service 
delivery in South Africa, it does identify some of the systemic and structural aspects that 
impact on the manner in which local municipalities provide basic services.  It raises concerns 
that the basic service delivery obligations of local municipalities are strenuous and 
challenging, and will continue to be so long as local municipalities rely on or are controlled 
by other spheres of government in meeting their constitutional mandate. 
 
The implementation of decentralisation in reality in South Africa contradicts the normative 
objectives of decentralisation as embodied in the legislative policy framework.  There is a 
marked divergence between what the central government decentralises in a formal and legal 
sense, and what is experienced in practical terms.  The challenge for sustainable basic service 
delivery at local government level in South Africa is for central government to better align 
the political, administrative and financial dimensions of decentralisation so that local 
municipalities can be supported and assisted in becoming autonomous and self-sufficient sub-
national units of government.  
                                        
712
 Sharma, C.K.(2005). When Does Decentralisation Deliver? The Dilemma of Design.  In 
South Asian Journal of Socio-Political Studies.  Volume 6(1).  Pp. 38-45. 
713
 Grindle, M. (2007). Going Local.  Princeton:  Princeton University Press. 
 
 
Page | 279 
 
In closing, this thesis has demonstrated that decentralisation in South Africa encompasses a 
mixture of political, administrative and financial intergovernmental relationships.  Each of 
these dimensions takes on forms of deconcentration, delegation and devolution.  The overall 
finding of this study is that the ability of municipalities to provide sustainable basic services 
autonomously depends on the interaction between the three different forms of 
decentralisation within each of the three dimensions of decentralisation.  While there may be 
no optimal design for decentralised governance in South Africa, there is a need to consider 
the interdependency of the political, administrative and financial powers and functions of the 
sphere of local government in order to make it both autonomous and viable. 
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APPENDIX 1:   Structures of Governance 
 
 National Government  
Legislative Authority 
Parliament:   
Comprises the National Assembly (NA) and the National 
Council of Provinces (NCOP). The National Assembly is made 
up of members of Parliament, elected every five years.  
The NCOP was set up to ensure that provincial and local 
government are directly represented in Parliament. It is made up 
of representatives of provincial legislatures and local government. 
Each province has a set number of permanent and rotating 
representatives. The NCOP has to debate and vote on any law or 
policy that affects provincial or local government.  
Executive Authority 
The President is elected by Parliament and appoints a Cabinet of 
Ministers. They act as the executive committee of government 




 Provincial Government  
Legislative Authority 
Provincial Legislature: 30-90 Members of Provincial 




Premier (elected by the Legislature) 
Members of the Executive Council (MECs) appointed by the 
Premier to be the political heads of each provincial department.  
Director-General heads provincial government (public servant)  




 Local Government  
Legislative Authority 
Category C municipalities:  
Council comprises of 60% Ward Councillors & 40% Proportional 
Representation elected locally (every five years). 
Category A and B municipalities: 
Council comprises of 50% Ward Councillors & 50% Proportional 
Representation elected locally (every five years). 
Municipal Subcommittees 
Executive Authority 
Mayor (elected by Council). 
Executive Committee (elected by council). 
or Mayoral Committee (appointed by mayor). 
Oversees work of the Municipal Manager and department heads. 
In some very small municipalities the whole Council forms the 
executive – this is called a Plenary Executive. 
Municipal Manager appointed by Executive/Mayoral Council; 
responsible for employing staff and co-ordinating them to 
implement all programmes approved by council. 
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APPENDIX 2:   Extracts from the Municipal Structures Act (Act 117 of 1998) on 
   the Composition of Category A, B & C Councils 
 
Section 22:   Election of Metropolitan and Local Councils 
1. The council of a metropolitan or local municipality consists of councillors elected in 
accordance with Schedule 1- 
(a) by voters registered on that municipality's segment of the national common voters 
roll, to proportionally represent the parties that contested the election in that 
municipality; and 
 (b) by voters registered on that municipality's segment of the national common voters 
roll in the respective wards in that municipality, to directly represent the wards.   
2. The number of ward councillors in a metropolitan or local council referred to in  
subsection (1) (b) must be equal to 50 per cent of the number of councillors 
determined for the municipality in terms of section 20. If the number of councillors 
determined in terms of section 20 is an uneven number, the fraction must be rounded 
off upwards.  
 
Section 23:   Election and Appointment of District Councils 
1. The council of a district municipality consists of- 
a) councillors elected in accordance with Part 1 of Schedule 2 by voters registered on 
that municipality's segment of the national common voters roll, to proportionally 
represent the parties that contested the election in that district municipality; 
b) councillors appointed in accordance with Schedule 2 by the councils of the 
respective local municipalities within that district municipality, to directly 
represent those local municipalities; and 
c)  if the district municipality has a district management area, councillors elected in 
accordance with Part 1 of Schedule 2 by voters registered on that district 
municipality's segment of the national common voters roll in that area, to 
proportionally represent the parties that contested the election in that area. 
2. The number of councillors representing local municipalities and district management 
areas in a district council referred to in subsection (1) (b) and (c) must be- 
a) equal to 60 per cent (fractions to be disregarded) of the number of councillors 
determined for the municipality in terms of section 20 before any increase in 
terms of  section 20 (5), plus the increase; and  
b) allocated to the respective local councils and district management areas in 
accordance with Part 2 of Schedule 2. 
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APPENDIX 3:   2004 and 2009 National Election Results 
 




2009 National Election Result 
 
 




Page | 301 
APPENDIX 4: Survey on Access to Basic Services in the Msunduzi Municipality  
   2005 and 2009 Survey Results 
Below are graphs illustrating my survey results on the perceptions of Ward Committee Meetings in 
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2009 Survey Results 
Below are graphs illustrating my survey results of the perceptions of Ward Committee 
Meetings in Msunduzi Municipality done by myself during 2009.  The survey sample size 
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APPENDIX 5:  Schedule 4:  Functional Areas of Concurrent National and  
   Provincial Legislative Competence (The Constitution of South  
   Africa.  Act 108 of 1998). 
 
 
Schedule 4  Part A  
 Administration of indigenous forests  
 Agriculture  
 Airports other than international and national airports  
 Animal control and diseases  
 Casinos, racing, gambling and wagering, excluding lotteries and sports pools  
 Consumer protection  
 Cultural matters  
 Disaster management  
 Education at all levels, excluding tertiary education  
 Environment  
 Health services  
 Housing  
 Indigenous law and customary law, subject to Chapter 12 of the Constitution  
 Industrial promotion  
 Language policy and the regulation of official languages to the extent that the 
provisions of Section 6 of the Constitution expressly confer upon the provincial 
legislatures legislative competence  
 Media services directly controlled or provided by the provincial government, subject 
to Section 192  
 Nature conservation, excluding national parks, national botanical gardens and marine 
resources  
 Police to the extent that the provisions of Chapter 11 of the Constitution confer upon 
the provincial legislatures legislative competence  
 Pollution control  
 Population development  
 Property transfer fees  
 Provincial public enterprises in respect of the functional areas in this Schedule and 
Schedule 5  
 Public transport  
 Public works only in respect of the needs of provincial government departments in the 
discharge of their responsibilities to administer functions specifically assigned to them 
in terms of the Constitution or any other law  
 Regional planning and development  
 Road traffic regulation  
 Soil conservation  
 Tourism  
 Trade  
 Traditional leadership, subject to Chapter 12 of the Constitution  
 Urban and rural development  
 Vehicle licensing  
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Schedule 4:  Part B 
 
 The following local government matters to the extent set out in section 155(6)(a) 
and (7):  
 Air pollution  
 Building regulations  
 Child care facilities  
 Electricity and gas reticulation  
 Firefighting services  
 Local tourism  
 Municipal airports  
 Municipal planning  
 Municipal health services  
 Municipal public transport  
 Municipal public works only in respect of the needs of municipalities in the 
discharge of their responsibilities to administer functions specifically assigned to 
them under this Constitution or any other law  
 Pontoons, ferries, jetties, piers and harbours, excluding the regulation of 
international and national shipping and matters related thereto  
 Stormwater management systems in built-up areas  
 Trading regulations  
 Water and sanitation services limited to potable water supply systems and 
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APPENDIX 6: Schedule 5:  Functional Areas of Exclusive Provincial Legislative 
   Competence 
 
Schedule 5  Part A 
 Abattoirs  
 Ambulance services  
 Archives other than national archives  
 Libraries other than national libraries  
 Liquor licences  
 Museums other than national museums  
 Provincial planning  
 Provincial cultural matters  
 Provincial recreation and amenities  
 Provincial sport  
 Provincial roads and traffic  
 Veterinary services, excluding regulation of the profession  
 
Schedule 5  Part B 
The following local government matters to the extent set out for provinces in section 
155(6)(a) and (7):  
 Beaches and amusement facilities  
 Billboards and the display of advertisements in public places  
 Cemeteries, funeral parlours and crematoria  
 Cleansing  
 Control of public nuisances  
 Control of undertakings that sell liquor to the public  
 Facilities for the accommodation, care and burial of animals  
 Fencing and fences  
 Licensing of dogs  
 Licensing and control of undertakings that sell food to the public  
 Local amenities  
 Local sport facilities  
 Markets  
 Municipal abattoirs  
 Municipal parks and recreation  
 Municipal roads  
 Noise pollution  
 Pounds  
 Public places  
 Refuse removal, refuse dumps and solid waste disposal  
 Street trading  
 Street lighting  
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APPENDIX 7:    Basic Sanitation Alternatives 
Unimproved pit toilet (below RDP level):  
A top structure over a pit. Costs vary. 
Ventilated improved pit (VIP) toilet: 
A top structure over a pit, vented by a pipe with a fly screen. The pit may be lined or unlined 
depending on soil conditions. Costs start at R600 to build and R60 per year to empty the 
waste if emptied once in five years. 
Ventilated improved double pit (VIDP) toilet:  
A single top structure over two shallow pits side by side. Only one pit is in use at a time and 
each is vented by a pipe with a fly screen. Pits are generally lined and the central wall is 
sealed. Costs begin at R2500 to install and R35 per year to operate and maintain. 
Composting toilets, including urine diversion and desiccating systems:  
A single top structure over a sealed container with access for removal of composted waste. 
Urine may be diverted and a vent pipe helps dry the waste. Costs begin at R3000 for 
commercial systems and operation and maintenance costs at R35 per year. 
Pour-flush latrine or aqua-privy:  
A toilet with water-seal. Waste is washed away through a short pipe or chute to a waste 
collecting and soakaway disposal system. The privy is accepted internationally where users 
squat and water is used for anal cleansing. It fails when people throw unauthorised objects in 
to the toilet, or there is no affordable emptying service. Installation begins at R2000 and 
removal costs at R150 per year. 
Septic tank and soakaway:  
An in-house full flush toilet connected via plumbing to a watertight underground digester 
(settling chamber) with liquids allowed to soak into the ground. Costs to install begin at 
R7000 and annual costs at R200, depending on how often it is emptied. 
Flush toilets with conservancy tanks:  
Waste is flushed into a tank from where it cannot flow into the surrounding environment and 
which must be emptied. Costs depend on the size of tank and how often it is emptied. 
Small bore solids-free sewer:  
An in-house flush toilet discharging to a septic tank where solids settle out. Liquids go 
through a small sewer into a central collection sump or existing sewer. Costs depend on size 
of tank and how often it is emptied. 
Full bore waterborne sewerage:  
An in-house flush toilet which connects to sewer which, in turn, flows to a waste water 
treatment plant. This costs R6000 to install and operating costs are about R400 per year. 
Shallow sewerage:  
An in-house toilet flushed with less water than usual and through smaller pipes at shallower 
levels with on-site inspection chambers. Internationally this saves up to 50% on water use but 
is still being tested in South Africa. 
Chemical toilets:  
Stand-alone units which use chemicals to render excreta harmless and odourless. Expensive 
and generally used as temporary. Most authorities are trying to discontinue their use. 
Bucket toilet (unhygienic and not recommended):  
A top structure with a seat over a bucket. The bucket is periodically removed and contents 
disposed of. Widely used but poses health risk to collectors. Most authorities are trying to 
discontinue these - and they are expensive to operate and maintain. 
Communal toilets (not recommended for household use):  
Toilet blocks may be based on wet or dry systems. These require regular cleaning and 
maintenance. 
Source: Adapted from the Department of Water Affairs and Forestry.  (2002).  Sanitation for a Healthy Nation 
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APPENDIX 8:   Free Basic Service Levels 
 
Service Areas Service Levels 
Free Basic Water 6kl per household of 8 people per month. 
Provided through: 
 Communal standpipes 
 Rudimentary systems (hand pumps, boreholes etc) 
 Prepaid communal street tap 
 Low pressure trickle feed yard tank 
 Low pressure manually operated yard tank 
 Low pressure regulated yard tank 
 Medium pressure manually operated roof tank 
 Medium pressure regulated roof tank 
 Full pressure conventional house connection 
 Full pressure prepaid house connection 
Free Basic Electricity An amount of 50 kWh per month. 
Provided through:  
 Grid 
 Non Grid (Energy Alternatives) 
Free Basic Sanitation Provide through: 
 Ventilated Improved Pit Toilet (VIP) 
 Ventilated Improved Double Pit Toilet 
 Urine Diversion Toilet 
 Septic tank 
 Shallow sewerage 
 Full water borne sewerage 
Source:  Adapted from the Department of Provincial and Local Government.  (2005)  Guidelines for the 
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APPENDIX 9:  Extracts from the Constitution (Act 108 of 1996) Regarding Fiscal 
   Decentralisation  
214. Equitable shares and allocations of revenue  
1. An Act of Parliament must provide for   
a. the equitable division of revenue raised nationally among the national, 
provincial and local spheres of government;  
b. the determination of each province's equitable share of the provincial share of 
that revenue; and  
c. any other allocations to provinces, local government or municipalities from 
the national government's share of that revenue, and any conditions on which 
those allocations may be made.  
2. The Act referred to in subsection (1) may be enacted only after the provincial 
governments, organised local government and the Financial and Fiscal Commission 
have been consulted, and any recommendations of the Commission have been 
considered, and must take into account   
a. the national interest;  
b. any provision that must be made in respect of the national debt and other 
national obligations;  
c. the needs and interests of the national government, determined by objective 
criteria;  
d. the need to ensure that the provinces and municipalities are able to provide 
basic services and perform the functions allocated to them;  
e. the fiscal capacity and efficiency of the provinces and municipalities;  
f. developmental and other needs of provinces, local government and 
municipalities;  
g. economic disparities within and among the provinces;  
h. obligations of the provinces and municipalities in terms of national legislation;  
i. the desirability of stable and predictable allocations of revenue shares; and  
j. the need for flexibility in responding to emergencies or other temporary needs, 
and other factors based on similar objective criteria.  
215. National, provincial and municipal budgets  
1. National, provincial and municipal budgets and budgetary processes must promote 
transparency, accountability and the effective financial management of the economy, 
debt and the public sector.  
2. National legislation must prescribe   
a. the form of national, provincial and municipal budgets;  
b. when national and provincial budgets must be tabled; and  
c. that budgets in each sphere of government must show the sources of revenue 
and the way in which proposed expenditure will comply with national 
legislation.  
3. Budgets in each sphere of government must contain   
a. estimates of revenue and expenditure, differentiating between capital and 
current expenditure;  
b. proposals for financing any anticipated deficit for the period to which they 
apply; and  
 
 
Page | 309 
c. an indication of intentions regarding borrowing and other forms of public 
liability that will increase public debt during the ensuing year.  
216. Treasury control  
1. National legislation must establish a national treasury and prescribe measures to 
ensure both transparency and expenditure control in each sphere of government, by 
introducing   
a. generally recognised accounting practice;  
b. uniform expenditure classifications; and  
c. uniform treasury norms and standards.  
2. The national treasury must enforce compliance with the measures established in terms 
of subsection (1), and may stop the transfer of funds to an organ of state if that organ 
of state commits a serious or persistent material breach of those measures.  
217. Procurement  
1. When an organ of state in the national, provincial or local sphere of government, or 
any other institution identified in national legislation, contracts for goods or services, 
it must do so in accordance with a system which is fair, equitable, transparent, 
competitive and cost-effective.  
2. Subsection (1) does not prevent the organs of state or institutions referred to in that 
subsection from implementing a procurement policy providing for   
a. categories of preference in the allocation of contracts; and  
b. the protection or advancement of persons, or categories of persons, 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination.  
3. National legislation must prescribe a framework within which the policy referred to in 
subsection (2) must be implemented.  
219. Remuneration of persons holding public office  
1. An Act of Parliament must establish a framework for determining-  
a. the salaries, allowances and benefits of members of the National Assembly, 
permanent delegates to the National Council of Provinces, members of the 
Cabinet, Deputy Ministers, traditional leaders and members of any councils of 
traditional leaders; and  
b. the upper limit of salaries, allowances or benefits of members of provincial 
legislatures, members of Executive Councils and members of Municipal 
Councils of the different categories.  
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Financial and Fiscal Commission  
220. Establishment and functions  
1. There is a Financial and Fiscal Commission for the Republic which makes 
recommendations envisaged in this Chapter, or in national legislation, to Parliament, 
provincial legislatures and any other authorities determined by national legislation.  
2. The Commission is independent and subject only to the Constitution and the law, and 
must be impartial.  
3. The Commission must function in terms of an Act of Parliament and, in performing 
its functions, must consider all relevant factors, including those listed in section 
214(2).  
221. Appointment and tenure of members  
1. The Commission consists of the following women and men appointed by the 
President, as head of the national executive:  
a. A chairperson and deputy chairperson;  
b. three persons selected, after consulting the Premiers, from a list compiled in 
accordance with a process prescribed by national legislation;  
c. two persons selected, after consulting organised local government, from a list 
compiled in accordance with a process prescribed national legislation; and  
d. two other persons.  
2. Members of the Commission must have appropriate expertise.  
3. Members serve for a term established in terms of national legislation. The President 
may remove a member from office on the ground of misconduct, incapacity or 
incompetence.  
Provincial and Local Financial Matters  
226. Provincial Revenue Funds  
1. There is a Provincial Revenue Fund for each province into which all money received 
by the provincial government must be paid, except money reasonably excluded by an 
Act of Parliament.  
2. Money may be withdrawn from a Provincial Revenue Fund only   
a. in terms of an appropriation by a provincial Act; or  
b. as a direct charge against the Provincial Revenue Fund, when it is provided for 
in the Constitution or a provincial Act.  
3. Revenue allocated through a province to local government in that province in terms of 
section 214(1), is a direct charge against that province's Revenue Fund.  
4. National legislation may determine a framework within which-  
a. a provincial Act may in terms of subsection (2) (b) authorise the withdrawal of 
money as a direct charge against a Provincial Revenue Fund; and  
b. revenue allocated through a province to local government in that province in 
terms of subsection (3) must be paid to municipalities in the province.  
227. National sources of provincial and local government funding  
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1. Local government and each province   
a. is entitled to an equitable share of revenue raised nationally to enable it to 
provide basic services and perform the functions allocated to it; and  
b. may receive other allocations from national government revenue, either 
conditionally or unconditionally.  
2. Additional revenue raised by provinces or municipalities may not be deducted from 
their share of revenue raised nationally, or from other allocations made to them out of 
national government revenue. Equally, there is no obligation on the national 
government to compensate provinces or municipalities that do not raise revenue 
commensurate with their fiscal capacity and tax base.  
3. A province's equitable share of revenue raised nationally must be transferred to the 
province promptly and without deduction, except when the transfer has been stopped 
in terms of section 216. 
4. A province must provide for itself any resources that it requires, in terms of a 
provision of its provincial constitution, that are additional to its requirements 
envisaged in the Constitution.  
228. Provincial taxes  
1. A provincial legislature may impose   
a. taxes, levies and duties other than income tax, value-added tax, general sales 
tax, rates on property or customs duties; and  
b. b. flat-rate surcharges on any tax, levy or duty that is imposed by national 
legislation, other than on corporate income tax, value-added tax, rates on 
property or custom duties. 
2. The power of a provincial legislature to impose taxes, levies, duties and surcharges   
a. may not be exercised in a way that materially and unreasonably prejudices 
national economic policies, economic activities across provincial boundaries, 
or the national mobility of goods, services, capital or labour; and  
b. must be regulated in terms of an Act of Parliament, which may be enacted 
only after any recommendations of the Financial and Fiscal Commission have 
been considered.  
229. Municipal fiscal powers and functions  
A Municipal Council may not delegate the passing of by-laws; budgeting; the imposition of 
rates, taxes, levies and duties; nor the raising of loans.
714
   
1. Subject to subsections (2), (3) and (4), a municipality may impose   
a. rates on property and surcharges on fees for services provided by or on behalf 
of the municipality; and  
b. if authorised by national legislation, other taxes, levies and duties appropriate 
to local government or to the category of local government into which that 
municipality falls, but no municipality may impose income tax, value-added 
tax, general sales tax or customs duty.  
2. The power of a municipality to impose rates on property, surcharges on fees for 
services provided by or on behalf of the municipality, or other taxes, levies or duties   
                                        
714
 Section 160(2) of the Constitution of South Africa.  Act 108 of 1996. 
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a. may not be exercised in a way that materially and unreasonably prejudices 
national economic policies, economic activities across municipal boundaries, 
or the national mobility of goods, services, capital or labour; and  
b. may be regulated by national legislation.  
3. When two municipalities have the same fiscal powers and functions with regard to the 
same area, an appropriate division of those powers and functions must be made in 
terms of national legislation. The division may be made only after taking into account 
at least the following criteria:  
a. The need to comply with sound principles of taxation.  
b. The powers and functions performed by each municipality.  
c. The fiscal capacity of each municipality.  
d. The effectiveness and efficiency of raising taxes, levies and duties.  
e. Equity.  
4. Nothing in this section precludes the sharing of revenue raised in terms of this section 
between municipalities that have fiscal power and functions in the same area.  
5. National legislation envisaged in this section may be enacted only after organised 
local government and the Financial and Fiscal Commission have been consulted, and 
any recommendations of the Commission have been considered.  
230. Provincial and municipal loans  
1. A province may raise loans for capital or current expenditure in accordance with 
national legislation, but loans for current expenditure may be raised only when 
necessary for bridging purposes during a fiscal year.  
2. National legislation referred to in subsection (1) may be enacted only after any 
recommendations of the Financial and Fiscal Commission have been considered.  
230A. Municipal loans 
1. A Municipal Council may, in accordance with national legislation-  
a. raise loans for capital or current expenditure for the municipality, but loans for 
current expenditure may be raised only when necessary for bridging purposes 
during a fiscal year; and  
b. bind itself and a future Council in the exercise of its legislative and executive 
authority to secure loans or investments for the municipality. 
2. National legislation referred to in subsection (1) may be enacted only after any 
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APPENDIX 10:   Intergovernmental Transfers to Local Government 2003/04 -  
   2009/10
715
 
R Million 2003/4  2006/07 2009/10 
Equitable Share  6 624 18 421 31 011 
  Equitable Share 6 350 18 058 30 156 
  Water services operating subsidy 273 363 855 
Municipal Infrastructure Grant 2 323 5 809 10 330 
Other direct transfers: 364 909 3 922 
  Integrated national electrification programme 245 391 897 
  Public transport infrastructure and systems grant - 518 2 325 
  Neighbourhood development partnership grant - - 700 
  Building for sports & recreation programme grant 119 - - 
2010 FIFA World Cup - 600 1400 
Infrastructure: Indirect Transfers 2 727 1 333 2 741 
  Water services operating subsidy grant 817 440 - 
  Community based public works programme grant 12 - - 
  Implementation of water services projects (capital) 112 - - 
  Integrated national electrification programme 796 893 1 421 
  Backlogs in water & sanitation at clinics & schools - - 350 
  Backlogs in the electrification of clinics & schools - - 150 
  Neighbourhood development partnership grant                      - - 170 
Capacity Building 998 664 500 
  Municipal systems improvement programme grant 150 200 200 
  Local government restructuring grant 539 265 - 
  Local government financial management grant 280 145 300 
Other Recurrent Transfers - - 488 
FIFA World Cup host city operating grant - - 488 
Total 13 036 27 736 50 392 
  
                                        
715
 Division of Revenue Act (2009). 
 
 
Page | 314 
 
 












2003/04 50.8% 17.8% 2.8% - 20.9% 7.7% 
2004/05 50.3% 28.9% 2.1% - 13.7% 4.9% 
2005/06 53.4% 29.6% 2.9% - 10.6% 3.6% 
2006/07 67.9% 21.4% 3.3% - 4.9% 2.4% 
2007/08 54% 21% 4.5% 11.7% 6.5% 2.4% 
2008/09 58.3% 19.6% 9.4% 6.6% 5.2% 1% 
2009/10 62.1% 20.7% 7.9% 2.8% 5.5% 1% 




                                        
716
 Is conditionally allocated to other infrastructure programmes related to transport, 
electricification, neighbourhood development and sports.   
717
 Refers to conditional infrastructure grants targetting public works programmes as well as 
backlogs eradication at schools and clinics.   
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APPENDIX 11:   Conditional Grants  
 







To modernize large municipalities and to make them more effective 
and efficient service delivery authorities through assisting them to 
restructure their organisations, functions and fiscal positions.  National 
government will support municipal plans to the extent that they offer 





The grant supports implementation of municipal restructuring 
exercises necessary to avoid financial distress and any risks to the 
national fiscus.  It will be incorporated into the equitable share 
following an assessment that large municipalities are on a sustainable 
growth trajectory. 
 
Implementation of Water Services Projects 
Transferring 
Department 




To fund bulk connection and internal infrastructure for basic water 
services schemes for low-income households.  The allocation will be 
used to address that backlog in water sanitation and with water supply 
being provided at a community level on the basis of 25 litres of water 
per day per capita and sanitation at household levels on the basis of a 




The purpose of this allocation is to provide the capital expenditure 
required to address the backlog in basic water supply and sanitation to 
low-income household.  This backlog is being addressed by an on-
going multi-year programme that commenced in 1994 and is projected 
to continue to 2007. 
 
Consolidated Municipal Infrastructure Programme 
Transferring 
Department 
Department of Provincial and Local Government 
Purpose 
 
To provide internal bulk, connector and internal infrastructure and 





This is a specific capital transfer focused on the national policy 
priority of ensuring all South Africans have access to at least a basic 
level of municipal services.  Through CMIP Government directly 
support the Integrated and Sustainable Rural Development Strategy 
(ISRDS) and the Urban Renewal Strategy (URS) as well as the 
Housing Programme.  CMIP also demonstrates to municipalities how 
to implement infrastructure projects to achieve developmental 
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outcomes as well as new innovations that could be more effective and 
efficient to both municipality and community. 
 
Local Economic Development and Social Plan Measures Grant 
Transferring 
Department 
Department of Provincial and Local Government 
Purpose 
 
To support planning and implementation of job creation and poverty 
alleviation projects.  The following conditions apply: 
- The projects/business opportunity studies identified by 
municipalities must meet the criteria of the LED and Social 
Plan Measure Grant. 
- The projects/study business plans will act as a contract between 
the Department of Provincial and Local Government and the 
municipality. 
- Municipalities must submit monthly reports in terms of the 
Division of Revenue Act 201 and the Poverty Alleviation 
reporting requirements. 
- Number of business opportunity studies completed. 
- Number of short-term jobs created. 
- Number of long-term jobs created. 
- Person days of accredited/unaccredited training. 
Business, infrastructure developed, for example, business hives, arts 





The development mandate for municipalities to promote social and 
economic development is relatively new.  The LED and Social Plan 
Measures Grant is, therefore, a policy instrument in re-directing local 
government towards developmental outcomes. 
The establishment of the grant is intended to address large-scale job 
losses within the country and the targeting of poverty through the 
Poverty Alleviation Fund. 
 
Community Based Public Works Programme 
Transferring 
Department 
Department of Public Works 
Purpose 
 
Creation of community assets in rural disadvantages communities and 
empowerment of the communities to manage the facilities in co-
operation with the local municipality.  Employment of community 





A conditional grant is necessary in order to ensure that appropriate 
facilities are created within target communities, that proper 
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Urban Transport Fund 
Transferring 
Department 
Department of Transport 
Purpose 
 
To promote the planning of intermodal land transport infrastructure 
and operations, the facilitation of integrated land use and land 
transport planning, the development of guidelines in this regard and to 






National priorities are determined annually based on the National 
Department Business Poland. 
 
Building for Sport and Recreation Programme 
Transferring 
Department 
Department of Sport and Recreation 
Purpose 
 
Promotion of sport and recreation within disadvantaged communities 
by development of new and upgrading of existing sports facilities and 
empowerment of the communities to manage the facilities in 
cooperation with the local municipality.  Employment of community 






A conditional grant is necessary in order to ensure: 
- That appropriate facilities are created within target 
communities; 
- That proper sustainability planning takes place; 
- That municipalities and communities are empowered to 
promote sport; and 
- That employment targets are met.  
 
 
Water supply and water-borne sewerage disposal schemes 
Transferring 
Department 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
Purpose To honour existing subsidy commitments in terms of Government 
Notice (GN) No. 1341 of 30 June 1989 (as amended) and GN No. 247 
of 6 February 1987 (as amended) to municipalities who have installed 
water services works and obtained approval for subsidies in terms of 




This is a specific capital transfer to meet historical obligations.  At 
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Water Services Operating Subsidy 
Transferring 
Department 
Department of Water Affairs and Forestry 
Purpose 
 
To augment the Water Trading Account on the Department of Water 
Affairs and Forestry and thus provide subsidies to users of water 
schemes that are directly operated by the department. 
As water service provision is a functional competence of local 
government, the department is preparing to transfer these schemes, 
with associated staff and subsidies to municipalities.  This transfer will 
be converted into a conditional grant in the medium term to facilitate 




The grant will facilitate the transfer of water services schemes to 
municipalities, following which they will be incorporated into the 
equitable share. 
 
National Electrification Programme 
Transferring 
Department 
Department of Minerals and Energy 




To implement the national electrification programmes through 
providing capital subsidies to municipalities to: 
- Accelerate the electrification of permanently occupied 
residential dwellings that are situated in legally authorized 
areas set of by Local Government for formal or informal 
permanent settlement in designated township development 
areas where Eskom does not supply electricity. 
- Maximize the number of new connections in the furtherance of 
electrification in historically under-supplied areas. 
- Contribute towards leveling the playing field between Eskom 








Land Restitution, Land Reform and Land Tenure Grant 
Transferring 
Department 




To transfer funds or assets to municipalities for the development of 





This is a specific capital transfer to assist municipalities to develop 
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Local Government Financial Management Grant 
Transferring 
Department 
Department of National Treasury 
Purpose To promote and support reforms to municipal management practices, 
including the modernisation of budgeting, financial management, 




Due to the critical need to develop municipal financial capacity as the 
foundation upon which other reforms can be built. 
 
 
Municipal Systems Improvement Programme 
Transferring 
Department 
Department of Provincial and Local Government 
Purpose To support municipalities in implementing new systems as provided 
for in the Municipal Systems Act, 2000, including integrated 
development planning, performance management, and related local 
public sector management reforms, which must be within that 
municipality‟s budgetary framework.  In addition, it will also cover 
historical commitments by the Department of Land Affairs from the 




New grant to assist with the implementation of the Municipal Systems 
Act, 2000 and develop municipal capacity. 
 
 
Local Government Transformation Grant 
Transferring 
Department 
Department of Provincial and Local Government 
Purpose To assist municipalities with significant once-off costs of 





Specific and conditional funding to meet identified transitional costs. 
 
 




Department of Provincial and Local Government 
Purpose 
 
To assist medium and small municipalities experiencing severe 
financial problems to restructure their financial positions and 





According to section 154 (1) of the Constitution, the national 
government and provincial governments, by legislative and other 
measures, must support and strengthen the capacity of their 
municipalities to manage their own affairs, to exercise their powers 
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2001 11,560,370  
2002 11,859,597 2.6% 
2003 12,142,786 2.4% 
2004 12,415,422 2.2% 
2005 12,676,972 2.1% 
2006 12,929,389 2.0% 
2007 13,171,503 1.9% 
2008 13,412,776 1.8% 
2009 13,654,415 1.8% 
2010 13,901,499 1.8% 
2011 14,155,017 1.8% 
2012 14,416,603 1.8% 
2013 14,689,879 1.9% 
2014 14,975,097 1.9% 
2015 15,274,881 2.0% 
2016 15,587,093 2.0% 
2017 15,913,537 2.1% 
2018 16,256,442 2.2% 
2019 16,614,917 2.2% 
2020 16,989,407 2.3% 




Source:  Adapted from Van Aardt, C. and Lamb, M. (2007).  Population and Household Projections 2001-2021. Bureau of Market 
Research.  University of South Africa.   
 
 
 
